Files
agents_and_robots/tools/file/validate.go
T
egutierrez 4ab879e461 feat: agregar write_file, list_directory, append_file, delete_file a tools/file/
Expande el paquete tools/file/ con 4 operaciones nuevas para que los agentes
puedan interactuar con carpetas de trabajo (workspaces, outputs).

Cambios:
- Extraer validatePath() y resolveReal() a validate.go para reutilizarlos
- Agregar validateWritePath() que verifica ReadOnly == false
- write_file: crea/sobreescribe archivos, crea dirs padre, limite 1MB
- list_directory: lista archivos con metadata, modo recursivo, limite 500 entries
- append_file: agrega contenido al final, crea si no existe, limite 10MB total
- delete_file: borra solo archivos (nunca directorios), previene rm -rf accidental
- Registrar las 4 tools nuevas en runtime.go condicionalmente:
  - list_directory: siempre (no requiere escritura)
  - write/append/delete: solo si ReadOnly == false

Seguridad: todas las tools reutilizan validatePath() con deny-by-default,
resolucion de symlinks y proteccion contra path traversal.
2026-04-09 00:21:30 +00:00

68 lines
2.1 KiB
Go

package file
import (
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
// validatePath checks that absPath is under one of the allowed paths.
// Deny-by-default: if allowedPaths is empty, no paths are allowed.
// Resolves symlinks to prevent traversal via ../ or symlink escapes.
func validatePath(absPath string, allowedPaths []string) error {
if len(allowedPaths) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("file: no allowed paths configured, all operations denied")
}
// Resolve symlinks on the requested path to get the real path.
// If the file doesn't exist yet, resolve the parent directory.
realPath, err := resolveReal(absPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("file: cannot resolve path %q: %w", absPath, err)
}
for _, allowed := range allowedPaths {
a, err := filepath.Abs(allowed)
if err != nil {
continue
}
// Resolve symlinks on the allowed path too.
realAllowed, err := resolveReal(a)
if err != nil {
continue
}
// Ensure the real path is strictly under the allowed directory.
// Add trailing separator to prevent /opt matching /opt1234.
if strings.HasPrefix(realPath, realAllowed+string(filepath.Separator)) || realPath == realAllowed {
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("path %q not under any allowed path", absPath)
}
// validateWritePath checks path validity AND that writing is allowed.
func validateWritePath(absPath string, allowedPaths []string, readOnly bool) error {
if readOnly {
return fmt.Errorf("file: write operations denied (read_only mode)")
}
return validatePath(absPath, allowedPaths)
}
// resolveReal resolves symlinks for a path.
// If the exact path doesn't exist, it resolves the deepest existing ancestor
// and appends the remaining segments, preventing partial traversal.
func resolveReal(path string) (string, error) {
real, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)
if err == nil {
return filepath.Clean(real), nil
}
// Path doesn't exist — resolve parent and append base.
parent := filepath.Dir(path)
base := filepath.Base(path)
realParent, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(parent)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(realParent, base)), nil
}