d64b0c052d
Add the data layer for WhatsApp-style accounts on the wallet model: the admin mints a single-use invitation link, the new user redeems it by publishing only its public keys, and the admin can hard-delete a user. - Invite type and lifecycle (invites.go): 32-byte crypto/rand hex token, 7-day default TTL, fail-closed expiry parsing. Methods CreateInvite/GetInvite/ ListInvites/ConsumeInvite/CancelInvite on both backends. ConsumeInvite is atomic and single-use: SQLite uses a transaction guarded by `used = 0`, the KV store uses a compare-and-swap on the entry revision (mark-first). Both burn the token on claim, so an already-registered key surfaces ErrUserExists with the invite spent — identical semantics across backends. - DeleteUser (users.go + jetstream_store.go): hard-delete of the allowlist row, distinct from RevokeUser's status flip. Room memberships of the ex-user are intentionally left inert (they can no longer authenticate); no partial cleanup. - Migration 003_invites.sql (root + embedded copy, byte-identical): additive `invites` table with audit columns, per db_migrations rules. - Store interface gains DeleteUser, CreateInvite, GetInvite, ListInvites, ConsumeInvite, CancelInvite. New UNIBUS_invites KV bucket. - Consistency fix: SQLite GetUser now maps sql.ErrNoRows to ErrNotFound, matching the KV backend and the storage-agnostic contract documented in store.go. - ValidateKexPubHex added alongside ValidateSignPubHex for /register key checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
297 lines
11 KiB
Go
297 lines
11 KiB
Go
package membership
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"database/sql"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// Invite is a single-use registration token the admin mints so a brand-new
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// identity can join the bus allowlist WITHOUT the admin ever handling its
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// private key (the wallet model: the key is born and stays on the user's
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// device; only the public key is published, via POST /register).
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//
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// The admin fixes the handle and role at mint time; the registering client may
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// NOT change them (no privilege escalation). Token is 32 random bytes in
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// lowercase hex (64 chars). ExpiresAt and CreatedAt are RFC3339Nano UTC. Used
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// flips to true the instant the invite is consumed, and an invite can be
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// consumed at most once. The audit fields (UsedAt/UsedSignPub/UsedKexPub) are
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// empty until the invite is consumed; they record which keys claimed it, so the
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// link between an invite and the identity it created stays traceable even though
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// the allowlist row itself stores only the signing key.
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type Invite struct {
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Token string `json:"token"`
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Handle string `json:"handle"`
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Role string `json:"role"`
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ExpiresAt string `json:"expires_at"`
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Used bool `json:"used"`
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CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
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// Audit (populated on consume; omitted on the wire while pending).
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UsedAt string `json:"used_at,omitempty"`
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UsedSignPub string `json:"used_sign_pub,omitempty"`
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UsedKexPub string `json:"used_kex_pub,omitempty"`
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}
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// Invite-flow sentinels. They let callers (and the HTTP layer) map a failed
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// consume to a precise status code without string-matching: an unknown token is
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// ErrNotFound (reused from the store), a spent token is ErrInviteUsed, a
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// past-deadline token is ErrInviteExpired. ErrUserExists (from users.go) is
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// reused when the presented signing key is already registered.
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var (
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ErrInviteUsed = errors.New("membership: invite already used")
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ErrInviteExpired = errors.New("membership: invite expired")
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)
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// defaultInviteTTL is the lifetime of an invite when the caller passes a
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// non-positive ttlSecs. Seven days mirrors a typical "share this link this
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// week" expectation while keeping the un-authenticated /register window bounded.
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const defaultInviteTTL = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
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// newInviteToken returns 32 cryptographically-random bytes as lowercase hex (64
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// chars). The token IS the bearer secret that authorizes /register, so it must
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// be unguessable; crypto/rand is the only acceptable source.
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func newInviteToken() (string, error) {
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b := make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("membership: generate invite token: %w", err)
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}
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return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
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}
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// inviteTTL resolves a caller-supplied ttlSecs into a concrete duration,
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// defaulting to defaultInviteTTL when non-positive.
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func inviteTTL(ttlSecs int) time.Duration {
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if ttlSecs <= 0 {
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return defaultInviteTTL
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}
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return time.Duration(ttlSecs) * time.Second
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}
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// inviteIsExpired reports whether the RFC3339 expiry has passed. A token whose
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// expiry cannot be parsed is treated as expired (fail closed): a corrupt
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// deadline must never widen the unauthenticated registration window.
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func inviteIsExpired(expiresAt string) bool {
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exp, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, expiresAt)
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if err != nil {
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return true
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}
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return time.Now().UTC().After(exp)
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}
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// validateInviteRole normalizes and validates the role an invite may carry. It
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// mirrors AddUser: empty defaults to member, and only admin|member are allowed
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// (an admin minting an admin invite is deliberate and permitted).
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func validateInviteRole(role string) (string, error) {
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if role == "" {
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return RoleMember, nil
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}
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if role != RoleAdmin && role != RoleMember {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("membership: invalid role %q (want %q or %q)", role, RoleAdmin, RoleMember)
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}
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return role, nil
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}
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// ---- SQLite implementation ------------------------------------------------
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// CreateInvite mints a single-use invite for a future user. handle is required;
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// role defaults to member and must be admin|member. ttlSecs sets the lifetime
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// (non-positive uses the 7-day default). The token is 32 random bytes in hex.
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func (s *sqliteStore) CreateInvite(handle, role string, ttlSecs int) (Invite, error) {
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if handle == "" {
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return Invite{}, fmt.Errorf("membership: CreateInvite: handle required")
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}
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role, err := validateInviteRole(role)
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if err != nil {
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return Invite{}, err
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}
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token, err := newInviteToken()
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if err != nil {
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return Invite{}, err
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}
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now := time.Now().UTC()
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inv := Invite{
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Token: token,
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Handle: handle,
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Role: role,
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ExpiresAt: now.Add(inviteTTL(ttlSecs)).Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
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Used: false,
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CreatedAt: now.Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
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}
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if _, err := s.db.Exec(
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`INSERT INTO invites (token, handle, role, expires_at, used, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?)`,
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inv.Token, inv.Handle, inv.Role, inv.ExpiresAt, inv.CreatedAt,
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); err != nil {
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return Invite{}, fmt.Errorf("membership: insert invite: %w", err)
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}
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return inv, nil
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}
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// GetInvite returns the invite with the given token, or ErrNotFound (wrapped)
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// when there is none.
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func (s *sqliteStore) GetInvite(token string) (Invite, error) {
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var inv Invite
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var used int
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var usedAt, usedSign, usedKex sql.NullString
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err := s.db.QueryRow(
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`SELECT token, handle, role, expires_at, used, created_at, used_at, used_sign_pub, used_kex_pub
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FROM invites WHERE token = ?`, token,
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).Scan(&inv.Token, &inv.Handle, &inv.Role, &inv.ExpiresAt, &used, &inv.CreatedAt, &usedAt, &usedSign, &usedKex)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return Invite{}, fmt.Errorf("membership: get invite %q: %w", token, ErrNotFound)
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}
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return Invite{}, fmt.Errorf("membership: get invite %q: %w", token, err)
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}
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inv.Used = used != 0
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inv.UsedAt, inv.UsedSignPub, inv.UsedKexPub = usedAt.String, usedSign.String, usedKex.String
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return inv, nil
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}
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// ListInvites returns every invite ordered newest-first (by created_at). It
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// includes consumed invites so the admin panel can show the full picture; the
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// caller filters to "pending" when it wants only live links.
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func (s *sqliteStore) ListInvites() ([]Invite, error) {
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rows, err := s.db.Query(
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`SELECT token, handle, role, expires_at, used, created_at, used_at, used_sign_pub, used_kex_pub
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FROM invites ORDER BY created_at DESC, token`,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("membership: list invites: %w", err)
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []Invite
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for rows.Next() {
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var inv Invite
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var used int
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var usedAt, usedSign, usedKex sql.NullString
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if err := rows.Scan(&inv.Token, &inv.Handle, &inv.Role, &inv.ExpiresAt, &used, &inv.CreatedAt, &usedAt, &usedSign, &usedKex); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("membership: scan invite: %w", err)
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}
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inv.Used = used != 0
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inv.UsedAt, inv.UsedSignPub, inv.UsedKexPub = usedAt.String, usedSign.String, usedKex.String
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out = append(out, inv)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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// ConsumeInvite atomically validates and spends an invite, registering the
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// presented signing key as a bus user with the invite's handle and role. It is
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// the ONLY path that adds to the allowlist without an admin signature: the
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// bearer token is the authorization, so the checks here are the security
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// boundary.
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//
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// Atomicity (single transaction): the invite is marked used FIRST (guarded by
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// `used = 0`, so two concurrent consumers cannot both win), then the user is
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// inserted. A token that passes validation is therefore spent exactly once.
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// Special case: if the signing key is already registered, the user INSERT hits
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// the PRIMARY KEY and we return ErrUserExists — but the invite stays SPENT (we
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// commit the mark), matching the JetStream backend's burn-on-claim semantics so
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// the two stores behave identically. A genuine backend error rolls everything
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// back, leaving the invite reusable.
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func (s *sqliteStore) ConsumeInvite(token, signPub, kexPub string) error {
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signPub = normalizeSignPub(signPub)
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kexPub = normalizeSignPub(kexPub)
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if signPub == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: ConsumeInvite: sign_pub required")
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}
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tx, err := s.db.Begin()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: ConsumeInvite: begin: %w", err)
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}
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defer tx.Rollback()
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var handle, role, expiresAt string
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var used int
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err = tx.QueryRow(
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`SELECT handle, role, expires_at, used FROM invites WHERE token = ?`, token,
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).Scan(&handle, &role, &expiresAt, &used)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: %w", token, ErrNotFound)
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: %w", token, err)
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}
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if used != 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: %w", token, ErrInviteUsed)
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}
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if inviteIsExpired(expiresAt) {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: %w", token, ErrInviteExpired)
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}
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// Mark used first, guarded by used = 0 so a concurrent consumer that already
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// flipped it (rows affected = 0) is rejected as used rather than double-spending.
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now := nowRFC3339()
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res, err := tx.Exec(
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`UPDATE invites SET used = 1, used_at = ?, used_sign_pub = ?, used_kex_pub = ? WHERE token = ? AND used = 0`,
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now, signPub, kexPub, token,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: mark used: %w", token, err)
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}
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n, err := res.RowsAffected()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: rows affected: %w", token, err)
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}
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if n == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: %w", token, ErrInviteUsed)
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}
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// Register the user with the invite-fixed handle and role.
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_, err = tx.Exec(
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`INSERT INTO users (sign_pub, handle, role, status, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
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signPub, handle, role, StatusActive, now,
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)
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if err != nil {
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// Already-registered key: the invite is still spent (commit the mark) so
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// the burn-on-claim contract matches the KV store. Any other failure rolls back.
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if isUniqueViolation(err) {
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if cErr := tx.Commit(); cErr != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: commit: %w", token, cErr)
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}
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return ErrUserExists
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: insert user: %w", token, err)
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: consume invite %q: commit: %w", token, err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// CancelInvite removes a pending invite (the admin revoked the link before it
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// was used). It hard-deletes the row; a consumed invite stays for audit only if
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// the caller targets a pending token. Deleting an unknown token returns
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// ErrNotFound so the HTTP layer can answer 404.
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func (s *sqliteStore) CancelInvite(token string) error {
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res, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM invites WHERE token = ?`, token)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: cancel invite %q: %w", token, err)
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}
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n, err := res.RowsAffected()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: cancel invite %q: rows affected: %w", token, err)
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}
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if n == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("membership: cancel invite %q: %w", token, ErrNotFound)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// isUniqueViolation reports whether err is a SQLite UNIQUE/PRIMARY KEY conflict.
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// modernc.org/sqlite surfaces it as a message fragment; matching it here keeps
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// the string-matching in one place (the same fragments AddUser checks inline).
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func isUniqueViolation(err error) bool {
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if err == nil {
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return false
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}
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msg := err.Error()
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return strings.Contains(msg, "UNIQUE constraint") || strings.Contains(msg, "PRIMARY KEY")
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}
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