2f5b372a80
A secured bus freezes per-subject permissions at connect time, so a peer that creates or joins a room after connecting cannot pub/sub on it until it reconnects (RefreshSession). No client called it, so under enforce+ACL the demos failed closed — pushing the operator to disable the ACL (a security regression at the operator's discretion). Wire the membership-change contract into every client: - cmd/worker: RefreshSession after CreateRoom, before publishing. - cmd/chat (simple): RefreshSession after CreateRoom+Join, before Subscribe. - cmd/chat (encrypted demo): A refreshes after CreateRoom; B refreshes after the invite+join, both before pub/sub. - local_files/bridge (gateway): RefreshSession after CreateRoom+Join, before Subscribe. - mobile: new Session.RefreshSession wrapper + the contract documented for callers. Contract (documented on the wrappers): after ANY membership change, call RefreshSession BEFORE pub/sub on the new room (it drops active subs, so it must precede Subscribe). On an unsecured/dev bus it is a harmless reconnect. Test: - TestClientCreateRoomRefreshPublishFlow: end-to-end under enforce+ACL, a peer creates a room, refreshes, invites a second peer who joins+refreshes+subscribes, and the publish is received — no manual intervention, the ACL stays on. CGO_ENABLED=0 go build/vet/test green; govulncheck 0 reachable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
201 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
201 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
// Command chat is a demo peer with two modes.
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//
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// Simple mode (default): joins a room subject and prints every received message
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// live. It validates uniformity worker<->chat: a process publishes, a human UI
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// subscribes, both speak the same protocol.
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//
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// Encrypted demo (--demo-encrypted): a self-contained script against a running
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// membershipd that proves E2E encryption and forward secrecy. A creates an
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// encrypted room, invites B, A publishes a message B can decrypt, then A kicks
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// B and publishes again at the new epoch — B can no longer decrypt. Prints a
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// PASS/FAIL summary of each assertion.
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package main
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import (
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"os"
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"os/signal"
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"syscall"
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"time"
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"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/client"
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"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/frame"
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"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/room"
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)
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func main() {
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var (
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natsURL = flag.String("nats-url", "nats://127.0.0.1:4250", "NATS url")
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ctrlURL = flag.String("ctrl-url", "http://127.0.0.1:8470", "membershipd control-plane url")
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roomSub = flag.String("room", "proc.test.ticks", "room subject to subscribe to")
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idFile = flag.String("id-file", "./local_files/chat.id", "identity file path")
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demoEnc = flag.Bool("demo-encrypted", false, "run the encrypted forward-secrecy demo")
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caFile = flag.String("ca", "", "path to the bus CA cert (ca.crt); set to connect with TLS + nkey to a secured bus")
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)
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flag.Parse()
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log.SetFlags(log.LstdFlags | log.Lmsgprefix)
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log.SetPrefix("[chat] ")
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if *demoEnc {
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runEncryptedDemo(*natsURL, *ctrlURL, *caFile)
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return
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}
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runSimple(*natsURL, *ctrlURL, *roomSub, *idFile, *caFile)
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}
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// runSimple subscribes to a cleartext subject and prints messages live.
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func runSimple(natsURL, ctrlURL, roomSub, idFile, caFile string) {
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id, err := client.LoadOrCreateIdentity(idFile)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("identity: %v", err)
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}
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c, err := client.Connect(natsURL, ctrlURL, id, caFile)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("connect: %v", err)
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}
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defer c.Close()
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log.Printf("endpoint: %s", c.Endpoint().ID)
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// A subscriber needs a room to resolve the subject + policy. For the
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// cleartext demo each peer owns a room mapped to the shared subject; NATS
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// fans out by subject so worker publishes reach this subscription.
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roomID, err := c.CreateRoom(roomSub, room.ModeNATS)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("create room: %v", err)
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}
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if err := c.Join(roomID); err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("join: %v", err)
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}
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// Membership-change contract (issue 0006e): refresh so the just-created room's
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// subject is subscribable under enforce+ACL (permissions are frozen at connect
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// time). Must run BEFORE Subscribe — RefreshSession drops active subscriptions.
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if err := c.RefreshSession(); err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("refresh session after create room: %v", err)
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}
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sub, err := c.Subscribe(roomID, func(f frame.Frame, plaintext []byte) {
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fmt.Printf("[%s] %s: %s\n", f.Subject, shortID(f.Sender), string(plaintext))
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})
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("subscribe: %v", err)
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}
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defer sub.Unsubscribe()
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log.Printf("subscribed to %q; waiting for messages (Ctrl-C to stop)", roomSub)
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stop := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
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signal.Notify(stop, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
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<-stop
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log.Printf("bye")
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}
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func shortID(id string) string {
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if len(id) > 8 {
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return id[:8]
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}
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return id
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}
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// runEncryptedDemo proves E2E encryption + forward secrecy end-to-end.
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func runEncryptedDemo(natsURL, ctrlURL, caFile string) {
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log.Printf("=== encrypted forward-secrecy demo ===")
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pass := true
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check := func(name string, ok bool) {
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status := "PASS"
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if !ok {
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status = "FAIL"
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pass = false
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}
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fmt.Printf(" [%s] %s\n", status, name)
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}
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// Two identities: A (owner) and B (invitee). In-memory only (demo).
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idA, err := newEphemeralIdentity()
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must(err, "generate A identity")
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idB, err := newEphemeralIdentity()
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must(err, "generate B identity")
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a, err := client.Connect(natsURL, ctrlURL, idA, caFile)
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must(err, "connect A")
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defer a.Close()
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b, err := client.Connect(natsURL, ctrlURL, idB, caFile)
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must(err, "connect B")
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defer b.Close()
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// A creates an encrypted room.
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roomID, err := a.CreateRoom("room.test", room.ModeMatrix)
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must(err, "A create room")
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fmt.Printf(" room.test -> %s (E2E, persisted, signed)\n", roomID)
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// Membership-change contract (issue 0006e): A only became a member of this room
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// after connecting, so refresh to gain its subject + per-room JetStream API
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// under enforce+ACL before publishing.
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must(a.RefreshSession(), "A refresh after create room")
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// A invites B (seals K to B's X25519 key).
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must(a.Invite(roomID, b.Endpoint()), "A invite B")
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// B joins (fetches + decrypts K).
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must(b.Join(roomID), "B join")
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// B became a member via the invite above; refresh so B can subscribe to the
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// room's subject under enforce+ACL (before subscribing — refresh drops subs).
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must(b.RefreshSession(), "B refresh after join")
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// B subscribes; capture received plaintexts.
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recv := make(chan string, 4)
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subB, err := b.Subscribe(roomID, func(f frame.Frame, plaintext []byte) {
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recv <- string(plaintext)
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})
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must(err, "B subscribe")
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defer subB.Unsubscribe()
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time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) // let the subscription settle
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// A publishes a message B can decrypt.
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const msg1 = "hola E2E"
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must(a.Publish(roomID, []byte(msg1)), "A publish msg1")
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got1, ok := waitMsg(recv, 2*time.Second)
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check("B decrypts pre-kick message", ok && got1 == msg1)
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// A kicks B (rotates K to a new epoch, re-sealed only for the remaining members).
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must(a.Kick(roomID, b.Endpoint().ID), "A kick B")
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time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
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// A publishes at the new epoch. B must NOT be able to decrypt: it was removed
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// from the member list, so /key returns no key for B at the new epoch.
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const msg2 = "secreto post-kick"
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must(a.Publish(roomID, []byte(msg2)), "A publish msg2 (post-kick)")
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got2, ok2 := waitMsg(recv, 1500*time.Millisecond)
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// Forward secrecy holds if B did NOT receive the post-kick plaintext.
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check("B cannot decrypt post-kick message (forward secrecy)", !(ok2 && got2 == msg2))
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if ok2 {
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fmt.Printf(" (unexpected: B received %q after kick)\n", got2)
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} else {
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fmt.Printf(" (B received nothing decryptable after kick — correct)\n")
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}
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fmt.Println()
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if pass {
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fmt.Println("RESULT: PASS — E2E encryption and forward secrecy verified")
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os.Exit(0)
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}
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fmt.Println("RESULT: FAIL — see assertions above")
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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func waitMsg(ch <-chan string, timeout time.Duration) (string, bool) {
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select {
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case m := <-ch:
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return m, true
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case <-time.After(timeout):
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return "", false
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}
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}
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func must(err error, what string) {
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("%s: %v", what, err)
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}
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}
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