agents_and_robots/agents/handler.go

package agents

import (
	"context"
	"fmt"

	"maunium.net/go/mautrix/event"

	"github.com/enmanuel/agents/pkg/command"
	"github.com/enmanuel/agents/pkg/decision"
	coretypes "github.com/enmanuel/agents/pkg/llm"
	"github.com/enmanuel/agents/pkg/orchestration"
	"github.com/enmanuel/agents/pkg/sanitize"
	"github.com/enmanuel/agents/shell/audit"
	"github.com/enmanuel/agents/shell/bus"
)

// handleEvent is called by the matrix Listener for each filtered incoming event.
func (a *Agent) handleEvent(ctx context.Context, msgCtx decision.MessageContext, evt *event.Event) {
	a.logger.Debug("handling event",
		"sender", msgCtx.SenderID,
		"is_dm", msgCtx.IsDirectMsg,
		"is_mention", msgCtx.IsMention,
		"command", msgCtx.Command,
	)

	roomID := evt.RoomID.String()

	// Audit: message_received
	a.emitAudit(audit.Event{
		AgentID:   a.cfg.Agent.ID,
		EventType: audit.EventMessageReceived,
		SenderID:  msgCtx.SenderID,
		RoomID:    roomID,
		Detail:    fmt.Sprintf("is_dm=%v is_mention=%v", msgCtx.IsDirectMsg, msgCtx.IsMention),
	})

	// Update room context for memory tools
	a.roomCtx.Set(roomID)

	if a.cfg.Personality.Behavior.TypingIndicator {
		_ = a.sender.SendTyping(ctx, roomID, true)
		defer a.sender.SendTyping(ctx, roomID, false)
	}

	// ── Command flow ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
	// Commands (!xxx) always resolve before rules or LLM. Never reach the LLM.
	// Priority: built-in → unknown (agent-specific commands can be added via RegisterCommand).
	if msgCtx.Command != "" {
		a.logger.Info("command_received",
			"command", msgCtx.Command,
			"sender", msgCtx.SenderID,
			"room", roomID,
			"args", msgCtx.Args,
		)

		// Resolve aliases
		cmdName := msgCtx.Command
		if canonical, ok := a.cmdAliases[cmdName]; ok {
			cmdName = canonical
		}

		if handler, ok := a.commands[cmdName]; ok {
			// RBAC check for commands
			if !a.acl.CanDo(msgCtx.SenderID, "command:"+cmdName) {
				a.logger.Info("command_denied", "command", cmdName, "sender", msgCtx.SenderID)
				_ = a.sendReply(ctx, roomID, msgCtx.EventID, msgCtx.ThreadID,
					"No tienes permisos para ejecutar este comando.")
				return
			}
			a.logger.Info("command_executed", "command", cmdName)

			// Audit: command_exec
			a.emitAudit(audit.Event{
				AgentID:   a.cfg.Agent.ID,
				EventType: audit.EventCommandExec,
				SenderID:  msgCtx.SenderID,
				RoomID:    roomID,
				Detail:    fmt.Sprintf("command=%s", cmdName),
			})

			reply := handler(ctx, msgCtx)
			_ = a.sendReply(ctx, roomID, msgCtx.EventID, msgCtx.ThreadID, reply)
			return
		}

		// Prompt-command: expand .md content and pass to LLM
		if content, ok := a.promptCmds[cmdName]; ok {
			a.logger.Info("prompt_command_expanded", "command", cmdName)
			msgCtx.Content = command.ExpandPrompt(content, msgCtx.Args)
			msgCtx.Command = ""
			msgCtx.Args = nil
			// Fall through to rules/LLM flow below
		} else {
			// Unknown command — never falls through to rules or LLM
			a.logger.Info("command_unknown", "command", msgCtx.Command)
			unknownMsg := fmt.Sprintf("Comando desconocido: `!%s`. Usa `!help` para ver comandos disponibles.", msgCtx.Command)
			if a.cfg.Matrix.Filters.CommandPrefix == "" {
				unknownMsg = fmt.Sprintf("Comando desconocido: `%s`. Usa `help` para ver comandos disponibles.", msgCtx.Command)
			}
			_ = a.sendReply(ctx, roomID, msgCtx.EventID, msgCtx.ThreadID, unknownMsg)
			return
		}
	}

	// ── Non-command flow ─────────────────────────────────────────────
	// RBAC check for LLM access ("ask" action)
	if !a.acl.CanDo(msgCtx.SenderID, "ask") {
		a.logger.Info("ask_denied", "sender", msgCtx.SenderID)
		_ = a.sendReply(ctx, roomID, msgCtx.EventID, msgCtx.ThreadID,
			"No tienes permisos para interactuar con este agente.")
		return
	}

	actions := decision.Evaluate(msgCtx, a.rules)
	a.logger.Debug("rules evaluated", "matched_actions", len(actions))

	// If no rules matched and the message mentions the bot or is a DM, use LLM.
	if len(actions) == 0 && (msgCtx.IsMention || msgCtx.IsDirectMsg) {
		if a.llm == nil {
			// Simple bot: no LLM, ignore non-command messages
			a.logger.Debug("no LLM configured, ignoring non-command message")
			return
		}
		a.logger.Debug("no rules matched, falling back to LLM")
		actions = []decision.Action{{
			Kind: decision.ActionKindLLM,
			LLM:  &decision.LLMAction{ContextKey: msgCtx.RoomID},
		}}
	}

	if len(actions) == 0 {
		a.logger.Debug("no actions, ignoring message",
			"is_dm", msgCtx.IsDirectMsg,
			"is_mention", msgCtx.IsMention,
		)
		return
	}

	a.executeActions(ctx, roomID, msgCtx, actions)
}

// executeActions expands LLM actions and runs the effects runner.
func (a *Agent) executeActions(ctx context.Context, roomID string, msgCtx decision.MessageContext, actions []decision.Action) {
	// Auto-thread: if configured and message is not already in a thread,
	// start a new thread rooted at the user's message.
	if a.cfg.Matrix.Threads.AutoThread && msgCtx.ThreadID == "" && msgCtx.EventID != "" {
		msgCtx.ThreadID = msgCtx.EventID
	}

	// Sanitize user input before sending to LLM
	sanitized, rejected := a.sanitizeInput(msgCtx.Content, roomID, msgCtx.SenderID)
	if rejected {
		a.runner.Execute(ctx, roomID, []decision.Action{{
			Kind:  decision.ActionKindReply,
			Reply: &decision.ReplyAction{Content: "Tu mensaje fue rechazado por el filtro de seguridad.", InReplyTo: msgCtx.EventID, ThreadID: msgCtx.ThreadID},
		}})
		return
	}
	msgCtx.Content = sanitized

	// Resolve memory key: use thread root as context key when inside a thread,
	// so parallel threads in the same room have independent conversation windows.
	memKey := roomID
	if msgCtx.ThreadID != "" {
		memKey = msgCtx.ThreadID
	}

	expanded := make([]decision.Action, 0, len(actions))
	for _, act := range actions {
		if act.Kind == decision.ActionKindLLM {
			if a.llm == nil {
				a.logger.Warn("LLM action requested but no LLM configured")
				expanded = append(expanded, decision.Action{
					Kind:  decision.ActionKindReply,
					Reply: &decision.ReplyAction{Content: "Este bot no tiene LLM configurado.", InReplyTo: msgCtx.EventID, ThreadID: msgCtx.ThreadID},
				})
				continue
			}
			// Memory: load window + append user message before LLM call
			a.ensureWindowLoaded(ctx, memKey)
			a.appendToWindow(memKey, coretypes.Message{
				Role: coretypes.RoleUser, Content: msgCtx.Content,
			})
			a.persistMessage(ctx, memKey, coretypes.RoleUser, msgCtx.Content)

			reply, err := a.runLLM(ctx, msgCtx, memKey)
			if err != nil {
				a.logger.Error("llm error", "err", err)
				expanded = append(expanded, decision.Action{
					Kind:  decision.ActionKindReply,
					Reply: &decision.ReplyAction{Content: "Sorry, I encountered an error.", InReplyTo: msgCtx.EventID, ThreadID: msgCtx.ThreadID},
				})
			} else {
				expanded = append(expanded, decision.Action{
					Kind:  decision.ActionKindReply,
					Reply: &decision.ReplyAction{Content: reply, InReplyTo: msgCtx.EventID, ThreadID: msgCtx.ThreadID},
				})

				// Memory: append assistant reply after LLM call
				a.appendToWindow(memKey, coretypes.Message{
					Role: coretypes.RoleAssistant, Content: reply,
				})
				a.persistMessage(ctx, memKey, coretypes.RoleAssistant, reply)
			}
		} else {
			expanded = append(expanded, act)
		}
	}

	a.runner.Execute(ctx, roomID, expanded)
}

// listenBus processes messages from the inter-agent bus.
func (a *Agent) listenBus(ctx context.Context, ch <-chan bus.AgentMessage) {
	for {
		select {
		case <-ctx.Done():
			return
		case msg, ok := <-ch:
			if !ok {
				return
			}
			if msg.Kind == bus.KindTask {
				a.handleTaskEvent(ctx, msg)
			}
		}
	}
}

// handleTaskEvent processes a task delegated by the orchestrator.
// The bot generates a response and sends it both to Matrix and back via bus.
func (a *Agent) handleTaskEvent(ctx context.Context, msg bus.AgentMessage) {
	taskJSON, ok := msg.Payload["task_json"]
	if !ok {
		a.logger.Error("task message missing task_json payload")
		return
	}

	task, err := orchestration.UnmarshalTaskEvent(taskJSON)
	if err != nil {
		a.logger.Error("failed to unmarshal task event", "err", err)
		return
	}

	a.logger.Info("handling orchestrated task",
		"task_id", task.TaskID,
		"room", task.TargetRoomID,
		"sender", task.OriginalSender,
		"iteration", task.Iteration,
	)

	roomID := task.TargetRoomID

	// Update room context for memory tools
	a.roomCtx.Set(roomID)

	if a.cfg.Personality.Behavior.TypingIndicator {
		_ = a.sender.SendTyping(ctx, roomID, true)
		defer a.sender.SendTyping(ctx, roomID, false)
	}

	// Build a synthetic MessageContext from the task
	msgCtx := decision.MessageContext{
		SenderID:    task.OriginalSender,
		RoomID:      roomID,
		Content:     task.OriginalQuestion,
		IsDirectMsg: false,
		IsMention:   true, // treat orchestrated tasks like mentions
	}

	// If there are previous responses, prepend context
	if len(task.PreviousResponses) > 0 {
		var context string
		for _, pr := range task.PreviousResponses {
			context += fmt.Sprintf("[Previous response from %s]: %s\n\n", pr.BotID, pr.Text)
		}
		msgCtx.Content = context + "Original question: " + task.OriginalQuestion +
			"\n\nPlease provide an improved or complementary answer."
	}

	// Sanitize orchestrated input
	sanitized, rejected := a.sanitizeInput(msgCtx.Content, roomID, msgCtx.SenderID)
	if rejected {
		a.logger.Warn("orchestrated task rejected by sanitizer",
			"task_id", task.TaskID, "sender", task.OriginalSender)
		_ = a.sender.SendMarkdown(ctx, roomID, "El mensaje fue rechazado por el filtro de seguridad.")
		return
	}
	msgCtx.Content = sanitized

	// Load memory and run LLM
	a.ensureWindowLoaded(ctx, roomID)
	a.appendToWindow(roomID, coretypes.Message{
		Role: coretypes.RoleUser, Content: msgCtx.Content,
	})

	reply, err := a.runLLM(ctx, msgCtx, roomID)

	// Build the result to send back via bus
	result := orchestration.TaskResult{
		TaskID: task.TaskID,
		BotID:  a.cfg.Agent.ID,
	}

	if err != nil {
		a.logger.Error("LLM error during orchestrated task", "err", err)
		result.Error = err.Error()
		reply = "Sorry, I encountered an error."
	} else {
		result.Text = reply
		// Persist assistant reply
		a.appendToWindow(roomID, coretypes.Message{
			Role: coretypes.RoleAssistant, Content: reply,
		})
		a.persistMessage(ctx, roomID, coretypes.RoleAssistant, reply)
	}

	// Send reply to Matrix room
	if sendErr := a.sender.SendMarkdown(ctx, roomID, reply); sendErr != nil {
		a.logger.Error("failed to send orchestrated reply to Matrix", "err", sendErr)
	}

	// Send result back to orchestrator via bus
	resultJSON, marshalErr := orchestration.MarshalTaskResult(result)
	if marshalErr != nil {
		a.logger.Error("failed to marshal task result", "err", marshalErr)
		return
	}

	replyMsg := bus.AgentMessage{
		From:    bus.AgentID(a.cfg.Agent.ID),
		To:      msg.From,
		Kind:    bus.KindTaskResult,
		Payload: map[string]string{"result_json": resultJSON},
	}

	if busErr := a.agentBus.Reply(task.TaskID, replyMsg); busErr != nil {
		a.logger.Error("failed to send task result via bus", "err", busErr)
	}
}

// sendReply sends a markdown reply that respects thread context.
// If threadID is non-empty, the reply is sent as part of that thread.
func (a *Agent) sendReply(ctx context.Context, roomID, eventID, threadID, markdown string) error {
	if threadID != "" {
		return a.sender.SendThreadMarkdown(ctx, roomID, threadID, eventID, markdown)
	}
	return a.sender.SendReplyMarkdown(ctx, roomID, eventID, markdown)
}

// parseSeverity converts a config string to sanitize.Severity.
func parseSeverity(s string) sanitize.Severity {
	switch s {
	case "high":
		return sanitize.SeverityHigh
	case "low":
		return sanitize.SeverityLow
	default:
		return sanitize.SeverityMedium
	}
}

// emitAudit writes an audit event if the audit writer is enabled.
func (a *Agent) emitAudit(evt audit.Event) {
	if a.auditWriter != nil {
		a.auditWriter.Emit(evt)
	}
}

// sanitizeInput runs prompt injection detection on the message content.
// Returns the (possibly modified) content and true if the message should be rejected.
func (a *Agent) sanitizeInput(content, roomID, senderID string) (string, bool) {
	if a.sanitizeOpts == nil {
		return content, false
	}

	result := sanitize.Sanitize(content, *a.sanitizeOpts)

	for _, w := range result.Warnings {
		a.logger.Warn("prompt_injection_detected",
			"pattern", w.PatternName,
			"severity", w.Severity,
			"matched", w.Matched,
			"sender", senderID,
			"room", roomID,
		)
	}

	return result.Output, result.Rejected
}