The one-time data move decentralization needs (issue 0003c): copy the
entire control-plane state from the local SQLite database into the
replicated JetStream KV buckets, with a backup taken first.
pkg/membership:
- Snapshot / SealedKeyRecord: a backend-agnostic dump of the whole
control plane (rooms with their real epoch, members, every sealed-key
row across epochs, users with status).
- (*sqliteStore).ExportSnapshot and (*jetstreamStore).ExportSnapshot read
a full Snapshot from each backend; (*jetstreamStore).importSnapshot
writes one with raw Puts (preserving epoch/status, not resetting to
defaults) so the migration is faithful and idempotent (every write is
an overwrite, so re-running converges).
- MigrateSQLiteToKV orchestrates export -> import; BackupSQLite makes a
consistent copy via SQLite's VACUUM INTO before any migration.
cmd/membershipd:
- `membershipd migrate-to-kv --db <path> --nats-url <url> [--replicas N]
[--ca <cert>] [--no-backup]` backs up the SQLite file, connects to the
cluster's NATS, and migrates. Dispatched on the host like `user`.
Tests (DoD: golden + edge + parity):
- TestMigrateSQLiteToKVParity: seed a representative SQLite (two rooms,
one rekeyed to epoch 2, members, a revoked user); after migration the
KV ExportSnapshot equals the SQLite ExportSnapshot.
- TestMigrateSQLiteToKVIdempotent: running the migration twice yields the
same KV state.
- TestBackupSQLiteCreatesConsistentCopy: the backup reopens with
identical data.
Plus a binary smoke (seed user -> run server -> migrate-to-kv -> re-run):
backup written, 1 user migrated, second run identical.
Branch-by-abstraction for the control-plane store (issue 0003b), so the
membership state can move off process-local SQLite onto replicated
JetStream KV without rewriting callers and without breaking master.
pkg/membership:
- Store is now an interface (rooms/members/keys + user allowlist +
Close). The existing SQLite implementation is renamed sqliteStore and
stays the default: Open(path) still returns it. openSQLite keeps the
concrete type for internal callers (the 0003c migration).
- ErrNotFound is a storage-agnostic "no such record" sentinel; both
backends return it (the SQLite store maps sql.ErrNoRows to it). The
control plane now branches on ErrNotFound instead of sql.ErrNoRows, so
server.go no longer imports database/sql.
- jetstreamStore (new) implements Store over five replicated KV buckets:
rooms, members, rooms_by_member (reverse index for ListRoomsForEndpoint),
room_keys, users. Replication factor is configurable (R1..R5) for the
R1->R3 rollout. Every read is bounded by OpTimeout and IsAuthorized /
HasAdmin FAIL CLOSED on any backend error (a KV quorum loss denies,
never admits), per the audit's requirement for the decentralized store.
dev/feature_flags.json:
- Add the `decentralized` flag (OFF): sqliteStore default while off,
jetstreamStore behind it. The membershipd boot wiring that selects the
KV store is deliberately deferred to 0003e/0003f (the embedded-NATS
authenticator<->store bootstrap is part of the session/deploy redesign);
OFF keeps the single-node SQLite control plane unchanged.
Tests (DoD: golden + edges + error path):
- TestJetStreamStoreRoomsCRUD: encrypted room + owner + invited member
round-trip through every room/member/key method, including latest-epoch
resolution and rekey.
- TestJetStreamStoreUsers: add/get/authorize/list/revoke + admin gate,
with case-insensitive key normalization and duplicate rejection.
- TestJetStreamStoreNotFound: ErrNotFound mapping for misses.
- TestJetStreamStoreIsAuthorizedFailClosed: NATS backend shut down ->
IsAuthorized and HasAdmin both DENY within the bounded timeout.
The full existing suite stays green: sqliteStore is unchanged behavior.
TestAudit_OwnerSpoof: a body declaring a foreign owner endpoint or signing key
is 403; a self-owned create is 201.
TestAudit_NonceCachePoisonPreAuth: an unregistered identity's repeated nonce
still fails 'not authorized' (never 'replayed'), proving it was not cached, while
an authorized identity's replay is still rejected.
Nonce cache unit tests: prune-after-TTL and cap-bounded memory.
Three medium audit findings.
H6 (owner spoof): handleCreateRoom now binds the body's declared owner to the
authenticated signer — both the endpoint id and the signing key must be the
signer's — so a registered peer cannot create rooms in another identity's name.
Enforced only when an authenticated signer is present.
H7 (nonce-cache poison pre-auth): IsAuthorized now runs BEFORE the replay cache
is touched, so an unregistered identity (Ed25519 keys are free) can no longer
seed nonces into it. The cache is rewritten with O(expired) pruning (insertion
order equals expiry order under a constant TTL) instead of the previous O(n)
full-map scan under the mutex, plus a size cap with oldest-eviction. This is the
prerequisite the 0003 replicated nonce store builds on.
H12 (error leak): internal store/blob errors are logged and replaced with a
generic client message via writeServerErr, so SQL fragments and filesystem paths
no longer reach the caller. Crafted 4xx messages (owner-sig, validation) are kept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
pkg/membership TestRequireEncryptedRoomsRejectsCleartext: cleartext create ->
403, encrypted -> 201, flag off -> cleartext allowed again.
pkg/client TestAudit_NoSubjectACL: under the public posture a ModeNATS room is
refused; bob (member) decrypts the secret; eve raw-subscribes to the subject off
the data plane and receives only ciphertext (non-empty AEAD nonce, no plaintext
substring) — closing the auditor's 'eve reads internal: salary numbers'.
Audit H4 (Alto). The embedded NATS has a single account with no per-subject
permissions, so any registered peer can subscribe to any subject — a cleartext
(ModeNATS) room's payload is readable by anyone who knows the subject.
A complete per-subject ACL derived from membership does not fit here: NATS
evaluates a connection's permissions once at connect time and never re-evaluates
them, but unibus clients connect-then-create/join-then-publish on one connection
(TestSecureBusEndToEnd). Static permissions would forbid the owner from
publishing to a room it just created; the dynamic reconnection model belongs to
the 0003 decentralization redesign. See dev/0004d-dataplane-acl.md.
Minimum defense implemented: Server.RequireEncryptedRooms (set by membershipd on
any non-loopback bind) refuses to create cleartext rooms, so every room on a
public deployment is end-to-end encrypted. Message CONTENT stays confidential
even with no subject isolation; residual traffic-metadata exposure is documented
and tracked for 0003.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Audit H3 (Alto). 'Authorized' meant 'registered in the allowlist', not 'member
of the room', so any registered peer could read another room's subject, its
full member list (every member's sign_pub + kex_pub), any endpoint's room
directory, and even another member's sealed key.
The middleware now carries the authenticated signer's endpoint id into the
handler via request context. Room handlers enforce membership:
- GET /rooms/{id} and /rooms/{id}/members require the signer to be a member;
- GET /rooms/{id}/key serves the sealed key only to its own endpoint
(endpoint == signer) and only to a member;
- GET /members/{endpoint}/rooms is restricted to the signer's own endpoint.
Authorization is skipped only when no authenticated signer is present (AuthOff
dev, or a soft-mode pass-through), preserving legacy/dev behavior. Internal
errors no longer echo store messages to the client on these paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ports the auditor's TestAudit_DoSBodyLimitNoAuth: an unsigned oversized POST
to /blobs is now rejected 413 without the resident set spiking (measured via
/proc/self/status, delta bounded to <96 MiB vs the attack's 400 MB+). Covers
both a truthful over-ceiling Content-Length (rejected pre-read) and a chunked
unknown-length sender (MaxBytesReader caps the read). Plus golden (normal blob
stored), boundary (exactly at the ceiling accepted), the 1 MiB control-plane
ceiling, and the per-IP rate limit (flood -> 429, distinct IPs not throttled).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-auth DoS hardening (audit H1, Critical). The control-plane middleware
read the request body with io.ReadAll before authenticating and with no size
cap, so an unauthenticated peer could force the server to buffer an arbitrary
body in RAM (the auditor sent 400 MB and watched RSS climb to ~898 MB).
- ServeHTTP now caps the buffered body before reading: a per-route ceiling
(1 MiB JSON, 16 MiB /blobs) rejects an over-declared Content-Length outright
and wraps the body in http.MaxBytesReader so a lying/chunked sender trips at
the ceiling instead of unbounded.
- handlePutBlob maps the MaxBytesReader cutoff to 413 in every auth mode.
- Per-IP token-bucket rate limiter (golang.org/x/time/rate, already in the
module graph) sheds floods before auth or body reads. Loopback dev stacks are
unaffected (burst >> any single client's rate). Kept in-package as transport
glue, not promoted to the registry, mirroring the nonceCache decision in 0003.
- membershipd sets http.Server.MaxHeaderBytes and ReadHeaderTimeout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
membership/auth_test: golden (signed+registered accepted), error paths
(unregistered 401, replayed nonce 401, clock skew 401, tampered body 401,
missing headers 401), exemptions (healthz, soft allows, off no-op).
client_test: end-to-end with the real client against an enforce server —
registered peer accepted, unregistered rejected, revoked peer denied without
a server restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the bus-auth rollout (off|soft|enforce) to the control plane. The
middleware verifies an Ed25519 request signature over CanonicalRequest
(method, request-URI, ts, nonce, sha256(body)), checks the timestamp is
within +/-30s, rejects replayed nonces via an in-memory TTL cache (60s), and
requires the signer to be an active user in the allowlist. soft logs
rejections but lets requests through so clients can migrate without an
outage; off is the legacy no-op default. /healthz is exempt so health probes
work before any identity exists. CanonicalRequest is exported as the single
source of truth shared with the client.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Golden: add -> get -> IsAuthorized true, admin seeded. Edge: empty role
defaults to member, case-insensitive hex lookup, list ordering, revoke
denies authorization and stamps revoked_at. Error: duplicate key
(ErrUserExists), invalid role, empty sign_pub, unknown user not authorized,
revoke of unknown/already-revoked. Plus users-table migration idempotency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bus-level user allowlist (issue 0001a): the authoritative directory of
Ed25519 signing identities permitted to use the bus, independent of room
membership. Migration is additive and mirrored byte-for-byte between the
module-root migrations/ and the embedded pkg/membership/migrations/.
Store adds AddUser/GetUser/ListUsers/RevokeUser/IsAuthorized/HasAdmin.
IsAuthorized is the single fail-closed predicate both the control plane and
the NATS data plane will consult, so revocation is a status flip that denies
access on both without a restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A peer invited to an encrypted room needs to find it: the control plane is
pull-based (no server push of invitations), so add a discovery endpoint that
lists every room an endpoint belongs to, with the room's metadata and the
endpoint's role.
- store.ListRoomsForEndpoint: JOIN members+rooms, ordered by room id, empty
slice (not error) for an endpoint in no rooms.
- membershipd: GET /members/{endpoint}/rooms returns {room_id, subject, epoch,
policy, role}[].
- client.ListMyRooms + RoomRef: a bot polls this to discover and then Join +
Subscribe rooms it was invited to.
Tests: store-level (owner in N rooms, member in one, unknown endpoint → []) and
client-level e2e through the embedded harness (B discovers a room A invited it
to, without prior knowledge of the room id; owner sees role=owner).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- membership server returns 403 + human-readable message on missing sealed key (was leaking 'sql: no rows in result set')
- client doJSON unwraps the server's {"error"} field instead of pasting the raw HTTP envelope
agent
egutierrez