Files
unibus/pkg/busauth/authenticator.go
T
agent 96abb75a2e feat(0003e/3): per-subject data-plane ACL from room membership (audit H4)
Closes the residual the 0004 hardening deferred: the NATS authenticator
can now confine a registered peer to the subjects of the rooms it
belongs to, instead of letting any registered identity sub/pub on any
subject. The dynamic-membership reconnection model the audit named is
provided by client.RefreshSession.

pkg/busauth:
- verifyNkey factors out the shared nkey verification.
- NewNkeyAuthenticatorACL + PermissionsFunc: an authenticator that, after
  authorizing, derives and RegisterUser()s per-subject permissions. A
  derivation error denies the connection (fail closed).

pkg/membership:
- SubjectACLFor(store) maps a signing pubkey to the subjects it may use:
  the subject of every room it belongs to, plus the client infrastructure
  subjects (_INBOX.>, $JS.API.> for request/reply and the persisted plane).

pkg/client:
- RefreshSession() rebuilds the data-plane connection so the authenticator
  re-derives permissions after a membership change (NATS freezes
  permissions at connect time). It retains the seeds/options to reconnect;
  active subscriptions are dropped and must be re-made (documented).

Tests (DoD: isolation + refresh):
- TestSubjectACLIsolation: alice (member of room.A) may sub/pub room.A but
  is DENIED sub and pub on room.B (permissions violation), and never reads
  bob's room.B traffic; bob never receives alice's cross-room publish.
- TestRefreshSessionGainsNewRoom: alice has no permission for room B until
  she is added and calls RefreshSession; the reconnect grants the subject
  and she then receives room B traffic.

Scope note: the per-subject ACL authenticator is opt-in (NewServer/
membershipd keep the open authenticator by default) and is wired in with
the decentralized boot path; auto-RefreshSession on every membership
change (fully transparent) remains for 0003f. Master behavior unchanged.
2026-06-07 15:27:45 +02:00

115 lines
4.6 KiB
Go

package busauth
import (
"encoding/base64"
server "github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2/server"
"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
)
// nkeyAuthenticator is a NATS server.Authentication that authorizes a client by
// verifying the nkey signature over the server-presented nonce and then
// consulting the bus user allowlist. Authorization is checked on every new
// connection via the injected predicate (not a static Options.Nkeys map), so
// revoking a user denies its next connection without restarting the server.
type nkeyAuthenticator struct {
// isAuthorized reports whether the lowercase-hex Ed25519 public key behind an
// nkey belongs to an active bus user. Injected (membership.Store.IsAuthorized)
// so this package stays free of the store dependency.
isAuthorized func(signPubHex string) bool
}
// NewNkeyAuthenticator builds a NATS custom authenticator backed by isAuthorized.
// Pass it to embeddednats so the data plane only accepts registered identities.
func NewNkeyAuthenticator(isAuthorized func(signPubHex string) bool) server.Authentication {
return &nkeyAuthenticator{isAuthorized: isAuthorized}
}
// Check verifies the client's nkey signature against the nonce the server
// presented, then maps the nkey to its allowlist key and checks authorization.
// Any malformed input or failed verification yields false (fail closed).
func (a *nkeyAuthenticator) Check(c server.ClientAuthentication) bool {
signPubHex, ok := verifyNkey(c)
if !ok {
return false
}
return a.isAuthorized(signPubHex)
}
// verifyNkey performs the shared nkey verification: it checks the client's
// signature against the server-presented nonce and returns the lowercase-hex
// Ed25519 public key behind the nkey. ok is false on any malformed input or
// failed verification (fail closed). The signature decoding mirrors
// nats-server's own (raw-url base64, then std base64 fallback) so genuine
// clients using nats.Nkey are accepted unchanged.
func verifyNkey(c server.ClientAuthentication) (signPubHex string, ok bool) {
opts := c.GetOpts()
if opts.Nkey == "" {
return "", false
}
sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(opts.Sig)
if err != nil {
sig, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(opts.Sig)
if err != nil {
return "", false
}
}
pub, err := nkeys.FromPublicKey(opts.Nkey)
if err != nil {
return "", false
}
if err := pub.Verify(c.GetNonce(), sig); err != nil {
return "", false
}
signPubHex, err = SignPubHexFromNkey(opts.Nkey)
if err != nil {
return "", false
}
return signPubHex, true
}
// PermissionsFunc maps a connecting identity (lowercase-hex Ed25519 signing key)
// to the NATS permissions it should be granted for this connection. Returning an
// error denies the connection (fail closed). It is how the data plane enforces
// per-subject access from room membership (issue 0003e, audit H4 residual).
type PermissionsFunc func(signPubHex string) (*server.Permissions, error)
// nkeyAuthenticatorACL is the nkey authenticator that ALSO scopes the connection
// to per-subject permissions derived from room membership. NATS evaluates
// permissions once, at connect time, so a peer that joins a room after
// connecting must reconnect (client.RefreshSession) to gain that room's subject
// — the dynamic-membership reconnection model the audit deferred to this issue.
type nkeyAuthenticatorACL struct {
isAuthorized func(signPubHex string) bool
perms PermissionsFunc
}
// NewNkeyAuthenticatorACL builds an authenticator that authorizes by the bus
// allowlist AND registers per-subject permissions from perms. A registered but
// permission-less peer can no longer subscribe to or publish on arbitrary
// subjects: it is confined to the subjects of the rooms it belongs to (plus the
// client infrastructure subjects perms includes). This is the per-subject ACL
// the 0004 hardening left as a residual.
func NewNkeyAuthenticatorACL(isAuthorized func(signPubHex string) bool, perms PermissionsFunc) server.Authentication {
return &nkeyAuthenticatorACL{isAuthorized: isAuthorized, perms: perms}
}
// Check verifies the nkey, authorizes against the allowlist, then derives and
// registers the connection's subject permissions. A permissions-derivation
// error denies the connection (fail closed) rather than granting open access.
func (a *nkeyAuthenticatorACL) Check(c server.ClientAuthentication) bool {
signPubHex, ok := verifyNkey(c)
if !ok {
return false
}
if !a.isAuthorized(signPubHex) {
return false
}
perms, err := a.perms(signPubHex)
if err != nil {
return false // fail closed: never grant open access on a derivation error
}
c.RegisterUser(&server.User{Permissions: perms})
return true
}