diff --git a/cmd/membershipd/config.go b/cmd/membershipd/config.go
index a593382..6842597 100644
--- a/cmd/membershipd/config.go
+++ b/cmd/membershipd/config.go
@@ -43,9 +43,12 @@ func isLoopbackBind(bind string) bool {
 // configuration that would expose the bus without enforced authentication:
 //
 //   - a non-loopback --bind without --bus-auth enforce (the data plane and
-//     control plane would both accept anyone), and
+//     control plane would both accept anyone),
 //   - --tls-cert/--tls-key without --bus-auth enforce (TLS encrypts the channel
-//     but authenticates no one — encrypted access for everybody is still open).
+//     but authenticates no one — encrypted access for everybody is still open), and
+//   - a non-loopback --bind WITHOUT --tls-cert/--tls-key (the control plane would
+//     serve metadata over plaintext HTTP publicly — audit H5 reappearing, the N4
+//     gap the re-audit found: TLS was available but not mandatory).
 //
 // It is a pure function of the parsed flags so the command can fail fast at
 // startup and tests can assert the policy without booting a server.
@@ -60,6 +63,11 @@ func validateBootConfig(bind string, mode membership.AuthMode, tlsCert, tlsKey s
 			"refusing to start: --tls-cert/--tls-key set but --bus-auth is %q; TLS without enforced auth is fail-open (encrypted channel, no authentication) — set --bus-auth enforce",
 			mode)
 	}
+	if !isLoopbackBind(bind) && (tlsCert == "" || tlsKey == "") {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"refusing to start: --bind %q is not loopback but --tls-cert/--tls-key are not both set; a public control plane must serve HTTPS or its metadata (subjects, pubkeys, sealed keys, the social graph) travels in cleartext to a network MITM (audit H5/N4) — provide a CA-signed --tls-cert/--tls-key, or bind 127.0.0.1 for local dev",
+			bind)
+	}
 	return nil
 }
 
diff --git a/cmd/membershipd/config_test.go b/cmd/membershipd/config_test.go
index 8adbb1c..6791b7b 100644
--- a/cmd/membershipd/config_test.go
+++ b/cmd/membershipd/config_test.go
@@ -30,6 +30,31 @@ func TestAudit_FailOpenTLSWithoutAuth(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestGap_PublicEnforceNoTLS ports the re-auditor's N4 gap: the H2 guard refused
+// "public without enforce" and "TLS without enforce", but ALLOWED a public bind
+// with enforce and NO --tls-cert, so the control plane served metadata over
+// plaintext HTTP publicly (H5 reappearing). The guard now refuses it.
+func TestGap_PublicEnforceNoTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	// The exact auditor configuration: public bind, enforce on, no TLS cert/key.
+	err := validateBootConfig("0.0.0.0", membership.AuthEnforce, "", "")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("public bind + enforce + NO --tls-cert must be refused: the control plane would serve plaintext HTTP publicly (audit N4)")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "tls-cert") {
+		t.Fatalf("error should point the operator at --tls-cert/--tls-key, got: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Golden: the same public+enforce config WITH a cert/key is allowed.
+	if err := validateBootConfig("0.0.0.0", membership.AuthEnforce, "server.crt", "server.key"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("public + enforce + TLS is the intended production config, got: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Edge: loopback without TLS stays allowed (local dev is not a public exposure).
+	if err := validateBootConfig("127.0.0.1", membership.AuthOff, "", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("loopback dev without TLS must remain allowed, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestBootConfigPolicy is the full table: the golden secure-public config is
 // allowed, dev loopback is allowed, and every fail-open shape is refused.
 func TestBootConfigPolicy(t *testing.T) {
@@ -41,19 +66,25 @@ func TestBootConfigPolicy(t *testing.T) {
 		key     string
 		wantErr bool
 	}{
-		// Golden: the intended public production config.
+		// Golden: the intended public production config — enforce AND TLS.
 		{"public+enforce+tls", "0.0.0.0", membership.AuthEnforce, "s.crt", "s.key", false},
-		{"public+enforce+notls", "0.0.0.0", membership.AuthEnforce, "", "", false},
 		// Edge: local dev on loopback may stay open (no auth, no TLS).
 		{"loopback+off", "127.0.0.1", membership.AuthOff, "", "", false},
 		{"loopback-ipv6+off", "::1", membership.AuthOff, "", "", false},
 		{"localhost+off", "localhost", membership.AuthOff, "", "", false},
 		{"loopback+soft", "127.0.0.1", membership.AuthSoft, "", "", false},
+		// Edge: loopback with full enforce+TLS is also fine.
+		{"loopback+enforce+tls", "127.0.0.1", membership.AuthEnforce, "s.crt", "s.key", false},
 		// Error: public bind without enforce.
 		{"public+off", "0.0.0.0", membership.AuthOff, "", "", true},
 		{"public+soft", "0.0.0.0", membership.AuthSoft, "", "", true},
 		{"lan-ip+off", "192.168.1.10", membership.AuthOff, "", "", true},
 		{"empty-bind+off", "", membership.AuthOff, "", "", true},
+		// Error (N4): public bind + enforce but NO TLS -> plaintext control plane.
+		{"public+enforce+notls", "0.0.0.0", membership.AuthEnforce, "", "", true},
+		{"public+enforce+certonly", "0.0.0.0", membership.AuthEnforce, "s.crt", "", true},
+		{"public+enforce+keyonly", "0.0.0.0", membership.AuthEnforce, "", "s.key", true},
+		{"lan-ip+enforce+notls", "192.168.1.10", membership.AuthEnforce, "", "", true},
 		// Error: TLS flags without enforce (cert or key alone is enough to trip it).
 		{"loopback+tlscert+off", "127.0.0.1", membership.AuthOff, "s.crt", "", true},
 		{"loopback+tlskey+soft", "127.0.0.1", membership.AuthSoft, "", "s.key", true},