Files
agents_and_robots/tools/file/file.go
T
egutierrez 4e7aa95adb feat: hardening de tools — deny-by-default, SSRF, path traversal, allowlists
Cambios de seguridad en las 4 herramientas de agentes:

- tools/file: deny-by-default (AllowedPaths vacío = todo denegado),
  resolución de symlinks con EvalSymlinks, protección contra path
  traversal (../) y confusión de prefijos (/opt vs /opt1234)
- tools/ssh: nuevo AllowedCommands allowlist (complementa ForbiddenCommands),
  validación de sintaxis shell (bloquea pipes, subshells, redirects, chains)
- tools/http: protección SSRF bloqueando IPs privadas, loopback, link-local,
  metadata (169.254.169.254). Validación de dominio case-insensitive.
- tools/matrix: nuevo parámetro AllowedRooms para restringir rooms destino
- internal/config/schema: AllowedCommands en SSHToolCfg, MatrixToolCfg nueva
- agents/runtime: pasa MatrixToolCfg al constructor de matrix_send

Parte de issue 0019 (prompt injection hardening). Feature flag OFF.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-07 19:17:00 +00:00

108 lines
3.2 KiB
Go

package file
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/enmanuel/agents/internal/config"
"github.com/enmanuel/agents/tools"
)
// NewReadFile creates a read_file tool that reads local files.
// Deny-by-default: if AllowedPaths is empty, all reads are rejected.
// Resolves symlinks and normalizes paths to prevent traversal attacks.
func NewReadFile(cfg config.FileOpsCfg) tools.Tool {
return tools.Tool{
Def: tools.Def{
Name: "read_file",
Description: "Read the contents of a local file.",
Parameters: []tools.Param{
{Name: "path", Type: "string", Description: "Absolute path to the file to read", Required: true},
},
},
Exec: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
path := tools.GetString(args, "path")
if path == "" {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("read_file: path is required")}
}
absPath, err := filepath.Abs(path)
if err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("read_file: %w", err)}
}
if err := validatePath(absPath, cfg.AllowedPaths); err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: err}
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(absPath)
if err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("read_file: %w", err)}
}
// Limit output to 64 KB
content := string(data)
if len(content) > 64*1024 {
content = content[:64*1024] + "\n... (truncated)"
}
return tools.Result{Output: content}
},
}
}
// validatePath checks that absPath is under one of the allowed paths.
// Deny-by-default: if allowedPaths is empty, no paths are allowed.
// Resolves symlinks to prevent traversal via ../ or symlink escapes.
func validatePath(absPath string, allowedPaths []string) error {
if len(allowedPaths) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("read_file: no allowed paths configured, all reads denied")
}
// Resolve symlinks on the requested path to get the real path.
// If the file doesn't exist yet, resolve the parent directory.
realPath, err := resolveReal(absPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read_file: cannot resolve path %q: %w", absPath, err)
}
for _, allowed := range allowedPaths {
a, err := filepath.Abs(allowed)
if err != nil {
continue
}
// Resolve symlinks on the allowed path too.
realAllowed, err := resolveReal(a)
if err != nil {
continue
}
// Ensure the real path is strictly under the allowed directory.
// Add trailing separator to prevent /opt matching /opt1234.
if strings.HasPrefix(realPath, realAllowed+string(filepath.Separator)) || realPath == realAllowed {
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("path %q not under any allowed path", absPath)
}
// resolveReal resolves symlinks for a path.
// If the exact path doesn't exist, it resolves the deepest existing ancestor
// and appends the remaining segments, preventing partial traversal.
func resolveReal(path string) (string, error) {
real, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)
if err == nil {
return filepath.Clean(real), nil
}
// Path doesn't exist — resolve parent and append base.
parent := filepath.Dir(path)
base := filepath.Base(path)
realParent, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(parent)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(realParent, base)), nil
}