Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
egutierrez 0b96c114b6 feat(membership): trust reverse-proxy forwarded client IP for rate limit
The per-IP rate limiter keys on the transport RemoteAddr. Behind the
same-origin Caddy proxy that fronts the control plane, every request
arrives with the proxy's single IP, which collapses the limiter into one
bucket shared by the whole world — a flood from one client throttles all
of them.

Add an opt-in `--trusted-proxies` flag (comma-separated IPs/CIDRs). When
the immediate peer is one of the named proxies, clientIP now believes its
X-Forwarded-For (read right-to-left, skipping trusted hops) or X-Real-IP
and keys on the real client. A direct, non-trusted peer's forwarding
headers are ignored entirely, so this opens no quota-fanning hole: an
attacker connecting straight to the public :8470 cannot spoof a key. The
zero value (no flag) preserves the prior RemoteAddr-only behavior exactly.

Covered by ratelimit_proxy_test.go: trusted vs untrusted peers, XFF
right-to-left precedence, client-prepended forgery, X-Real-IP fallback,
and rejection of malformed proxy entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 12:29:57 +02:00
egutierrez 60d6a86655 feat(membership): bound request bodies and add per-IP rate limit
Pre-auth DoS hardening (audit H1, Critical). The control-plane middleware
read the request body with io.ReadAll before authenticating and with no size
cap, so an unauthenticated peer could force the server to buffer an arbitrary
body in RAM (the auditor sent 400 MB and watched RSS climb to ~898 MB).

- ServeHTTP now caps the buffered body before reading: a per-route ceiling
  (1 MiB JSON, 16 MiB /blobs) rejects an over-declared Content-Length outright
  and wraps the body in http.MaxBytesReader so a lying/chunked sender trips at
  the ceiling instead of unbounded.
- handlePutBlob maps the MaxBytesReader cutoff to 413 in every auth mode.
- Per-IP token-bucket rate limiter (golang.org/x/time/rate, already in the
  module graph) sheds floods before auth or body reads. Loopback dev stacks are
  unaffected (burst >> any single client's rate). Kept in-package as transport
  glue, not promoted to the registry, mirroring the nonceCache decision in 0003.
- membershipd sets http.Server.MaxHeaderBytes and ReadHeaderTimeout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 14:16:04 +02:00