Files
unibus/pkg/membership/users.go
T
egutierrez 450ca01baf feat(membership,client): HTTP admin-only users API
Close the last control-plane asymmetry: rooms had a signed HTTP surface
but users were only manageable via the local CLI or direct store access.
Add admin-only HTTP endpoints, symmetric with rooms, executed against the
same privileged store the server already serves (SQLite single-node, the
replicated JetStream KV in cluster) — no new KV connection, no internal
identity, so the admin panel can manage the allowlist by signing as an
admin instead of needing --db / direct KV access.

Endpoints (all behind requireAdmin, on top of the existing
signature+nonce+TLS+enforce middleware):
  - GET  /users                    list the full allowlist (incl. revoked)
  - POST /users                    add {sign_pub, handle, role}
  - POST /users/{signpub}/revoke   revoke (status flip, no hard delete)

requireAdmin is default-deny with no dev relaxation: it allows a request
only when the authenticated signer is confirmed by the store as an active
admin; any other case (no signer, non-admin, revoked, store error) is 403,
fail-closed. The request context now also carries the signer's sign_pub
hex, because the endpoint id is a one-way hash of the key and cannot be
reversed to look the signer up in the allowlist.

Validation/idempotency mirror the CLL: sign_pub must be 64-hex, role must
be admin|member (empty defaults to member), re-adding an existing key is a
409 that leaves the row untouched. The hex check is unified into
membership.ValidateSignPubHex, reused by the CLI and the handlers.

pkg/client gains ListUsers/AddUser/RevokeUser (flat UserInfo type) signed
via doJSON, so the panel plugs in directly.

Tests: non-admin -> 403 on all three endpoints; admin add->list->revoke
roundtrip; validation (400 hex, 400 role, 409 re-add, row untouched); plus
a client test against an embedded membershipd under enforce.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 20:31:57 +02:00

183 lines
6.7 KiB
Go

package membership
import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
)
// User roles and statuses. They are stored as free text in the users table so
// new values can be introduced without a schema change; these constants name
// the ones the code reasons about today.
const (
RoleAdmin = "admin"
RoleMember = "member"
StatusActive = "active"
StatusRevoked = "revoked"
)
// ErrUserExists is returned by AddUser when a user with the same sign_pub is
// already registered. Callers that want upsert semantics should branch on it.
var ErrUserExists = errors.New("membership: user already exists")
// User is a bus-level identity in the allowlist: the Ed25519 signing public key
// that authenticates a peer on both the control plane (request signatures) and
// the data plane (NATS nkey), plus its role and revocation status. SignPub is
// the lowercase hex of the 32-byte Ed25519 public key — the same key that
// derives the endpoint id via frame.EndpointID.
type User struct {
SignPub string // Ed25519 public key, lowercase hex
Handle string
Role string // RoleAdmin | RoleMember
Status string // StatusActive | StatusRevoked
CreatedAt string
RevokedAt string // empty unless revoked
}
// ValidateSignPubHex ensures signPub is exactly a 32-byte Ed25519 public key in
// hex (64 hex chars). It is the single source of truth for that check, shared by
// the local admin CLI (which validates before seeding the first admin) and the
// HTTP user-management handlers (which validate an admin-supplied key before it
// reaches the store). Catching a malformed key here turns a silent "authorized
// nobody" into an explicit error at the boundary.
func ValidateSignPubHex(signPub string) error {
b, err := hex.DecodeString(signPub)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("sign-pub is not valid hex: %w", err)
}
if len(b) != 32 {
return fmt.Errorf("sign-pub must be a 32-byte Ed25519 public key (64 hex chars), got %d bytes", len(b))
}
return nil
}
// normalizeSignPub lowercases the hex key so lookups are case-insensitive: the
// primary key is stored lowercase and every query normalizes its input the same
// way, so a caller passing uppercase hex still matches.
func normalizeSignPub(signPub string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(signPub))
}
// AddUser inserts a new bus user. role defaults to RoleMember when empty. It
// returns ErrUserExists if the sign_pub is already registered (the caller may
// choose to revoke+re-add or ignore). handle and signPub must be non-empty.
func (s *sqliteStore) AddUser(signPub, handle, role string) error {
signPub = normalizeSignPub(signPub)
if signPub == "" || handle == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("membership: AddUser: sign_pub and handle required")
}
if role == "" {
role = RoleMember
}
if role != RoleAdmin && role != RoleMember {
return fmt.Errorf("membership: AddUser: invalid role %q (want %q or %q)", role, RoleAdmin, RoleMember)
}
_, err := s.db.Exec(
`INSERT INTO users (sign_pub, handle, role, status, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
signPub, handle, role, StatusActive, nowRFC3339(),
)
if err != nil {
// modernc.org/sqlite surfaces a UNIQUE/PRIMARY KEY violation as a message
// containing "UNIQUE constraint failed"; translate it into a typed error so
// callers do not have to string-match.
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "UNIQUE constraint") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "PRIMARY KEY") {
return ErrUserExists
}
return fmt.Errorf("membership: insert user: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// GetUser returns the user with the given signing public key. It returns
// sql.ErrNoRows (wrapped) when there is no such user.
func (s *sqliteStore) GetUser(signPub string) (User, error) {
signPub = normalizeSignPub(signPub)
var u User
var revoked sql.NullString
err := s.db.QueryRow(
`SELECT sign_pub, handle, role, status, created_at, revoked_at FROM users WHERE sign_pub = ?`,
signPub,
).Scan(&u.SignPub, &u.Handle, &u.Role, &u.Status, &u.CreatedAt, &revoked)
if err != nil {
return User{}, fmt.Errorf("membership: get user %q: %w", signPub, err)
}
u.RevokedAt = revoked.String
return u, nil
}
// ListUsers returns every user ordered by handle then sign_pub (stable output).
func (s *sqliteStore) ListUsers() ([]User, error) {
rows, err := s.db.Query(
`SELECT sign_pub, handle, role, status, created_at, revoked_at FROM users ORDER BY handle, sign_pub`,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("membership: list users: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []User
for rows.Next() {
var u User
var revoked sql.NullString
if err := rows.Scan(&u.SignPub, &u.Handle, &u.Role, &u.Status, &u.CreatedAt, &revoked); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("membership: scan user: %w", err)
}
u.RevokedAt = revoked.String
out = append(out, u)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// RevokeUser marks a user as revoked and stamps revoked_at. Revocation is a
// status flip (not a delete) so the identity stays auditable and IsAuthorized
// immediately denies it on both planes. Revoking an unknown or already-revoked
// user returns an error / is a no-op respectively.
func (s *sqliteStore) RevokeUser(signPub string) error {
signPub = normalizeSignPub(signPub)
res, err := s.db.Exec(
`UPDATE users SET status = ?, revoked_at = ? WHERE sign_pub = ? AND status = ?`,
StatusRevoked, nowRFC3339(), signPub, StatusActive,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("membership: revoke user %q: %w", signPub, err)
}
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("membership: revoke user %q: rows affected: %w", signPub, err)
}
if n == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("membership: revoke user %q: no active user with that key", signPub)
}
return nil
}
// IsAuthorized reports whether signPub belongs to an active (non-revoked) bus
// user. It is the single authorization predicate consulted by both the control
// plane (HTTP request middleware) and the data plane (NATS nkey authenticator),
// so revoking a user denies access on both without restarting anything. An
// unknown key, a revoked key, or any query error all yield false (fail closed).
func (s *sqliteStore) IsAuthorized(signPub string) bool {
signPub = normalizeSignPub(signPub)
if signPub == "" {
return false
}
var one int
err := s.db.QueryRow(
`SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE sign_pub = ? AND status = ?`, signPub, StatusActive,
).Scan(&one)
return err == nil && one == 1
}
// HasAdmin reports whether at least one active admin exists. The control plane
// uses it to gate user-management endpoints: until the host operator seeds the
// first admin via the local CLI, those endpoints stay closed (chicken-egg).
func (s *sqliteStore) HasAdmin() bool {
var one int
err := s.db.QueryRow(
`SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE role = ? AND status = ? LIMIT 1`, RoleAdmin, StatusActive,
).Scan(&one)
return err == nil && one == 1
}