Files
unibus/cmd/membershipd/main.go
T
egutierrez e502b16675 feat(membership): forbid cleartext rooms on public deployments (H4 min defense)
Audit H4 (Alto). The embedded NATS has a single account with no per-subject
permissions, so any registered peer can subscribe to any subject — a cleartext
(ModeNATS) room's payload is readable by anyone who knows the subject.

A complete per-subject ACL derived from membership does not fit here: NATS
evaluates a connection's permissions once at connect time and never re-evaluates
them, but unibus clients connect-then-create/join-then-publish on one connection
(TestSecureBusEndToEnd). Static permissions would forbid the owner from
publishing to a room it just created; the dynamic reconnection model belongs to
the 0003 decentralization redesign. See dev/0004d-dataplane-acl.md.

Minimum defense implemented: Server.RequireEncryptedRooms (set by membershipd on
any non-loopback bind) refuses to create cleartext rooms, so every room on a
public deployment is end-to-end encrypted. Message CONTENT stays confidential
even with no subject isolation; residual traffic-metadata exposure is documented
and tracked for 0003.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-07 14:26:45 +02:00

164 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

// Command membershipd is the unibus control-plane service: room metadata,
// member directory, sealed key distribution, and the media blob store. The data
// plane is NATS — if --nats-url is empty it starts an embedded nats-server with
// JetStream so the whole stack runs with `go run` and nothing to install.
package main
import (
"context"
"flag"
"log"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
"syscall"
"time"
server "github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2/server"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/blobstore"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/busauth"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/embeddednats"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/membership"
)
func main() {
// Subcommand dispatch: `membershipd user ...` is the local administration CLI
// (seed/list/revoke bus users) and must be handled before the server flag set
// parses os.Args. Running the CLI on the bus host is trusted by design (whoever
// has a shell there already controls the service), which is how the first admin
// is seeded without a chicken-egg auth problem.
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "user" {
runUserCLI(os.Args[2:])
return
}
var (
bind = flag.String("bind", "127.0.0.1", "network interface to bind the HTTP API and the embedded NATS to; use 0.0.0.0 to accept LAN/remote peers")
natsURL = flag.String("nats-url", "", "external NATS url; empty starts an embedded server")
httpPort = flag.String("http-port", "8470", "HTTP port for the control-plane API")
dbPath = flag.String("db", "./local_files/unibus.db", "SQLite database path")
storeDir = flag.String("store-dir", "./local_files/blobs", "blob store directory")
natsPort = flag.Int("nats-port", 4250, "embedded NATS listen port (when --nats-url empty)")
natsStore = flag.String("nats-store", "./local_files/jetstream", "embedded JetStream store dir")
busAuth = flag.String("bus-auth", "off", "control-plane auth rollout: off|soft|enforce (feature flag bus-auth)")
tlsCert = flag.String("tls-cert", "", "PATH to the NATS server certificate (deploy/tls/server.crt); enables TLS on the embedded data plane")
tlsKey = flag.String("tls-key", "", "path to the NATS server private key (deploy/tls/server.key); required with --tls-cert")
)
flag.Parse()
authMode, err := membership.ParseAuthMode(*busAuth)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
// Fail-open guard (audit H2): a non-loopback bind, or any TLS flag, demands
// --bus-auth enforce. This makes an insecure public startup impossible rather
// than silently exposing the bus with the appearance of security.
if err := validateBootConfig(*bind, authMode, *tlsCert, *tlsKey); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
log.SetFlags(log.LstdFlags | log.Lmsgprefix)
log.SetPrefix("[membershipd] ")
// Control plane store first: the NATS authenticator consults IsAuthorized, so
// the store must exist before the embedded server starts.
store, err := membership.Open(*dbPath)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("open membership store: %v", err)
}
defer store.Close()
log.Printf("membership store: %s", *dbPath)
blobs, err := blobstore.New(*storeDir)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("open blob store: %v", err)
}
log.Printf("blob store: %s", *storeDir)
// Data plane: embedded or external NATS. For the embedded server, enforce
// turns on the nkey authenticator (only allowlisted identities may connect)
// and --tls-cert/--tls-key turn on TLS. An external NATS manages its own
// auth/TLS, so those flags do not apply to it.
var ns *server.Server
natsClientURL := *natsURL
if natsClientURL == "" {
cfg := embeddednats.ServerConfig{
// Bind the embedded NATS to the same interface as the HTTP API so a
// single --bind flag governs reachability: 127.0.0.1 keeps the whole
// stack loopback-only; 0.0.0.0 exposes both planes to the LAN.
StoreDir: *natsStore,
Host: *bind,
Port: *natsPort,
}
if authMode == membership.AuthEnforce {
cfg.Auth = busauth.NewNkeyAuthenticator(store.IsAuthorized)
log.Printf("NATS nkey authentication: ON (enforce)")
}
if *tlsCert != "" || *tlsKey != "" {
if *tlsCert == "" || *tlsKey == "" {
log.Fatalf("--tls-cert and --tls-key must be set together")
}
tlsCfg, err := busauth.ServerTLSConfig(*tlsCert, *tlsKey)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("load NATS TLS: %v", err)
}
cfg.TLS = tlsCfg
log.Printf("NATS TLS: ON (%s)", *tlsCert)
}
ns, err = embeddednats.StartServer(cfg)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("start embedded nats: %v", err)
}
natsClientURL = embeddednats.ClientURL(ns)
log.Printf("embedded NATS (JetStream) ready: %s", natsClientURL)
} else {
log.Printf("using external NATS: %s", natsClientURL)
}
srv := membership.NewServer(store, blobs, authMode)
// On a public (non-loopback) bind, disable cleartext rooms: the embedded NATS
// has no per-subject ACL, so cleartext content would be readable by any
// registered peer. Forcing E2E keeps message content confidential regardless
// (audit H4 minimum defense; see dev/0004d-dataplane-acl.md).
if !isLoopbackBind(*bind) {
srv.RequireEncryptedRooms = true
log.Printf("cleartext rooms: DISABLED (public bind requires end-to-end encryption)")
}
log.Printf("control-plane auth: %s", authMode)
addr := *bind + ":" + *httpPort
httpSrv := &http.Server{
Addr: addr,
Handler: srv,
// Bound request header size so a peer cannot exhaust memory with huge
// headers before any body limit applies (the body ceilings live in the
// membership middleware).
MaxHeaderBytes: membership.MaxHeaderBytes,
ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
}
go func() {
log.Printf("HTTP control-plane API: http://%s", addr)
log.Printf(" health: http://%s/healthz", addr)
if err := httpSrv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
log.Fatalf("http server: %v", err)
}
}()
// Graceful shutdown on SIGINT/SIGTERM.
stop := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(stop, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
<-stop
log.Printf("shutting down...")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = httpSrv.Shutdown(ctx)
if ns != nil {
ns.Shutdown()
ns.WaitForShutdown()
}
log.Printf("bye")
}