fn_registry/dev/issues/0150-matrix-client-pc-e2ee.md at bd9f0d843759031df4dfe44bdf5dbcdf19eb44bc

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egutierrez bd9f0d8437 feat(matrix): MAS migration helpers + 2 flows + 15 issues + capability group

Helper functions (matrix-mas capability group):
- mas_client_register_bash_infra: register/sync OAuth clients via mas-cli
- mas_syn2mas_migration_bash_infra: dry-run + apply user migration to MAS
- synapse_msc3861_enable_go_infra: edit homeserver.yaml MSC3861 block (with diff)
- wellknown_oidc_patch_go_infra: patch well-known JSON with msc2965.authentication
- synapse_login_flows_check_go_infra: health-check post-migration login flows

Flows + issues for custom Matrix clients (PC + Android):
- 0010 matrix-client-pc: Wails + React+Mantine (issues 0147-0153)
- 0011 matrix-client-android: Kotlin + Compose (issues 0154-0161)
- 0162 enable MAS as auth provider (Synapse delegate) — EXECUTED on VPS
- 0163 custom admin panel propio (sustituye synapse-admin)

Production state (organic-machine.com):
- Synapse migrated SQLite -> Postgres
- MSC3861 active, password_config disabled
- 21 users + 41 access_tokens migrated via syn2mas
- 4 MAS clients registered (element, matrix_pc, matrix_android, admin_panel)
- synapse-admin container removed + Coolify route deleted
- well-known patched with org.matrix.msc2965.authentication

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-24 22:53:33 +02:00

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Objetivo

Encriptacion end-to-end con mautrix-go (Olm/Megolm). Cross-signing keys (master/self-signing/user-signing), SAS verification de devices (emoji + decimal), recovery passphrase + key backup en Synapse, manejo de devices no verificados con warning visible. Mensajes en rooms encriptados se envian y descifran correctamente.

Tareas

Backend Go:
- MatrixService.BootstrapCrossSigning(passphrase) — genera master/self/user keys, sube a Synapse cifradas con passphrase-derived key.
- MatrixService.RecoverFromPassphrase(passphrase) — descarga keys de Synapse y descifra.
- MatrixService.StartVerification(userID, deviceID) -> *VerificationSession.
- MatrixService.VerifyEmoji(sessionID, accepted bool).
- MatrixService.ListDevices() -> []Device (con verified flag).
- MatrixService.BackupMegolmKeys() — key backup server-side.
- Crypto store SQLite separado del state store (mejor para integridad).
Frontend React:
- Wizard onboarding E2EE: pasos (1) generar passphrase, (2) backup, (3) verificar device.
- Panel Settings > Security & Privacy:
  - Lista devices propios con verified state.
  - Boton "Verify new device" + dialog SAS con emoji grid.
  - "Reset cross-signing" (destructive, requiere confirmacion).
  - "Restore from passphrase" (login en device nuevo).
- EventBubble muestra shield: green (verified), amber (encrypted, device unverified), red (decryption failed).
- Banner room: "X devices are not verified" si algun miembro tiene devices unverified.
Tests:
- e2e/test_e2ee_send_receive.sh — msg enviado en room encriptado se descifra en Element Web.
- e2e/test_cross_signing.sh — bootstrap + verificar device desde Element Web.
- e2e/test_recovery.sh — login en device nuevo + recover keys con passphrase.
- e2e/test_unverified_warning.sh — device nuevo aparece como warning en otros clientes.

Funciones del registry a crear

matrix_e2ee_bootstrap_go_infra — wrapper cross-signing bootstrap.
matrix_device_verify_go_infra — SAS verification flow.
matrix_key_backup_go_infra — server-side key backup wrapper.
passphrase_derive_key_go_infra — PBKDF2/scrypt para derivar key de passphrase.
VerificationDialog_ts_ui — componente emoji grid SAS.

Acceptance

Bootstrap cross-signing crea 3 keys + las sube a Synapse cifradas.
Msg enviado a room encriptado se descifra en Element Web (y al reves).
SAS verification con emoji grid funciona contra Element Web (ambos lados muestran 7 emojis iguales).
Login en device nuevo + restore con passphrase recupera msgs historicos.
Device no verificado dispara shield amber en EventBubble.
Decryption failure (key no disponible) muestra shield rojo + boton "Request key".

Notas

Critico — anti-criterio:

NO marcar done si E2EE silent-falla (msg muestra "** Unable to decrypt **" sin shield rojo claro).
NO marcar done si recovery passphrase queda en plain text en disco (debe vivir solo en keyring/memoria).

Decisiones:

Olm/Megolm via mautrix-go/crypto (Go port estable de libolm).
Alternativa rust-crypto via CGo: descartada, mantiene complejidad build.
Passphrase format: 4 palabras Diceware o 12-byte base32. Usuario elige al bootstrap.

Gotchas:

Key rotation: rooms encriptados rotan megolm cada 1 semana o 100 msgs (default). Manejar refresh.
Olm sessions max 100 mensajes: rotar prekey bundles automaticamente.
Cuando arrancas device nuevo sin passphrase, los msgs pre-existentes NO se descifran — UI debe ser clara.

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