Audit H3 (Alto). 'Authorized' meant 'registered in the allowlist', not 'member
of the room', so any registered peer could read another room's subject, its
full member list (every member's sign_pub + kex_pub), any endpoint's room
directory, and even another member's sealed key.
The middleware now carries the authenticated signer's endpoint id into the
handler via request context. Room handlers enforce membership:
- GET /rooms/{id} and /rooms/{id}/members require the signer to be a member;
- GET /rooms/{id}/key serves the sealed key only to its own endpoint
(endpoint == signer) and only to a member;
- GET /members/{endpoint}/rooms is restricted to the signer's own endpoint.
Authorization is skipped only when no authenticated signer is present (AuthOff
dev, or a soft-mode pass-through), preserving legacy/dev behavior. Internal
errors no longer echo store messages to the client on these paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the bus-auth rollout (off|soft|enforce) to the control plane. The
middleware verifies an Ed25519 request signature over CanonicalRequest
(method, request-URI, ts, nonce, sha256(body)), checks the timestamp is
within +/-30s, rejects replayed nonces via an in-memory TTL cache (60s), and
requires the signer to be an active user in the allowlist. soft logs
rejections but lets requests through so clients can migrate without an
outage; off is the legacy no-op default. /healthz is exempt so health probes
work before any identity exists. CanonicalRequest is exported as the single
source of truth shared with the client.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
egutierrez