feat(webgw): web gateway peer (REST + SSE) for the chat SPA

Add cmd/webgw: a single Go binary that holds the operator's bus identity,
connects to the bus as a real authenticated peer (pkg/client), and exposes a
small REST + SSE API the browser consumes. The browser never signs, never
speaks NATS, and never sees a private key.

Endpoints (all under /api, gated by a session cookie except login):
  POST /api/login            unlock a session with the operator passphrase
  POST /api/logout
  GET  /api/me               operator identity the gateway acts as
  GET  /api/rooms            ListMyRooms
  POST /api/rooms            CreateRoom (default policy: encrypted+persisted+signed)
  POST /api/rooms/{id}/join  Join (fetch room key)
  POST /api/rooms/{id}/send  Publish (sealed + signed by the peer)
  GET  /api/rooms/{id}/stream  SSE of decrypted frames (history then live)

Design notes:
- One fan-out hub per room: a single bus subscription is multiplexed to N SSE
  clients, avoiding the per-(room,endpoint) durable-consumer contention that
  multiple Subscribe calls would cause.
- Posture seam mirrors unibus_admin/clientcheck: empty --ca = plaintext dev,
  non-empty = TLS+nkey on both planes; RefreshSession after a membership change
  only under the secured (ACL) posture.
- Identity loaded from `pass` or a 0600 file, held only in memory.
- Session auth: passphrase compared in constant time; opaque HttpOnly cookie
  so EventSource (which cannot set headers) can authenticate the stream.

TRUST MODEL: room content stays end-to-end encrypted on the bus. The gateway
reads plaintext only because it acts AS the operator's client — a legitimate
member of each room holding the room key. The per-browser wallet (WebCrypto)
that moves decryption into the browser is phase 2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
agent
2026-06-07 21:14:08 +02:00
parent b4f3118e85
commit fb8a03cf0c
5 changed files with 965 additions and 0 deletions
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package main
import (
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
cs "fn-registry/functions/cybersecurity"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/busauth"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/client"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/frame"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/room"
)
// gateway is the live web gateway: it owns the operator's identity and a single
// connected unibus client, and turns the bus's crypto-bearing API into the plain
// REST/SSE surface the browser consumes. The browser never signs, never speaks
// NATS, and never sees a private key — the gateway is the legitimate room member
// that seals/opens payloads on the browser's behalf.
//
// TRUST MODEL: content stays end-to-end encrypted on the wire. The gateway can
// read plaintext because it acts AS the operator's client — a real member of
// each room, holding the room key K like any peer. It is the same trust a native
// desktop client has. In the wallet phase (per-browser WebCrypto identity) the
// decryption can move into the browser; today, for the single-operator MVP, the
// gateway decrypts server-side and pushes cleartext over a loopback/authenticated
// SSE channel.
type gateway struct {
id cs.Identity
endpoint string
cli *client.Client
refreshACL bool // call RefreshSession after a membership change (needed under a per-subject ACL bus)
mu sync.Mutex
hubs map[string]*roomHub // roomID -> live fan-out of decrypted frames to SSE clients
}
// gatewayConfig wires a live gateway.
type gatewayConfig struct {
Identity cs.Identity
NatsURL string
CtrlURL string
CtrlURLs []string
NatsURLs []string
CAPath string // bus CA; empty => plaintext dev connection (matches a loopback membershipd)
}
// newGateway connects the unibus client with the operator identity following the
// same posture seam every peer uses: a non-empty CA path means TLS + nkey, empty
// means plaintext dev. When a CA is configured the bus is assumed to enforce a
// per-subject ACL, so membership changes trigger a session refresh.
func newGateway(cfg gatewayConfig) (*gateway, error) {
opts := client.Options{
CtrlURLs: cfg.CtrlURLs,
NatsServers: cfg.NatsURLs,
}
if cfg.CAPath != "" {
tlsCfg, err := busauth.LoadCATLSConfig(cfg.CAPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("webgw: load bus CA %q: %w", cfg.CAPath, err)
}
opts.UseNkey = true
opts.TLS = tlsCfg
opts.CtrlTLS = tlsCfg
}
cli, err := client.NewWithOptions(cfg.NatsURL, cfg.CtrlURL, cfg.Identity, opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("webgw: connect bus client: %w", err)
}
return &gateway{
id: cfg.Identity,
endpoint: frame.EndpointID(cfg.Identity.SignPub),
cli: cli,
refreshACL: cfg.CAPath != "",
hubs: map[string]*roomHub{},
}, nil
}
// Close stops every hub and releases the bus client connection.
func (g *gateway) Close() error {
g.mu.Lock()
for _, h := range g.hubs {
h.stop()
}
g.hubs = map[string]*roomHub{}
g.mu.Unlock()
if g.cli != nil {
return g.cli.Close()
}
return nil
}
// ---- wire types (browser-facing JSON) ------------------------------------
// meInfo is what GET /api/me returns: the operator identity the gateway acts as.
type meInfo struct {
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint"`
SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"`
}
// roomWire is the browser view of a room. It deliberately omits messages: those
// stream over SSE (GET /api/rooms/{id}/stream), not in the room list.
type roomWire struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Subject string `json:"subject"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Epoch int `json:"epoch"`
Encrypt bool `json:"encrypt"`
Persist bool `json:"persist"`
SignMsgs bool `json:"sign_msgs"`
Role string `json:"role"`
}
// createRoomReq is the POST /api/rooms body. Encrypt/Persist/SignMsgs are
// pointers so an omitted field falls back to the chat default rather than to the
// Go zero value (false). The common case — the browser sending only {subject,
// encrypted} — maps encrypted onto all three (the Matrix-like chat policy).
type createRoomReq struct {
Subject string `json:"subject"`
Encrypted *bool `json:"encrypted,omitempty"`
Encrypt *bool `json:"encrypt,omitempty"`
Persist *bool `json:"persist,omitempty"`
SignMsgs *bool `json:"sign_msgs,omitempty"`
}
// policy resolves the requested policy. A bare {subject} defaults to the
// Matrix-like chat room (encrypted + persisted + signed) so a created room keeps
// durable, end-to-end-encrypted, authored history. Callers can override any leg.
func (r createRoomReq) policy() room.Policy {
enc, per, sig := true, true, true
if r.Encrypted != nil {
enc, per, sig = *r.Encrypted, *r.Encrypted, *r.Encrypted
}
if r.Encrypt != nil {
enc = *r.Encrypt
}
if r.Persist != nil {
per = *r.Persist
}
if r.SignMsgs != nil {
sig = *r.SignMsgs
}
return room.Policy{Encrypt: enc, Persist: per, SignMsgs: sig}
}
// sendReq is the POST /api/rooms/{id}/send body.
type sendReq struct {
Body string `json:"body"`
}
// msgWire is one decrypted message pushed over SSE.
type msgWire struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Sender string `json:"sender"`
Body string `json:"body"`
TS int64 `json:"ts"` // epoch ms (decoded from the frame's ULID id)
Mine bool `json:"mine"`
}
// ---- operations -----------------------------------------------------------
func (g *gateway) me() meInfo {
return meInfo{Endpoint: g.endpoint, SignPub: hex.EncodeToString(g.id.SignPub)}
}
// subjectName derives a short, human-friendly room name from its bus subject by
// dropping the leading namespace segment (room., test., proc., agent.). It is a
// display nicety only; the canonical identity stays the subject/room id.
func subjectName(subject string) string {
for _, p := range []string{"room.", "test.", "proc.", "agent.", "rpc."} {
if strings.HasPrefix(subject, p) {
return strings.TrimPrefix(subject, p)
}
}
return subject
}
func (g *gateway) listRooms() ([]roomWire, error) {
rooms, err := g.cli.ListMyRooms()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out := make([]roomWire, 0, len(rooms))
for _, rm := range rooms {
out = append(out, roomWire{
ID: rm.RoomID,
Subject: rm.Subject,
Name: subjectName(rm.Subject),
Epoch: rm.Epoch,
Encrypt: rm.Policy.Encrypt,
Persist: rm.Policy.Persist,
SignMsgs: rm.Policy.SignMsgs,
Role: rm.Role,
})
}
return out, nil
}
func (g *gateway) createRoom(req createRoomReq) (roomWire, error) {
subject := strings.TrimSpace(req.Subject)
if subject == "" {
return roomWire{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: subject required")
}
p := req.policy()
roomID, err := g.cli.CreateRoom(subject, p)
if err != nil {
return roomWire{}, err
}
// Under a per-subject ACL the operator's frozen NATS permissions do not yet
// cover the new room's subject; refresh so subsequent data-plane use works. On
// a plaintext/non-ACL dev bus this is unnecessary and would needlessly drop any
// live SSE subscriptions, so it is gated on the secured posture.
if g.refreshACL {
_ = g.cli.RefreshSession()
}
return roomWire{
ID: roomID,
Subject: subject,
Name: subjectName(subject),
Epoch: 1,
Encrypt: p.Encrypt,
Persist: p.Persist,
SignMsgs: p.SignMsgs,
Role: "owner",
}, nil
}
// join resolves room metadata and (for encrypted rooms) fetches the room key so
// the gateway can later open payloads. Idempotent.
func (g *gateway) join(roomID string) error {
if err := g.cli.Join(roomID); err != nil {
return err
}
if g.refreshACL {
_ = g.cli.RefreshSession()
}
return nil
}
// send publishes plaintext to a room. The unibus client seals it with the room
// key (encrypted rooms) and signs it (signed rooms) before it leaves the process.
func (g *gateway) send(roomID, body string) error {
return g.cli.Publish(roomID, []byte(body))
}
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package main
import (
"sync"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/client"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/frame"
"github.com/oklog/ulid/v2"
)
// roomHub multiplexes ONE unibus room subscription to MANY SSE clients. The
// unibus client derives a per-(room, endpoint) durable consumer name, so a
// second Subscribe for the same room from the same operator would contend for
// the same durable (load-balanced delivery) rather than each browser receiving
// every message. The hub holds a single subscription per room and fans each
// decrypted frame out to every connected browser, which also means the gateway
// opens at most one bus subscription per room regardless of how many tabs watch
// it.
type roomHub struct {
roomID string
myEndpoint string
sub *client.Sub
mu sync.Mutex
clients map[chan msgWire]struct{}
}
// frameTS decodes the millisecond timestamp embedded in a frame's ULID id. A
// malformed id (should not happen for bus-produced frames) yields 0, which the
// browser renders without crashing.
func frameTS(msgID string) int64 {
id, err := ulid.Parse(msgID)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
return int64(id.Time())
}
// newRoomHub opens the single bus subscription for roomID and starts fanning
// decrypted frames out to registered clients. The room must already be joined
// (so the gateway holds the room key) before this is called.
func newRoomHub(cli *client.Client, roomID, myEndpoint string) (*roomHub, error) {
h := &roomHub{
roomID: roomID,
myEndpoint: myEndpoint,
clients: map[chan msgWire]struct{}{},
}
sub, err := cli.Subscribe(roomID, func(f frame.Frame, plaintext []byte) {
m := msgWire{
ID: f.MsgID,
Sender: f.Sender,
Body: string(plaintext),
TS: frameTS(f.MsgID),
Mine: f.Sender == myEndpoint,
}
h.broadcast(m)
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
h.sub = sub
return h, nil
}
// broadcast delivers a message to every registered client without blocking the
// NATS delivery goroutine: a client whose buffer is full (a stalled browser)
// drops this frame rather than stalling the whole room.
func (h *roomHub) broadcast(m msgWire) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
for ch := range h.clients {
select {
case ch <- m:
default:
}
}
}
// add registers a new SSE client channel.
func (h *roomHub) add(ch chan msgWire) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
h.clients[ch] = struct{}{}
}
// stop unsubscribes from the bus. Local delivery ends; for a persisted room the
// durable consumer's ack position stays on the server, so a later subscription
// with the same operator resumes from where it left off.
func (h *roomHub) stop() {
if h.sub != nil {
_ = h.sub.Unsubscribe()
}
}
// openStream joins the room (idempotent; fetches the room key for encrypted
// rooms), attaches an SSE client to the room's hub (creating it on first watcher),
// and returns the client's message channel plus a cleanup func. The cleanup
// detaches the client and, when it was the last watcher, tears down the room's
// single bus subscription.
func (g *gateway) openStream(roomID string) (chan msgWire, func(), error) {
if err := g.join(roomID); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
g.mu.Lock()
h := g.hubs[roomID]
if h == nil {
var err error
h, err = newRoomHub(g.cli, roomID, g.endpoint)
if err != nil {
g.mu.Unlock()
return nil, nil, err
}
g.hubs[roomID] = h
}
g.mu.Unlock()
// Buffer so a brief render hitch in the browser does not drop live frames; a
// sustained stall still drops (broadcast is non-blocking) rather than wedging
// the room.
ch := make(chan msgWire, 64)
h.add(ch)
// cleanup takes g.mu before h.mu (the single, consistent lock order) so a
// concurrent openStream that re-creates the hub cannot race the teardown.
cleanup := func() {
g.mu.Lock()
defer g.mu.Unlock()
h.mu.Lock()
delete(h.clients, ch)
empty := len(h.clients) == 0
h.mu.Unlock()
if empty {
if cur := g.hubs[roomID]; cur == h {
delete(g.hubs, roomID)
h.stop()
}
}
}
return ch, cleanup, nil
}
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package main
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
cs "fn-registry/functions/cybersecurity"
)
// identityJSON mirrors the on-disk / pass-stored identity format shared across
// the unibus tooling: the four keypair halves, each std-base64. It is the SAME
// shape the bus client persists (pkg/client identity file) and the operator's
// `pass` entry unibus/operator-identity, so the web gateway loads the operator's
// identity without a divergent serialization. Kept in lockstep with
// unibus_admin/internal/admin/identity.go.
type identityJSON struct {
SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"`
SignPriv string `json:"sign_priv"`
KexPub string `json:"kex_pub"`
KexPriv string `json:"kex_priv"`
}
// decodeIdentity turns the JSON identity bytes into a cs.Identity. The private
// halves stay only in memory; this never writes them anywhere.
func decodeIdentity(raw []byte) (cs.Identity, error) {
var f identityJSON
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &f); err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: parse identity json: %w", err)
}
dec := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString
signPub, err := dec(f.SignPub)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: decode sign_pub: %w", err)
}
signPriv, err := dec(f.SignPriv)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: decode sign_priv: %w", err)
}
kexPub, err := dec(f.KexPub)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: decode kex_pub: %w", err)
}
kexPriv, err := dec(f.KexPriv)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: decode kex_priv: %w", err)
}
if len(signPub) != 32 || len(signPriv) != 64 || len(kexPub) != 32 || len(kexPriv) != 32 {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: identity has wrong key sizes (sign_pub=%d sign_priv=%d kex_pub=%d kex_priv=%d)",
len(signPub), len(signPriv), len(kexPub), len(kexPriv))
}
return cs.Identity{SignPub: signPub, SignPriv: signPriv, KexPub: kexPub, KexPriv: kexPriv}, nil
}
// loadIdentityFromFile reads a 0600 identity JSON file (the same format the bus
// client writes) and decodes it. Used on a deploy host where `pass` is not
// available and the operator identity is delivered as a protected file.
func loadIdentityFromFile(path string) (cs.Identity, error) {
raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: read identity file %q: %w", path, err)
}
return decodeIdentity(raw)
}
// loadIdentityFromPass shells out to `pass show <entry>` and decodes the JSON
// identity it returns. The secret is held only in memory; this process never
// writes it to disk or argv. Used in local operator workflows where the GNU
// password store holds unibus/operator-identity.
func loadIdentityFromPass(entry string) (cs.Identity, error) {
out, err := exec.Command("pass", "show", entry).Output()
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: pass show %q: %w", entry, err)
}
return decodeIdentity(out)
}
// loadPassValue returns the first line of a `pass show <entry>` for non-identity
// secrets (e.g. the unlock passphrase). Empty entry yields an empty string and
// no error, so callers can treat "no pass entry configured" as "not set".
func loadPassValue(entry string) (string, error) {
if entry == "" {
return "", nil
}
out, err := exec.Command("pass", "show", entry).Output()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("webgw: pass show %q: %w", entry, err)
}
s := string(out)
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
if s[i] == '\n' || s[i] == '\r' {
return s[:i], nil
}
}
return s, nil
}
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// Command webgw is the web gateway for the unibus chat SPA. It is a single Go
// binary that holds the operator's bus identity, connects to the bus as a real
// authenticated peer (pkg/client), and exposes a small REST + SSE API the
// browser consumes. The browser never signs, never speaks NATS, and never sees a
// private key: it authenticates to the gateway with a passphrase and thereafter
// holds only an opaque session cookie.
//
// TRUST MODEL (MVP, single operator): room content stays end-to-end encrypted on
// the bus. The gateway can read plaintext because it acts AS the operator's
// client — a legitimate member of each room holding the room key. Decryption
// happens server-side in this process; cleartext then crosses an authenticated
// (loopback or TLS-fronted) SSE channel to the browser. The wallet phase (issue:
// per-browser WebCrypto identity) can move decryption into the browser; see the
// report for the FASE 2 plan.
//
// # local dev against a loopback membershipd (plaintext), operator from pass:
// webgw --identity-pass unibus/operator-identity \
// --ctrl-url http://127.0.0.1:8470 --nats-url nats://127.0.0.1:4250
//
// # secured cluster (TLS + nkey on both planes), identity from a 0600 file:
// webgw --ca ca.crt --identity-file operator.id \
// --ctrl-url https://node-a:8470 --nats-url nats://node-a:4250 \
// --ctrl-urls https://node-b:8470,https://node-c:8470 \
// --nats-urls nats://node-b:4250,nats://node-c:4250
package main
import (
"context"
"flag"
"log"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
cs "fn-registry/functions/cybersecurity"
)
func main() {
var (
bind = flag.String("bind", "127.0.0.1", "interface to bind the gateway HTTP server to (loopback by default)")
port = flag.String("port", "8481", "gateway HTTP port")
ctrlURL = flag.String("ctrl-url", "http://127.0.0.1:8470", "primary unibus control-plane base URL")
ctrlURLs = flag.String("ctrl-urls", "", "comma-separated ADDITIONAL control-plane base URLs (cluster failover)")
natsURL = flag.String("nats-url", "nats://127.0.0.1:4250", "primary NATS URL")
natsURLs = flag.String("nats-urls", "", "comma-separated ADDITIONAL NATS seed URLs (cluster failover)")
caPath = flag.String("ca", "", "bus CA cert path; set to talk TLS+nkey to a secured bus (empty = plaintext dev)")
identityFile = flag.String("identity-file", "", "path to the operator identity JSON file (0600). Mutually exclusive with --identity-pass")
identityPass = flag.String("identity-pass", "", "pass(1) entry holding the operator identity JSON, e.g. unibus/operator-identity")
unlockPass = flag.String("unlock-pass", "", "literal passphrase the browser must send to unlock a session (dev). Prefer --unlock-pass-entry")
unlockEntry = flag.String("unlock-pass-entry", "unibus/admin-panel-password", "pass(1) entry holding the unlock passphrase (used when --unlock-pass is empty)")
webDir = flag.String("web-dir", "", "OPTIONAL path to the built SPA (web/dist) to serve. Empty = API only (use vite dev server)")
)
flag.Parse()
log.SetFlags(log.LstdFlags | log.Lmsgprefix)
log.SetPrefix("[webgw] ")
id, err := loadIdentity(*identityFile, *identityPass)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
unlock := *unlockPass
if unlock == "" {
unlock, err = loadPassValue(*unlockEntry)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("resolve unlock passphrase: %v", err)
}
}
if unlock == "" {
log.Fatalf("an unlock passphrase is required: set --unlock-pass or a non-empty --unlock-pass-entry (default unibus/admin-panel-password)")
}
resolvedWebDir := resolveWebDir(*webDir)
gw, err := newGateway(gatewayConfig{
Identity: id,
NatsURL: *natsURL,
CtrlURL: *ctrlURL,
CtrlURLs: splitCSV(*ctrlURLs),
NatsURLs: splitCSV(*natsURLs),
CAPath: *caPath,
})
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
defer gw.Close()
log.Printf("operator endpoint: %s", gw.endpoint)
log.Printf("control plane: %s (+%d failover)", *ctrlURL, len(splitCSV(*ctrlURLs)))
tls := "OFF (plaintext dev)"
if *caPath != "" {
tls = "ON (CA " + *caPath + ")"
}
log.Printf("bus TLS+nkey: %s", tls)
if resolvedWebDir != "" {
log.Printf("serving SPA from: %s", resolvedWebDir)
} else {
log.Printf("API only (no --web-dir): use the vite dev server with a /api+stream proxy")
}
srv := newServer(gw, unlock, resolvedWebDir)
addr := *bind + ":" + *port
httpSrv := &http.Server{
Addr: addr,
Handler: srv,
// No global write timeout: SSE streams are long-lived. Header timeout still
// bounds slowloris on the request line/headers.
ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
}
go func() {
log.Printf("web gateway: http://%s", addr)
if err := httpSrv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
log.Fatalf("http server: %v", err)
}
}()
stop := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(stop, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
<-stop
log.Printf("shutting down...")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = httpSrv.Shutdown(ctx)
log.Printf("bye")
}
// loadIdentity resolves the operator identity from exactly one of --identity-file
// or --identity-pass.
func loadIdentity(file, passEntry string) (cs.Identity, error) {
switch {
case file != "" && passEntry != "":
return cs.Identity{}, errFlag("set only one of --identity-file or --identity-pass")
case file != "":
return loadIdentityFromFile(file)
case passEntry != "":
return loadIdentityFromPass(passEntry)
default:
return cs.Identity{}, errFlag("an identity is required: pass --identity-file <path> or --identity-pass <entry>")
}
}
// resolveWebDir validates the --web-dir flag. An empty flag means API-only. A
// non-empty dir is kept only if it actually holds an index.html, so a typo logs
// "API only" rather than serving 404s.
func resolveWebDir(dir string) string {
if dir == "" {
return ""
}
abs, err := filepath.Abs(dir)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("WARN --web-dir %q: %v; serving API only", dir, err)
return ""
}
if !statFile(filepath.Join(abs, "index.html")) {
log.Printf("WARN --web-dir %q has no index.html; serving API only", abs)
return ""
}
return abs
}
type flagErr string
func (e flagErr) Error() string { return string(e) }
func errFlag(s string) error { return flagErr("webgw: " + s) }
func splitCSV(s string) []string {
var out []string
for _, p := range strings.Split(s, ",") {
if p = strings.TrimSpace(p); p != "" {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
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package main
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// sessionCookie is the name of the gateway's session cookie. The browser sends
// it automatically on same-origin fetches AND on EventSource (SSE) connections —
// EventSource cannot set custom headers, so a cookie is the only way to
// authenticate the stream. It is HttpOnly so page JS can never read the token.
const sessionCookie = "unibus_session"
// server is the gateway's HTTP surface: a small REST/SSE API under /api gated by
// a session cookie, plus an optional static file server for the built SPA. The
// gateway's privileged operator identity never leaves the process; the browser
// authenticates with a passphrase and thereafter holds only an opaque session
// token.
type server struct {
gw *gateway
unlock string // passphrase that unlocks a session (compared in constant time)
webDir string // optional path to the built SPA (web/dist); empty = API only
mux *http.ServeMux
mu sync.Mutex
sessions map[string]time.Time // token -> issued-at
}
func newServer(gw *gateway, unlock, webDir string) *server {
s := &server{
gw: gw,
unlock: unlock,
webDir: webDir,
mux: http.NewServeMux(),
sessions: map[string]time.Time{},
}
s.routes()
return s
}
func (s *server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { s.mux.ServeHTTP(w, r) }
func (s *server) routes() {
// Liveness, unauthenticated (systemd / deploy smoke).
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
})
// Auth: login is the only /api route reachable without a session.
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/login", s.handleLogin)
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/logout", s.auth(s.handleLogout))
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/me", s.auth(s.handleMe))
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/rooms", s.auth(s.handleListRooms))
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/rooms", s.auth(s.handleCreateRoom))
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/rooms/{id}/join", s.auth(s.handleJoin))
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/rooms/{id}/send", s.auth(s.handleSend))
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/rooms/{id}/stream", s.auth(s.handleStream))
// Everything else is the SPA (when --web-dir is set). Registered last.
if s.webDir != "" {
s.mux.Handle("/", s.spaHandler())
}
}
// ---- auth -----------------------------------------------------------------
// auth wraps a handler so it runs only with a valid session cookie. A missing or
// unknown token yields 401, which the SPA treats as "show the login screen".
func (s *server) auth(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookie)
if err != nil || !s.validSession(c.Value) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
return
}
next(w, r)
}
}
func (s *server) validSession(token string) bool {
if token == "" {
return false
}
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
_, ok := s.sessions[token]
return ok
}
func (s *server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req struct {
Passphrase string `json:"passphrase"`
}
if !decode(w, r, &req) {
return
}
// Constant-time compare so a wrong passphrase cannot be timed character by
// character. An empty configured passphrase never matches (main refuses to
// start without one, so this is defense in depth).
if s.unlock == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(req.Passphrase), []byte(s.unlock)) != 1 {
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "wrong passphrase")
return
}
tok := newToken()
s.mu.Lock()
s.sessions[tok] = time.Now()
s.mu.Unlock()
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookie,
Value: tok,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, s.gw.me())
}
func (s *server) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookie); err == nil {
s.mu.Lock()
delete(s.sessions, c.Value)
s.mu.Unlock()
}
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookie, Value: "", Path: "/", MaxAge: -1, HttpOnly: true})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "logged_out"})
}
func (s *server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, s.gw.me())
}
// ---- rooms ----------------------------------------------------------------
func (s *server) handleListRooms(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
rooms, err := s.gw.listRooms()
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, rooms)
}
func (s *server) handleCreateRoom(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req createRoomReq
if !decode(w, r, &req) {
return
}
rv, err := s.gw.createRoom(req)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, rv)
}
func (s *server) handleJoin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err := s.gw.join(r.PathValue("id")); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "joined"})
}
func (s *server) handleSend(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req sendReq
if !decode(w, r, &req) {
return
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.Body) == "" {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "body required")
return
}
if err := s.gw.send(r.PathValue("id"), req.Body); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "sent"})
}
// handleStream is the SSE endpoint: it joins the room, attaches to the room's
// fan-out hub, and streams each decrypted message as a `data:` event. For a
// persisted room the hub's underlying subscription delivers history first
// (scrollback) and then live messages; for an ephemeral room only live messages
// flow. The stream ends when the browser disconnects (ctx cancelled).
func (s *server) handleStream(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
flusher, ok := w.(http.Flusher)
if !ok {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "streaming unsupported")
return
}
ch, cleanup, err := s.gw.openStream(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
defer cleanup()
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive")
w.Header().Set("X-Accel-Buffering", "no") // disable proxy buffering (nginx/caddy)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
// An initial comment opens the stream immediately so the browser's
// EventSource fires `onopen` without waiting for the first message.
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(": connected\n\n"))
flusher.Flush()
ctx := r.Context()
ping := time.NewTicker(25 * time.Second)
defer ping.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ping.C:
// Comment line keeps idle proxies from closing the connection.
if _, err := w.Write([]byte(": ping\n\n")); err != nil {
return
}
flusher.Flush()
case m := <-ch:
b, err := json.Marshal(m)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if _, err := w.Write([]byte("data: " + string(b) + "\n\n")); err != nil {
return
}
flusher.Flush()
}
}
}
// ---- SPA serving (optional) -----------------------------------------------
// spaHandler serves the built SPA from s.webDir. A request for an existing asset
// is served directly; any other path (a client-side route) falls back to
// index.html so the SPA router can take over. /api and /healthz are matched first.
func (s *server) spaHandler() http.Handler {
root := http.Dir(s.webDir)
fileServer := http.FileServer(root)
index := filepath.Join(s.webDir, "index.html")
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
p := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/")
if p == "" {
http.ServeFile(w, r, index)
return
}
if f, err := root.Open(p); err == nil {
_ = f.Close()
fileServer.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
http.ServeFile(w, r, index) // unknown path -> SPA client-side routing
})
}
// ---- helpers --------------------------------------------------------------
func newToken() string {
b := make([]byte, 32)
_, _ = rand.Read(b)
return hex.EncodeToString(b)
}
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(code)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
func writeErr(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, msg string) {
writeJSON(w, code, map[string]string{"error": msg})
}
// decode reads a JSON body into v, writing a 400 and returning false on failure.
func decode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, v any) bool {
defer r.Body.Close()
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<20)).Decode(v); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad json: "+err.Error())
return false
}
return true
}
// statFile reports whether path exists and is a regular file (used to validate
// --web-dir at startup so a typo surfaces as a clear log line, not 404s later).
func statFile(path string) bool {
fi, err := os.Stat(path)
return err == nil && !fi.IsDir()
}