feat: initial scaffold of uniweb — unibus web frontend (SPA + gateway)
Extracted from unibus v0.13.0: the chat SPA (web/, React+Mantine, per-user BIP39 wallet) and the web gateway (cmd/webgw, REST+SSE) that acts as a bus peer for the browser. Consumes unibus as a Go module via replace => ../unibus, keeping its own replace fn-registry for the cybersecurity primitives. go build/vet/test and pnpm build green in the new location.
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package main
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import (
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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cs "fn-registry/functions/cybersecurity"
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"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/busauth"
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"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/client"
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"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/frame"
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"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/room"
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)
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// gateway is the live web gateway: it owns the operator's identity and a single
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// connected unibus client, and turns the bus's crypto-bearing API into the plain
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// REST/SSE surface the browser consumes. The browser never signs, never speaks
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// NATS, and never sees a private key — the gateway is the legitimate room member
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// that seals/opens payloads on the browser's behalf.
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//
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// TRUST MODEL: content stays end-to-end encrypted on the wire. The gateway can
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// read plaintext because it acts AS the operator's client — a real member of
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// each room, holding the room key K like any peer. It is the same trust a native
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// desktop client has. In the wallet phase (per-browser WebCrypto identity) the
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// decryption can move into the browser; today, for the single-operator MVP, the
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// gateway decrypts server-side and pushes cleartext over a loopback/authenticated
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// SSE channel.
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type gateway struct {
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id cs.Identity
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endpoint string
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cli *client.Client
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refreshACL bool // call RefreshSession after a membership change (needed under a per-subject ACL bus)
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mu sync.Mutex
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hubs map[string]*roomHub // roomID -> live fan-out of decrypted frames to SSE clients
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}
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// gatewayConfig wires a live gateway.
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type gatewayConfig struct {
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Identity cs.Identity
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NatsURL string
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CtrlURL string
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CtrlURLs []string
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NatsURLs []string
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CAPath string // bus CA; empty => plaintext dev connection (matches a loopback membershipd)
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}
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// newGateway connects the unibus client with the operator identity following the
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// same posture seam every peer uses: a non-empty CA path means TLS + nkey, empty
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// means plaintext dev. When a CA is configured the bus is assumed to enforce a
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// per-subject ACL, so membership changes trigger a session refresh.
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func newGateway(cfg gatewayConfig) (*gateway, error) {
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opts := client.Options{
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CtrlURLs: cfg.CtrlURLs,
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NatsServers: cfg.NatsURLs,
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}
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if cfg.CAPath != "" {
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tlsCfg, err := busauth.LoadCATLSConfig(cfg.CAPath)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("webgw: load bus CA %q: %w", cfg.CAPath, err)
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}
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opts.UseNkey = true
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opts.TLS = tlsCfg
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opts.CtrlTLS = tlsCfg
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}
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cli, err := client.NewWithOptions(cfg.NatsURL, cfg.CtrlURL, cfg.Identity, opts)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("webgw: connect bus client: %w", err)
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}
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return &gateway{
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id: cfg.Identity,
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endpoint: frame.EndpointID(cfg.Identity.SignPub),
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cli: cli,
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refreshACL: cfg.CAPath != "",
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hubs: map[string]*roomHub{},
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}, nil
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}
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// Close stops every hub and releases the bus client connection.
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func (g *gateway) Close() error {
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g.mu.Lock()
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for _, h := range g.hubs {
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h.stop()
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}
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g.hubs = map[string]*roomHub{}
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g.mu.Unlock()
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if g.cli != nil {
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return g.cli.Close()
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ---- wire types (browser-facing JSON) ------------------------------------
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// meInfo is what GET /api/me returns: the operator identity the gateway acts as.
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type meInfo struct {
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Endpoint string `json:"endpoint"`
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SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"`
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}
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// roomWire is the browser view of a room. It deliberately omits messages: those
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// stream over SSE (GET /api/rooms/{id}/stream), not in the room list.
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type roomWire struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Subject string `json:"subject"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Epoch int `json:"epoch"`
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Encrypt bool `json:"encrypt"`
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Persist bool `json:"persist"`
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SignMsgs bool `json:"sign_msgs"`
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Role string `json:"role"`
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}
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// createRoomReq is the POST /api/rooms body. Encrypt/Persist/SignMsgs are
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// pointers so an omitted field falls back to the chat default rather than to the
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// Go zero value (false). The common case — the browser sending only {subject,
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// encrypted} — maps encrypted onto all three (the Matrix-like chat policy).
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type createRoomReq struct {
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Subject string `json:"subject"`
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Encrypted *bool `json:"encrypted,omitempty"`
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Encrypt *bool `json:"encrypt,omitempty"`
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Persist *bool `json:"persist,omitempty"`
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SignMsgs *bool `json:"sign_msgs,omitempty"`
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}
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// policy resolves the requested policy. A bare {subject} defaults to the
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// Matrix-like chat room (encrypted + persisted + signed) so a created room keeps
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// durable, end-to-end-encrypted, authored history. Callers can override any leg.
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func (r createRoomReq) policy() room.Policy {
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enc, per, sig := true, true, true
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if r.Encrypted != nil {
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enc, per, sig = *r.Encrypted, *r.Encrypted, *r.Encrypted
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}
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if r.Encrypt != nil {
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enc = *r.Encrypt
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}
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if r.Persist != nil {
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per = *r.Persist
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}
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if r.SignMsgs != nil {
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sig = *r.SignMsgs
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}
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return room.Policy{Encrypt: enc, Persist: per, SignMsgs: sig}
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}
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// sendReq is the POST /api/rooms/{id}/send body.
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type sendReq struct {
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Body string `json:"body"`
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}
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// msgWire is one decrypted message pushed over SSE.
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type msgWire struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Sender string `json:"sender"`
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Body string `json:"body"`
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TS int64 `json:"ts"` // epoch ms (decoded from the frame's ULID id)
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Mine bool `json:"mine"`
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}
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// ---- operations -----------------------------------------------------------
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func (g *gateway) me() meInfo {
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return meInfo{Endpoint: g.endpoint, SignPub: hex.EncodeToString(g.id.SignPub)}
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}
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// subjectName derives a short, human-friendly room name from its bus subject by
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// dropping the leading namespace segment (room., test., proc., agent.). It is a
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// display nicety only; the canonical identity stays the subject/room id.
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func subjectName(subject string) string {
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for _, p := range []string{"room.", "test.", "proc.", "agent.", "rpc."} {
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if strings.HasPrefix(subject, p) {
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return strings.TrimPrefix(subject, p)
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}
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}
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return subject
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}
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func (g *gateway) listRooms() ([]roomWire, error) {
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rooms, err := g.cli.ListMyRooms()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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out := make([]roomWire, 0, len(rooms))
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for _, rm := range rooms {
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out = append(out, roomWire{
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ID: rm.RoomID,
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Subject: rm.Subject,
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Name: subjectName(rm.Subject),
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Epoch: rm.Epoch,
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Encrypt: rm.Policy.Encrypt,
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Persist: rm.Policy.Persist,
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SignMsgs: rm.Policy.SignMsgs,
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Role: rm.Role,
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})
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (g *gateway) createRoom(req createRoomReq) (roomWire, error) {
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subject := strings.TrimSpace(req.Subject)
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if subject == "" {
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return roomWire{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: subject required")
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}
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p := req.policy()
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roomID, err := g.cli.CreateRoom(subject, p)
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if err != nil {
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return roomWire{}, err
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}
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// Under a per-subject ACL the operator's frozen NATS permissions do not yet
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// cover the new room's subject; refresh so subsequent data-plane use works. On
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// a plaintext/non-ACL dev bus this is unnecessary and would needlessly drop any
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// live SSE subscriptions, so it is gated on the secured posture.
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if g.refreshACL {
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_ = g.cli.RefreshSession()
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}
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return roomWire{
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ID: roomID,
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Subject: subject,
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Name: subjectName(subject),
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Epoch: 1,
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Encrypt: p.Encrypt,
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Persist: p.Persist,
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SignMsgs: p.SignMsgs,
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Role: "owner",
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}, nil
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}
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// join resolves room metadata and (for encrypted rooms) fetches the room key so
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// the gateway can later open payloads. Idempotent.
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func (g *gateway) join(roomID string) error {
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if err := g.cli.Join(roomID); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if g.refreshACL {
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_ = g.cli.RefreshSession()
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}
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return nil
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}
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// send publishes plaintext to a room. The unibus client seals it with the room
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// key (encrypted rooms) and signs it (signed rooms) before it leaves the process.
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func (g *gateway) send(roomID, body string) error {
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return g.cli.Publish(roomID, []byte(body))
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}
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