Audit H5 (Alto, public). The control plane was signed but plaintext, so a
network MITM could read all metadata (subjects, endpoints, public keys, sealed
keys, blob hashes, the social graph) and drop requests. Signing gives integrity,
not confidentiality.
- membershipd serves the control plane over TLS (ListenAndServeTLS, MinVersion
1.2) with the same CA-signed cert as the data plane when --tls-cert is set; the
fail-open guard already requires --bus-auth enforce alongside it.
- The client gets a separate Options.CtrlTLS so the HTTP client pins the bus CA,
independent of the NATS data-plane TLS. Connect now sets both planes' TLS from
the one CA and REFUSES a plaintext http:// control-plane URL when a CA is
provided, so metadata is never sent in the clear when TLS is expected.
Connect's signature is unchanged; callers (worker/chat --ca, mobile NewSession)
must pass an https:// control-plane URL when they pass a CA. Documented for the
deploy step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
egutierrez
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