Ports the auditor's TestAudit_DoSBodyLimitNoAuth: an unsigned oversized POST
to /blobs is now rejected 413 without the resident set spiking (measured via
/proc/self/status, delta bounded to <96 MiB vs the attack's 400 MB+). Covers
both a truthful over-ceiling Content-Length (rejected pre-read) and a chunked
unknown-length sender (MaxBytesReader caps the read). Plus golden (normal blob
stored), boundary (exactly at the ceiling accepted), the 1 MiB control-plane
ceiling, and the per-IP rate limit (flood -> 429, distinct IPs not throttled).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-auth DoS hardening (audit H1, Critical). The control-plane middleware
read the request body with io.ReadAll before authenticating and with no size
cap, so an unauthenticated peer could force the server to buffer an arbitrary
body in RAM (the auditor sent 400 MB and watched RSS climb to ~898 MB).
- ServeHTTP now caps the buffered body before reading: a per-route ceiling
(1 MiB JSON, 16 MiB /blobs) rejects an over-declared Content-Length outright
and wraps the body in http.MaxBytesReader so a lying/chunked sender trips at
the ceiling instead of unbounded.
- handlePutBlob maps the MaxBytesReader cutoff to 413 in every auth mode.
- Per-IP token-bucket rate limiter (golang.org/x/time/rate, already in the
module graph) sheds floods before auth or body reads. Loopback dev stacks are
unaffected (burst >> any single client's rate). Kept in-package as transport
glue, not promoted to the registry, mirroring the nonceCache decision in 0003.
- membershipd sets http.Server.MaxHeaderBytes and ReadHeaderTimeout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
TestSecureBusEndToEnd boots the server with control-plane enforce, NATS nkey
auth, and TLS all on; two registered peers connect with nkey+TLS, A creates a
Matrix room, invites B, publishes, and B decrypts — proving the three layers
compose. This is the headline golden of issue 0001.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
client.Connect is the single migration seam: a non-empty caPath connects with
TLS pinned to the bus CA plus nkey auth (matching enforce + bus-tls), an empty
caPath keeps the legacy plaintext dev connection; control-plane requests are
signed either way. worker and chat gain a --ca flag; the gomobile NewSession
gains a caPath parameter so the Android app bundles ca.crt and connects
securely. Every peer now flows through one code path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
client/tls_test: mints a throwaway CA + server cert in-memory; a client
pinning the CA completes the handshake and operates (golden), a client
without the CA fails the handshake (error path). busauth/tls_test: golden
load of a CA PEM and a server keypair, plus error paths (missing file,
non-PEM). Harness body extracted to bootHarness(ctrlMode, natsAuth, natsTLS).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
busauth.LoadCATLSConfig turns a ca.crt path into a *tls.Config trusting only
that private CA (clients must pin it; the system roots would reject a
self-signed server cert). busauth.ServerTLSConfig loads the server keypair.
client.Options gains TLS; NewWithOptions calls nats.Secure when set, so the
data-plane connection is encrypted and the server pinned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Collapses Start/StartHost/StartHostAuth onto StartServer(ServerConfig) so
auth and a TLS config can be set without growing the parameter list further.
When TLS is set the server presents the certificate and requires TLS on the
data plane; the wrappers preserve the existing no-auth/no-TLS behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Harness gains newHarnessFull(ctrlMode, natsAuth) wiring the nkey authenticator
to the user allowlist; NATS auth and HTTP auth are independent so each plane
is tested in isolation. TestNatsNkeyAuth: registered peer connects with nkey
and operates (golden); unregistered peer and no-nkey client refused at connect
(error paths); peer revoked at runtime refused on its next connection without
a restart (edge).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
nats.go refuses to connect with an nkey to a server that does not advertise
nkey auth, so the connection cannot blindly always present one. New keeps the
legacy plain connection; NewWithOptions(Options{UseNkey:true}) presents the
peer's identity-derived nkey. NewWithOptions is the single place the data-plane
connection is built, so every peer gets identical behavior from the same
Options (TLS fields arrive in phase 0001d).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
busauth.NewNkeyAuthenticator verifies a client's nkey signature over the
server nonce (decoding like nats-server: raw-url then std base64), maps the
nkey to its Ed25519 hex, and consults an injected IsAuthorized predicate.
Checking on every connection (rather than a static Options.Nkeys map) means
revoking a user denies its next connection with no restart. embeddednats
gains StartHostAuth(auth) and sets AlwaysEnableNonce so the server advertises
the nonce nkey clients need; Start/StartHost stay open (auth=nil) for dev.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A NATS nkey is an Ed25519 keypair, so the bus reuses each peer's signing
identity for the data plane instead of minting new key material. ClientNkey
derives the user nkey public string and a nonce-signing callback from the
peer's Ed25519 private key (its first 32 bytes are the nkey seed);
SignPubHexFromNkey maps a presented nkey back to the allowlist's hex key;
NkeyPublicFromSignPub is the public-only derivation.
This is NATS-specific transport glue kept in the app, not promoted to the
registry, to avoid pulling nats-io/nkeys into the multi-domain registry
module. The dedicated round-trip test runs first (spec requirement): it
proves the nkey signature equals the identity's raw Ed25519 signature and
that the nkey maps back to the identity's hex.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
membership/auth_test: golden (signed+registered accepted), error paths
(unregistered 401, replayed nonce 401, clock skew 401, tampered body 401,
missing headers 401), exemptions (healthz, soft allows, off no-op).
client_test: end-to-end with the real client against an enforce server —
registered peer accepted, unregistered rejected, revoked peer denied without
a server restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
doJSON, putBlob and getBlob now go through newSignedRequest, which attaches
X-Unibus-Pub/Ts/Nonce/Sig signing membership.CanonicalRequest with the peer's
Ed25519 key. GETs are signed too so the server can authenticate the caller
uniformly under enforce. The payload-level owner signature (invite/rekey)
is unchanged and coexists with this transport-level signature.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the bus-auth rollout (off|soft|enforce) to the control plane. The
middleware verifies an Ed25519 request signature over CanonicalRequest
(method, request-URI, ts, nonce, sha256(body)), checks the timestamp is
within +/-30s, rejects replayed nonces via an in-memory TTL cache (60s), and
requires the signer to be an active user in the allowlist. soft logs
rejections but lets requests through so clients can migrate without an
outage; off is the legacy no-op default. /healthz is exempt so health probes
work before any identity exists. CanonicalRequest is exported as the single
source of truth shared with the client.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Golden: add -> get -> IsAuthorized true, admin seeded. Edge: empty role
defaults to member, case-insensitive hex lookup, list ordering, revoke
denies authorization and stamps revoked_at. Error: duplicate key
(ErrUserExists), invalid role, empty sign_pub, unknown user not authorized,
revoke of unknown/already-revoked. Plus users-table migration idempotency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bus-level user allowlist (issue 0001a): the authoritative directory of
Ed25519 signing identities permitted to use the bus, independent of room
membership. Migration is additive and mirrored byte-for-byte between the
module-root migrations/ and the embedded pkg/membership/migrations/.
Store adds AddUser/GetUser/ListUsers/RevokeUser/IsAuthorized/HasAdmin.
IsAuthorized is the single fail-closed predicate both the control plane and
the NATS data plane will consult, so revocation is a status flip that denies
access on both without a restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A peer invited to an encrypted room needs to find it: the control plane is
pull-based (no server push of invitations), so add a discovery endpoint that
lists every room an endpoint belongs to, with the room's metadata and the
endpoint's role.
- store.ListRoomsForEndpoint: JOIN members+rooms, ordered by room id, empty
slice (not error) for an endpoint in no rooms.
- membershipd: GET /members/{endpoint}/rooms returns {room_id, subject, epoch,
policy, role}[].
- client.ListMyRooms + RoomRef: a bot polls this to discover and then Join +
Subscribe rooms it was invited to.
Tests: store-level (owner in N rooms, member in one, unknown endpoint → []) and
client-level e2e through the embedded harness (B discovers a room A invited it
to, without prior knowledge of the room id; owner sees role=owner).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Chat bots need replies, threads and reactions. Add two optional, omitempty
envelope fields (ThreadID, ReplyTo) plus a REACT frame type. The fields ride the
cleartext envelope (message-id references, not secret content) and are omitted
when unset, so non-threaded frames are byte-for-byte identical on the wire and
their signatures unchanged — a non-breaking, additive change.
Client gains PublishReply (threaded reply) and React (emoji reaction). The
reaction content travels in the payload, so it is sealed like any message and
stays confidential in E2E rooms; receivers dispatch on Frame.Type == REACT and
read Frame.ReplyTo for the target. Publish is refactored to share one
publishFrame path with the new helpers; its behavior is unchanged.
Tests: frame round-trip of a threaded REACT frame (golden), non-threaded
wire/sig back-compat asserting thr/re keys are absent (edge), Unmarshal of
garbage errors (error path), and an end-to-end reply+reaction round-trip in an
encrypted ModeMatrix room.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a --bind flag (default 127.0.0.1) to membershipd that controls which
network interface both the control-plane HTTP API and the embedded NATS data
plane listen on. Use 0.0.0.0 to expose the stack to the LAN so remote peers
(phones, other PCs) can connect; keep the default for a loopback-only dev stack.
embeddednats gains StartHost(storeDir, host, port) for explicit interface
control; Start stays a backward-compatible wrapper (host "" = nats default
0.0.0.0) so the playground and tests are untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- membership server returns 403 + human-readable message on missing sealed key (was leaking 'sql: no rows in result set')
- client doJSON unwraps the server's {"error"} field instead of pasting the raw HTTP envelope
egutierrez
agent