4e7aa95adb
Cambios de seguridad en las 4 herramientas de agentes: - tools/file: deny-by-default (AllowedPaths vacío = todo denegado), resolución de symlinks con EvalSymlinks, protección contra path traversal (../) y confusión de prefijos (/opt vs /opt1234) - tools/ssh: nuevo AllowedCommands allowlist (complementa ForbiddenCommands), validación de sintaxis shell (bloquea pipes, subshells, redirects, chains) - tools/http: protección SSRF bloqueando IPs privadas, loopback, link-local, metadata (169.254.169.254). Validación de dominio case-insensitive. - tools/matrix: nuevo parámetro AllowedRooms para restringir rooms destino - internal/config/schema: AllowedCommands en SSHToolCfg, MatrixToolCfg nueva - agents/runtime: pasa MatrixToolCfg al constructor de matrix_send Parte de issue 0019 (prompt injection hardening). Feature flag OFF. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
108 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
108 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
package file
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"github.com/enmanuel/agents/internal/config"
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"github.com/enmanuel/agents/tools"
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)
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// NewReadFile creates a read_file tool that reads local files.
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// Deny-by-default: if AllowedPaths is empty, all reads are rejected.
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// Resolves symlinks and normalizes paths to prevent traversal attacks.
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func NewReadFile(cfg config.FileOpsCfg) tools.Tool {
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return tools.Tool{
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Def: tools.Def{
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Name: "read_file",
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Description: "Read the contents of a local file.",
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Parameters: []tools.Param{
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{Name: "path", Type: "string", Description: "Absolute path to the file to read", Required: true},
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},
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},
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Exec: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
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path := tools.GetString(args, "path")
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if path == "" {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("read_file: path is required")}
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}
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absPath, err := filepath.Abs(path)
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if err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("read_file: %w", err)}
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}
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if err := validatePath(absPath, cfg.AllowedPaths); err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: err}
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}
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data, err := os.ReadFile(absPath)
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if err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("read_file: %w", err)}
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}
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// Limit output to 64 KB
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content := string(data)
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if len(content) > 64*1024 {
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content = content[:64*1024] + "\n... (truncated)"
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}
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return tools.Result{Output: content}
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},
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}
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}
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// validatePath checks that absPath is under one of the allowed paths.
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// Deny-by-default: if allowedPaths is empty, no paths are allowed.
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// Resolves symlinks to prevent traversal via ../ or symlink escapes.
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func validatePath(absPath string, allowedPaths []string) error {
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if len(allowedPaths) == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("read_file: no allowed paths configured, all reads denied")
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}
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// Resolve symlinks on the requested path to get the real path.
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// If the file doesn't exist yet, resolve the parent directory.
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realPath, err := resolveReal(absPath)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("read_file: cannot resolve path %q: %w", absPath, err)
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}
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for _, allowed := range allowedPaths {
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a, err := filepath.Abs(allowed)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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// Resolve symlinks on the allowed path too.
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realAllowed, err := resolveReal(a)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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// Ensure the real path is strictly under the allowed directory.
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// Add trailing separator to prevent /opt matching /opt1234.
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if strings.HasPrefix(realPath, realAllowed+string(filepath.Separator)) || realPath == realAllowed {
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return nil
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}
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("path %q not under any allowed path", absPath)
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}
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// resolveReal resolves symlinks for a path.
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// If the exact path doesn't exist, it resolves the deepest existing ancestor
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// and appends the remaining segments, preventing partial traversal.
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func resolveReal(path string) (string, error) {
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real, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)
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if err == nil {
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return filepath.Clean(real), nil
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}
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// Path doesn't exist — resolve parent and append base.
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parent := filepath.Dir(path)
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base := filepath.Base(path)
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realParent, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(parent)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(realParent, base)), nil
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}
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