egutierrez
1cbbad9ff9
Server-side homeserver.yaml on organic-machine VPS: - encryption_enabled_by_default_for_room_type: invite -> all - presence.enabled: false (block EDU metadata leak) - url_preview_enabled: false (block SSRF + IP leak) - msc4108 rendezvous endpoint uncommented (QR login) Synapse restarted, /versions shows e2ee_forced.* + msc4108 unstable features active. Backup at synapse_data/homeserver.yaml.bak.1779659423. Issues opened for remaining gaps: - 0165 LUKS for media_store (at-rest encryption) - 0166 LiveKit TURN deploy (NAT traversal gap) - 0167 STUN leak to Google (hardcode external_ip) - 0168 UDP range expand 200 -> 500 - 0169 LIVEKIT_SECRET rotation (audit exposure) - 0170 livekit.example.yaml rename hygiene Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
66 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: "0165"
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title: "Cifrar media_store/ Synapse con LUKS at-rest"
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status: pendiente
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type: infra
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domain:
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- matrix
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scope: app:element_matrix_chat
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priority: media
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depends: []
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blocks: []
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related: ["0162"]
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created: 2026-05-24
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updated: 2026-05-24
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tags: [matrix, synapse, encryption, security, luks]
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---
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# 0165 — Cifrar media_store/ Synapse con LUKS at-rest
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**Status:** pendiente
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**Created:** 2026-05-24
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**Type:** infra
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**Priority:** media
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**Domain:** matrix
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**Scope:** app:element_matrix_chat
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**Depends:** —
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**Blocks:** —
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## Problema
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`synapse_data/media_store/` contiene archivos subidos (fotos, voice messages, attachments) + thumbnails. Rooms NO-E2EE: media cleartext en disco. Tabla `media_repository` Postgres: filename/mime/uploader/room_id siempre cleartext. Riesgo: VPS provider snapshot disk, backups desencriptados, disco fisico.
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## Objetivo
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`media_store/` cifrado at-rest. Synapse arranca y sirve media normal. Decrypt automatico via keyfile en TPM o passphrase al boot.
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## Plan
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1. Decidir estrategia: LUKS container file-based (loop device) vs LUKS sobre volumen Docker dedicado.
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2. Crear LUKS container 50GB (ajustar segun crecimiento previsto).
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3. Montar como `/home/ubuntu/CodeProyects/element_matrix_chat/synapse_data/media_store_encrypted/`.
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4. Stop Synapse → rsync `media_store/` → `media_store_encrypted/` → swap mountpoint.
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5. Verificar Synapse sirve thumbnails + uploads OK.
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6. Configurar auto-unlock via keyfile en `/root/.luks-media.key` con permisos 0400.
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7. Documentar recovery passphrase en `pass` (entry `matrix/luks-media-passphrase`).
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## Acceptance
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- [ ] `media_store/` montado sobre LUKS, `lsblk -f` muestra crypto_LUKS.
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- [ ] Synapse arranca tras reboot completo del VPS sin intervencion manual.
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- [ ] Test: subir imagen via Element, verificar thumb generado.
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- [ ] Test: leer media_store via `dd if=/dev/sdX` directo retorna basura cifrada.
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- [ ] Passphrase backed up en `pass`.
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## Definition of Done
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- [ ] Repetibilidad: reboot VPS, media accesible sin intervencion.
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- [ ] Observabilidad: log entry en `journalctl -u systemd-cryptsetup@*`.
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- [ ] User-facing: clientes Element no notan diferencia.
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- [ ] Recovery probado: detach LUKS y reattach con passphrase.
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## Notas
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LUKS solo protege at-rest. VPS provider con acceso a RAM viva ve plaintext via memory dump. Sin TPM atestado, utilidad real = anti-snapshot/anti-backup-leak/anti-physical-theft.
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Caveat: si keyfile vive en mismo disco que LUKS device, no protege contra disk theft. Mover keyfile a USB removible o TPM2 (`systemd-cryptenroll`).
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