feat: add E2EE diagnostics logging and testing support for crypto initialization

This commit is contained in:
2026-03-05 00:41:01 +00:00
parent a7e28b0267
commit fc234bcb92
2 changed files with 368 additions and 1 deletions
+138 -1
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"maunium.net/go/mautrix"
"maunium.net/go/mautrix/crypto"
"maunium.net/go/mautrix/crypto/cryptohelper"
"maunium.net/go/mautrix/event"
"maunium.net/go/mautrix/id"
@@ -98,7 +99,12 @@ func (c *Client) InitCrypto(ctx context.Context, storePath, pickleKeyHex, agentI
}
// Assign the real mautrix crypto helper — this satisfies mautrix.CryptoHelper.
c.raw.Crypto = helper.(*mautrixCryptoWrapper)
wrapper := helper.(*mautrixCryptoWrapper)
c.raw.Crypto = wrapper
// Log E2EE diagnostic state to help debug verification issues.
logCryptoDiagnostics(ctx, wrapper, c.raw, slog.Default())
return closer, nil
}
@@ -190,6 +196,137 @@ func (c *Client) SendTyping(ctx context.Context, roomID string, typing bool) err
return err
}
// diagMachine abstracts the crypto.OlmMachine methods used by diagnostics,
// allowing unit tests to substitute a fake without a real crypto store.
type diagMachine interface {
GetOwnCrossSigningPublicKeys(ctx context.Context) *crypto.CrossSigningPublicKeysCache
OwnIdentity() *id.Device
ExportCrossSigningKeys() crypto.CrossSigningSeeds
ResolveTrustContext(ctx context.Context, device *id.Device) (id.TrustState, error)
IsDeviceTrusted(device *id.Device) bool
}
// logCryptoDiagnostics logs the E2EE state after initialization.
// This helps diagnose "Encrypted by a device not verified by its owner" warnings.
// It is defensive against nil fields in the crypto machine to avoid panics.
func logCryptoDiagnostics(ctx context.Context, wrapper *mautrixCryptoWrapper, raw *mautrix.Client, logger *slog.Logger) {
machine := wrapper.Machine()
if machine == nil {
logger.Warn("e2ee diagnostics: olm machine is nil")
return
}
logCryptoDiagnosticsCore(ctx, machine, raw.UserID, raw.DeviceID, logger)
}
// logCryptoDiagnosticsCore contains the testable diagnostics logic.
func logCryptoDiagnosticsCore(ctx context.Context, machine diagMachine, userID id.UserID, deviceID id.DeviceID, logger *slog.Logger) {
logger.Info("e2ee diagnostics: device info",
"user_id", userID,
"device_id", deviceID,
)
// Check own cross-signing public keys
ownKeys := machine.GetOwnCrossSigningPublicKeys(ctx)
if ownKeys == nil {
logger.Warn("e2ee diagnostics: NO cross-signing public keys found — this is likely why messages show 'not verified by its owner'",
"hint", "run: go run -tags goolm ./cmd/verify --homeserver <hs> --username <user> --password <pass> --token <token>",
)
} else {
logger.Info("e2ee diagnostics: cross-signing public keys found",
"master_key", truncateKey(string(ownKeys.MasterKey)),
"self_signing_key", truncateKey(string(ownKeys.SelfSigningKey)),
"user_signing_key", truncateKey(string(ownKeys.UserSigningKey)),
)
}
// Check if our own device is trusted via cross-signing
ownDevice := machine.OwnIdentity()
if ownDevice == nil {
logger.Warn("e2ee diagnostics: own device identity is nil — cannot check trust state")
} else {
logDeviceTrust(ctx, machine, ownDevice, logger)
}
// Check if cross-signing private keys are available (needed to sign devices).
// ExportCrossSigningKeys panics when CrossSigningKeys is nil (no private keys
// loaded), so we guard the call.
logCrossSigningSeeds(machine, logger)
}
// logCrossSigningSeeds safely exports and logs cross-signing private key availability.
// mautrix's ExportCrossSigningKeys panics when CrossSigningKeys is nil, so we
// recover from the panic instead of relying on unexported internal fields.
func logCrossSigningSeeds(machine diagMachine, logger *slog.Logger) {
var (
hasMasterSeed bool
hasSelfSigningSeed bool
hasUserSigningSeed bool
recovered bool
)
func() {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
recovered = true
}
}()
seeds := machine.ExportCrossSigningKeys()
hasMasterSeed = len(seeds.MasterKey) > 0
hasSelfSigningSeed = len(seeds.SelfSigningKey) > 0
hasUserSigningSeed = len(seeds.UserSigningKey) > 0
}()
if recovered {
logger.Warn("e2ee diagnostics: cross-signing private keys not available (not loaded in crypto store)")
return
}
logger.Info("e2ee diagnostics: cross-signing private keys in store",
"master_seed", hasMasterSeed,
"self_signing_seed", hasSelfSigningSeed,
"user_signing_seed", hasUserSigningSeed,
)
if !hasSelfSigningSeed {
logger.Warn("e2ee diagnostics: self-signing private key NOT in store — the bot cannot sign its own device",
"hint", "run cmd/verify with the SAME crypto store path the agent uses",
)
}
}
// logDeviceTrust resolves and logs the trust state for a device.
func logDeviceTrust(ctx context.Context, machine diagMachine, device *id.Device, logger *slog.Logger) {
trust, err := machine.ResolveTrustContext(ctx, device)
if err != nil {
logger.Warn("e2ee diagnostics: failed to resolve device trust",
"device_id", device.DeviceID,
"err", err,
)
return
}
logger.Info("e2ee diagnostics: own device trust state",
"device_id", device.DeviceID,
"trust_state", trust.String(),
"is_trusted", machine.IsDeviceTrusted(device),
)
if trust < id.TrustStateCrossSignedTOFU {
logger.Warn("e2ee diagnostics: device is NOT cross-signed — recipients will see 'not verified by its owner'",
"trust_state", trust.String(),
"required_minimum", "CrossSignedTOFU",
)
}
}
// truncateKey returns first 8 chars of a key for safe logging.
func truncateKey(key string) string {
if len(key) > 8 {
return key[:8] + "..."
}
return key
}
// Raw returns the underlying mautrix.Client for advanced use.
func (c *Client) Raw() *mautrix.Client {
return c.raw
+230
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package matrix
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
@@ -8,6 +9,9 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"maunium.net/go/mautrix/crypto"
"maunium.net/go/mautrix/id"
)
// fakeCryptoHelper implements cryptoHelper for testing.
@@ -170,3 +174,229 @@ func TestInitHelper_SetsAccountID(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("expected accountID='my-agent', got '%s'", helper.accountID)
}
}
// --- diagMachine fake for testing diagnostics ---
type fakeDiagMachine struct {
pubKeys *crypto.CrossSigningPublicKeysCache
ownDevice *id.Device
seeds crypto.CrossSigningSeeds
seedsPanic bool // simulate ExportCrossSigningKeys panic
trustState id.TrustState
trustErr error
deviceTrusted bool
}
func (f *fakeDiagMachine) GetOwnCrossSigningPublicKeys(ctx context.Context) *crypto.CrossSigningPublicKeysCache {
return f.pubKeys
}
func (f *fakeDiagMachine) OwnIdentity() *id.Device {
return f.ownDevice
}
func (f *fakeDiagMachine) ExportCrossSigningKeys() crypto.CrossSigningSeeds {
if f.seedsPanic {
panic("nil pointer dereference")
}
return f.seeds
}
func (f *fakeDiagMachine) ResolveTrustContext(ctx context.Context, device *id.Device) (id.TrustState, error) {
return f.trustState, f.trustErr
}
func (f *fakeDiagMachine) IsDeviceTrusted(device *id.Device) bool {
return f.deviceTrusted
}
// testLogger returns a logger that writes to a buffer for assertions.
func testLogger(buf *bytes.Buffer) *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug}))
}
func TestLogCryptoDiagnosticsCore_NilOwnDevice(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := testLogger(&buf)
machine := &fakeDiagMachine{
pubKeys: &crypto.CrossSigningPublicKeysCache{MasterKey: "abc", SelfSigningKey: "def", UserSigningKey: "ghi"},
ownDevice: nil, // nil device — was causing panic before the fix
seeds: crypto.CrossSigningSeeds{MasterKey: []byte("x"), SelfSigningKey: []byte("y"), UserSigningKey: []byte("z")},
}
logCryptoDiagnosticsCore(context.Background(), machine, "@bot:test", "DEVICE1", logger)
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "own device identity is nil") {
t.Errorf("expected warning about nil device identity, got:\n%s", out)
}
}
func TestLogCryptoDiagnosticsCore_NilPublicKeys(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := testLogger(&buf)
machine := &fakeDiagMachine{
pubKeys: nil, // no cross-signing public keys
ownDevice: nil,
seeds: crypto.CrossSigningSeeds{},
}
logCryptoDiagnosticsCore(context.Background(), machine, "@bot:test", "DEVICE1", logger)
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "NO cross-signing public keys found") {
t.Errorf("expected warning about missing public keys, got:\n%s", out)
}
}
func TestLogCrossSigningSeeds_PanicRecovery(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := testLogger(&buf)
machine := &fakeDiagMachine{seedsPanic: true}
// Must not panic — should recover gracefully.
logCrossSigningSeeds(machine, logger)
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "cross-signing private keys not available") {
t.Errorf("expected recovery warning, got:\n%s", out)
}
}
func TestLogCrossSigningSeeds_AllPresent(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := testLogger(&buf)
machine := &fakeDiagMachine{
seeds: crypto.CrossSigningSeeds{
MasterKey: []byte("master"),
SelfSigningKey: []byte("self"),
UserSigningKey: []byte("user"),
},
}
logCrossSigningSeeds(machine, logger)
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "cross-signing private keys in store") {
t.Errorf("expected info about keys in store, got:\n%s", out)
}
if strings.Contains(out, "self-signing private key NOT in store") {
t.Error("should not warn when self-signing key is present")
}
}
func TestLogCrossSigningSeeds_MissingSelfSigning(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := testLogger(&buf)
machine := &fakeDiagMachine{
seeds: crypto.CrossSigningSeeds{
MasterKey: []byte("master"),
// SelfSigningKey intentionally missing
},
}
logCrossSigningSeeds(machine, logger)
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "self-signing private key NOT in store") {
t.Errorf("expected warning about missing self-signing key, got:\n%s", out)
}
}
func TestLogDeviceTrust_Trusted(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := testLogger(&buf)
device := &id.Device{DeviceID: "DEV1"}
machine := &fakeDiagMachine{
trustState: id.TrustStateCrossSignedTOFU,
deviceTrusted: true,
}
logDeviceTrust(context.Background(), machine, device, logger)
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "own device trust state") {
t.Errorf("expected trust state log, got:\n%s", out)
}
if strings.Contains(out, "device is NOT cross-signed") {
t.Error("should not warn for trusted device")
}
}
func TestLogDeviceTrust_Untrusted(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := testLogger(&buf)
device := &id.Device{DeviceID: "DEV2"}
machine := &fakeDiagMachine{
trustState: id.TrustStateUnset,
deviceTrusted: false,
}
logDeviceTrust(context.Background(), machine, device, logger)
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "device is NOT cross-signed") {
t.Errorf("expected cross-sign warning, got:\n%s", out)
}
}
func TestLogDeviceTrust_ResolveTrustError(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := testLogger(&buf)
device := &id.Device{DeviceID: "DEV3"}
machine := &fakeDiagMachine{
trustErr: errors.New("crypto store unavailable"),
}
logDeviceTrust(context.Background(), machine, device, logger)
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "failed to resolve device trust") {
t.Errorf("expected trust resolve error, got:\n%s", out)
}
}
func TestLogCryptoDiagnosticsCore_FullHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := testLogger(&buf)
machine := &fakeDiagMachine{
pubKeys: &crypto.CrossSigningPublicKeysCache{
MasterKey: "masterkey123",
SelfSigningKey: "selfkey456",
UserSigningKey: "userkey789",
},
ownDevice: &id.Device{DeviceID: "MYDEV"},
trustState: id.TrustStateCrossSignedTOFU,
deviceTrusted: true,
seeds: crypto.CrossSigningSeeds{
MasterKey: []byte("m"),
SelfSigningKey: []byte("s"),
UserSigningKey: []byte("u"),
},
}
logCryptoDiagnosticsCore(context.Background(), machine, "@bot:hs", "MYDEV", logger)
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "device info") {
t.Error("expected device info log")
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "cross-signing public keys found") {
t.Error("expected public keys log")
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "own device trust state") {
t.Error("expected trust state log")
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "cross-signing private keys in store") {
t.Error("expected private keys log")
}
}