Files
agents_and_robots/tools/http/http.go
T
egutierrez 4e7aa95adb feat: hardening de tools — deny-by-default, SSRF, path traversal, allowlists
Cambios de seguridad en las 4 herramientas de agentes:

- tools/file: deny-by-default (AllowedPaths vacío = todo denegado),
  resolución de symlinks con EvalSymlinks, protección contra path
  traversal (../) y confusión de prefijos (/opt vs /opt1234)
- tools/ssh: nuevo AllowedCommands allowlist (complementa ForbiddenCommands),
  validación de sintaxis shell (bloquea pipes, subshells, redirects, chains)
- tools/http: protección SSRF bloqueando IPs privadas, loopback, link-local,
  metadata (169.254.169.254). Validación de dominio case-insensitive.
- tools/matrix: nuevo parámetro AllowedRooms para restringir rooms destino
- internal/config/schema: AllowedCommands en SSHToolCfg, MatrixToolCfg nueva
- agents/runtime: pasa MatrixToolCfg al constructor de matrix_send

Parte de issue 0019 (prompt injection hardening). Feature flag OFF.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-07 19:17:00 +00:00

199 lines
5.6 KiB
Go

package http
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/enmanuel/agents/internal/config"
"github.com/enmanuel/agents/tools"
)
// NewHTTPGet creates an http_get tool that performs GET requests.
// Validates URLs against cfg.AllowedDomains (deny-by-default if non-empty)
// and blocks requests to internal/private IP ranges (SSRF protection).
func NewHTTPGet(cfg config.HTTPToolCfg) tools.Tool {
timeout := cfg.Timeout
if timeout == 0 {
timeout = 30 * time.Second
}
client := &http.Client{Timeout: timeout}
return tools.Tool{
Def: tools.Def{
Name: "http_get",
Description: "Perform an HTTP GET request to a URL and return the response body.",
Parameters: []tools.Param{
{Name: "url", Type: "string", Description: "The URL to request", Required: true},
},
},
Exec: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
rawURL := tools.GetString(args, "url")
if rawURL == "" {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get: url is required")}
}
if err := validateURL(rawURL, cfg.AllowedDomains); err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get: %w", err)}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get: %w", err)}
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get: %w", err)}
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 64*1024)) // 64 KB limit
if err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get read body: %w", err)}
}
return tools.Result{Output: fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d\n%s", resp.StatusCode, body)}
},
}
}
// NewHTTPPost creates an http_post tool that performs POST requests with a JSON body.
// Validates URLs against cfg.AllowedDomains and blocks internal IPs.
func NewHTTPPost(cfg config.HTTPToolCfg) tools.Tool {
timeout := cfg.Timeout
if timeout == 0 {
timeout = 30 * time.Second
}
client := &http.Client{Timeout: timeout}
return tools.Tool{
Def: tools.Def{
Name: "http_post",
Description: "Perform an HTTP POST request with a JSON body and return the response.",
Parameters: []tools.Param{
{Name: "url", Type: "string", Description: "The URL to request", Required: true},
{Name: "body", Type: "string", Description: "The JSON body to send", Required: true},
},
},
Exec: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
rawURL := tools.GetString(args, "url")
if rawURL == "" {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: url is required")}
}
bodyStr := tools.GetString(args, "body")
if bodyStr == "" {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: body is required")}
}
if err := validateURL(rawURL, cfg.AllowedDomains); err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: %w", err)}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, rawURL, strings.NewReader(bodyStr))
if err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: %w", err)}
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: %w", err)}
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 64*1024))
if err != nil {
return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post read body: %w", err)}
}
return tools.Result{Output: fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d\n%s", resp.StatusCode, body)}
},
}
}
// validateURL checks domain allowlist and blocks internal IPs (SSRF protection).
func validateURL(rawURL string, allowedDomains []string) error {
u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid url: %w", err)
}
host := u.Hostname()
if host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("url has no host")
}
// SSRF protection: block internal/private IPs and localhost.
if err := rejectInternalHost(host); err != nil {
return err
}
// Domain allowlist (if configured).
if err := validateDomain(host, allowedDomains); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// validateDomain checks that the host is in the allowed list.
// If allowedDomains is empty, all domains are allowed.
func validateDomain(host string, allowedDomains []string) error {
if len(allowedDomains) == 0 {
return nil
}
lower := strings.ToLower(host)
for _, d := range allowedDomains {
if lower == strings.ToLower(d) {
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("domain %q not in allowed list", host)
}
// rejectInternalHost blocks requests to localhost, private IPs, and link-local addresses.
func rejectInternalHost(host string) error {
lower := strings.ToLower(host)
if lower == "localhost" {
return fmt.Errorf("requests to localhost are blocked")
}
ip := net.ParseIP(host)
if ip == nil {
// Not an IP literal — could be a domain. Resolve it.
ips, err := net.LookupIP(host)
if err != nil {
return nil // let the HTTP client handle DNS errors
}
for _, resolved := range ips {
if isPrivateIP(resolved) {
return fmt.Errorf("domain %q resolves to private IP %s", host, resolved)
}
}
return nil
}
if isPrivateIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf("requests to private IP %s are blocked", ip)
}
return nil
}
// isPrivateIP returns true for loopback, private, link-local, and metadata IPs.
func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return ip.IsLoopback() ||
ip.IsPrivate() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
isMetadataIP(ip)
}
// isMetadataIP checks for cloud metadata service IPs (169.254.169.254).
func isMetadataIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return ip.Equal(net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254"))
}