El wrapper mobile/unibus.go se habia perdido del repo (solo quedaba compilado
en el .aar del 5 jun). Se reconstruye y amplia con:
- Wallet BIP39 determinista: NewMnemonic, ValidateMnemonic, DeriveAndSaveIdentity.
Deriva la MISMA identidad que uniweb (web/src/wallet/derive.ts): PBKDF2-BIP39 ->
HKDF-SHA256(info unibus-sign-v1 / unibus-kex-v1) -> Ed25519 + X25519. Test de
paridad contra el vector de oro (mnemonica abandon...about -> sign_pub
34302746...b3c8) garantiza misma cuenta web<->movil byte a byte.
- Selector de salas: Session.ListMyRooms() -> JSON [{id,subject,mode,role}].
- Nombres legibles: Session.Directory() + Client.Directory()/EndpointID() nuevos
en pkg/client (GET /directory firmado).
- HasIdentity/SignPubAt para el onboarding.
Aditivo; build/vet/test del modulo verdes (incluido TestDeriveParityWithWeb).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
govulncheck reported 16 reachable vulnerabilities (re-audit finding N1, report 0006):
14 in github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2@v2.10.22 -- the embedded NATS server, which
is exposed to the internet in the chosen deployment -- and 2 in the Go standard
library (GO-2026-5039 net/textproto, GO-2026-5037 crypto/x509).
Changes:
- go get github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2@v2.11.15 (covers all 14 server CVEs;
pulls nats.go v1.49.0, nkeys v0.4.15, jwt v2.8.1, klauspost/compress v1.18.4
and friends transitively).
- go directive 1.25.0 -> 1.26.4 so the toolchain ships the two stdlib fixes.
This is a go.mod/go.sum change justified purely by CVE remediation; it is the
explicit exception to the "do not touch deps" rule for a CVE bump.
Verification:
- CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test -count=1 ./... -> green,
including the 0003 multi-node cluster/JetStream e2e in pkg/embeddednats, so the
server bump did not break the cluster or the durable plane.
- govulncheck ./... -> "No vulnerabilities found" (0 reachable; the 13 that remain
are in required-but-not-called modules).
Refs: report 0006 N1, issue 0005a.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-auth DoS hardening (audit H1, Critical). The control-plane middleware
read the request body with io.ReadAll before authenticating and with no size
cap, so an unauthenticated peer could force the server to buffer an arbitrary
body in RAM (the auditor sent 400 MB and watched RSS climb to ~898 MB).
- ServeHTTP now caps the buffered body before reading: a per-route ceiling
(1 MiB JSON, 16 MiB /blobs) rejects an over-declared Content-Length outright
and wraps the body in http.MaxBytesReader so a lying/chunked sender trips at
the ceiling instead of unbounded.
- handlePutBlob maps the MaxBytesReader cutoff to 413 in every auth mode.
- Per-IP token-bucket rate limiter (golang.org/x/time/rate, already in the
module graph) sheds floods before auth or body reads. Loopback dev stacks are
unaffected (burst >> any single client's rate). Kept in-package as transport
glue, not promoted to the registry, mirroring the nonceCache decision in 0003.
- membershipd sets http.Server.MaxHeaderBytes and ReadHeaderTimeout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
agent
egutierrez