Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
egutierrez a3ac58fb70 fix(0005a): bump nats-server v2.10.22->v2.11.15 + toolchain go1.26.4 (close 16 CVEs)
govulncheck reported 16 reachable vulnerabilities (re-audit finding N1, report 0006):
14 in github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2@v2.10.22 -- the embedded NATS server, which
is exposed to the internet in the chosen deployment -- and 2 in the Go standard
library (GO-2026-5039 net/textproto, GO-2026-5037 crypto/x509).

Changes:
- go get github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2@v2.11.15 (covers all 14 server CVEs;
  pulls nats.go v1.49.0, nkeys v0.4.15, jwt v2.8.1, klauspost/compress v1.18.4
  and friends transitively).
- go directive 1.25.0 -> 1.26.4 so the toolchain ships the two stdlib fixes.

This is a go.mod/go.sum change justified purely by CVE remediation; it is the
explicit exception to the "do not touch deps" rule for a CVE bump.

Verification:
- CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test -count=1 ./...  -> green,
  including the 0003 multi-node cluster/JetStream e2e in pkg/embeddednats, so the
  server bump did not break the cluster or the durable plane.
- govulncheck ./...  -> "No vulnerabilities found" (0 reachable; the 13 that remain
  are in required-but-not-called modules).

Refs: report 0006 N1, issue 0005a.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 15:55:32 +02:00
egutierrez 60d6a86655 feat(membership): bound request bodies and add per-IP rate limit
Pre-auth DoS hardening (audit H1, Critical). The control-plane middleware
read the request body with io.ReadAll before authenticating and with no size
cap, so an unauthenticated peer could force the server to buffer an arbitrary
body in RAM (the auditor sent 400 MB and watched RSS climb to ~898 MB).

- ServeHTTP now caps the buffered body before reading: a per-route ceiling
  (1 MiB JSON, 16 MiB /blobs) rejects an over-declared Content-Length outright
  and wraps the body in http.MaxBytesReader so a lying/chunked sender trips at
  the ceiling instead of unbounded.
- handlePutBlob maps the MaxBytesReader cutoff to 413 in every auth mode.
- Per-IP token-bucket rate limiter (golang.org/x/time/rate, already in the
  module graph) sheds floods before auth or body reads. Loopback dev stacks are
  unaffected (burst >> any single client's rate). Kept in-package as transport
  glue, not promoted to the registry, mirroring the nonceCache decision in 0003.
- membershipd sets http.Server.MaxHeaderBytes and ReadHeaderTimeout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 14:16:04 +02:00
agent 0bd6eb5315 feat(mobile): gomobile-friendly wrapper over pkg/client for Android binding 2026-06-05 17:40:28 +02:00
agent 8c680bc002 feat: optional per-room JetStream persistence (history + offline replay), gated by RoomPolicy.Persist 2026-06-03 21:48:55 +02:00
agent cd02a52191 feat: initial scaffold of unibus message bus (membership service + client lib + demo peers) 2026-06-03 19:47:32 +02:00