4e7aa95adb
Cambios de seguridad en las 4 herramientas de agentes: - tools/file: deny-by-default (AllowedPaths vacío = todo denegado), resolución de symlinks con EvalSymlinks, protección contra path traversal (../) y confusión de prefijos (/opt vs /opt1234) - tools/ssh: nuevo AllowedCommands allowlist (complementa ForbiddenCommands), validación de sintaxis shell (bloquea pipes, subshells, redirects, chains) - tools/http: protección SSRF bloqueando IPs privadas, loopback, link-local, metadata (169.254.169.254). Validación de dominio case-insensitive. - tools/matrix: nuevo parámetro AllowedRooms para restringir rooms destino - internal/config/schema: AllowedCommands en SSHToolCfg, MatrixToolCfg nueva - agents/runtime: pasa MatrixToolCfg al constructor de matrix_send Parte de issue 0019 (prompt injection hardening). Feature flag OFF. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
199 lines
5.6 KiB
Go
199 lines
5.6 KiB
Go
package http
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/enmanuel/agents/internal/config"
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"github.com/enmanuel/agents/tools"
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)
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// NewHTTPGet creates an http_get tool that performs GET requests.
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// Validates URLs against cfg.AllowedDomains (deny-by-default if non-empty)
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// and blocks requests to internal/private IP ranges (SSRF protection).
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func NewHTTPGet(cfg config.HTTPToolCfg) tools.Tool {
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timeout := cfg.Timeout
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if timeout == 0 {
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timeout = 30 * time.Second
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}
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client := &http.Client{Timeout: timeout}
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return tools.Tool{
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Def: tools.Def{
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Name: "http_get",
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Description: "Perform an HTTP GET request to a URL and return the response body.",
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Parameters: []tools.Param{
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{Name: "url", Type: "string", Description: "The URL to request", Required: true},
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},
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},
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Exec: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
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rawURL := tools.GetString(args, "url")
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if rawURL == "" {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get: url is required")}
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}
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if err := validateURL(rawURL, cfg.AllowedDomains); err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get: %w", err)}
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get: %w", err)}
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}
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get: %w", err)}
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 64*1024)) // 64 KB limit
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if err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_get read body: %w", err)}
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}
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return tools.Result{Output: fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d\n%s", resp.StatusCode, body)}
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},
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}
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}
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// NewHTTPPost creates an http_post tool that performs POST requests with a JSON body.
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// Validates URLs against cfg.AllowedDomains and blocks internal IPs.
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func NewHTTPPost(cfg config.HTTPToolCfg) tools.Tool {
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timeout := cfg.Timeout
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if timeout == 0 {
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timeout = 30 * time.Second
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}
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client := &http.Client{Timeout: timeout}
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return tools.Tool{
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Def: tools.Def{
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Name: "http_post",
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Description: "Perform an HTTP POST request with a JSON body and return the response.",
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Parameters: []tools.Param{
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{Name: "url", Type: "string", Description: "The URL to request", Required: true},
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{Name: "body", Type: "string", Description: "The JSON body to send", Required: true},
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},
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},
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Exec: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
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rawURL := tools.GetString(args, "url")
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if rawURL == "" {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: url is required")}
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}
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bodyStr := tools.GetString(args, "body")
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if bodyStr == "" {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: body is required")}
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}
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if err := validateURL(rawURL, cfg.AllowedDomains); err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: %w", err)}
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, rawURL, strings.NewReader(bodyStr))
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if err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: %w", err)}
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post: %w", err)}
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 64*1024))
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if err != nil {
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return tools.Result{Err: fmt.Errorf("http_post read body: %w", err)}
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}
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return tools.Result{Output: fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d\n%s", resp.StatusCode, body)}
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},
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}
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}
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// validateURL checks domain allowlist and blocks internal IPs (SSRF protection).
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func validateURL(rawURL string, allowedDomains []string) error {
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u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid url: %w", err)
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}
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host := u.Hostname()
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if host == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("url has no host")
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}
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// SSRF protection: block internal/private IPs and localhost.
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if err := rejectInternalHost(host); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Domain allowlist (if configured).
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if err := validateDomain(host, allowedDomains); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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// validateDomain checks that the host is in the allowed list.
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// If allowedDomains is empty, all domains are allowed.
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func validateDomain(host string, allowedDomains []string) error {
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if len(allowedDomains) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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lower := strings.ToLower(host)
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for _, d := range allowedDomains {
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if lower == strings.ToLower(d) {
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return nil
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}
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("domain %q not in allowed list", host)
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}
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// rejectInternalHost blocks requests to localhost, private IPs, and link-local addresses.
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func rejectInternalHost(host string) error {
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lower := strings.ToLower(host)
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if lower == "localhost" {
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return fmt.Errorf("requests to localhost are blocked")
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}
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ip := net.ParseIP(host)
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if ip == nil {
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// Not an IP literal — could be a domain. Resolve it.
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ips, err := net.LookupIP(host)
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if err != nil {
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return nil // let the HTTP client handle DNS errors
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}
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for _, resolved := range ips {
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if isPrivateIP(resolved) {
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return fmt.Errorf("domain %q resolves to private IP %s", host, resolved)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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if isPrivateIP(ip) {
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return fmt.Errorf("requests to private IP %s are blocked", ip)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// isPrivateIP returns true for loopback, private, link-local, and metadata IPs.
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func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
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return ip.IsLoopback() ||
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ip.IsPrivate() ||
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ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
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ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
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isMetadataIP(ip)
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}
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// isMetadataIP checks for cloud metadata service IPs (169.254.169.254).
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func isMetadataIP(ip net.IP) bool {
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return ip.Equal(net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254"))
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}
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