9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
egutierrez e8850d8965 feat(uniweb): crear rooms y chatear desde la UI
Añade un control "Nueva room" en el header del sidebar (botón "+") y CTAs
en los estados vacíos del sidebar y del panel. Abren un modal que pide el
asunto, crea la room con bus.createRoom contra el bus real, la inserta en
la lista (dedup por id, sin recargar) y la activa.

- NewRoomModal: modal de Mantine con loading, manejo de SessionError/Error
  en español, crear con Enter o botón, formulario limpio en cada apertura.
- ChatShell: estado del modal con useDisclosure, handleRoomCreated centraliza
  inserción + selección, empty state del panel rediseñado con botón crear.
- Sidebar: prop onNewRoom, botón "+" con tooltip, empty state distingue
  "sin resultados" de "sin rooms" (con CTA crear primera room).

No toca la capa de datos (busService.ts ni web/src/bus/): usa los métodos de
bus tal como están. Verificado end-to-end contra el cluster real: crear room
desde la UI, enviar mensaje y verlo aparecer por la suscripción.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 12:35:33 +02:00
agent 3f52167b04 feat: browser-native client — wire SPA to the SDK, delete the Go gateway
Phase 2 of issue 0001. uniweb becomes a pure frontend (web/ only), like
unibus_android: the SPA talks directly to the bus and the Go gateway is gone.

- busService.ts: the new data layer over the bus SDK, replacing the old api module.
  It holds the user's wallet identity and a connected BusClient IN THE BROWSER and
  opens the session locally — the private key is never sent anywhere (closes the
  gateway-era hole where the browser POSTed its private key to /api/session).
- Wire account/App/ChatShell/ChatPanel/WalletLogin/Recover/Join to busService;
  subscribeRoom replaces the SSE streamRoom; ApiError -> SessionError.
- SDK: ControlPlane.createRoom + listMemberRooms, and fetchRoom mapped to the real
  control-plane wire shape (snake_case, no id) — all verified by the live round-trip.
- Delete cmd/webgw, go.mod, go.sum, src/api.ts and the orphan operator Login. uniweb
  now has zero Go and no dependency on unibus as a module.
- vite: drop the /api proxy, dev server on 5173 to match the bus CORS allowlist; add
  vite-env typings. app.md: lang ts, no uses_functions, e2e_checks are now web-only.
  Bump 0.3.0.

Onboarding by token is now admin-side (the bus has no self-register endpoint; the
gateway only mocked it). tsc + pnpm build + 19/19 unit green.
2026-06-14 11:39:06 +02:00
egutierrez bf0884527e chore: auto-commit (2 archivos)
- dev/
- registry.db

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 11:27:04 +02:00
agent 2960b0984a feat(bus): createRoom + control-plane shape fixes, verified by live E2E round-trip
Validating the SDK against the real cluster surfaced the control-plane wire shapes:
the room/policy JSON is snake_case (sign_msgs) and GET /rooms/{id} omits the id.
Fix ControlPlane.fetchRoom to map the wire shape to the SDK Room type, and add
ControlPlane.createRoom (mint a room key, seal it to the owner via sealed box, POST
/rooms) so a browser peer can own an encrypted room.

The live smoke now does a full end-to-end round-trip against the 3-node cluster:
create an encrypted+signed room, connect over nats.ws, publish, and receive the
SDK's own message decrypted with the signature verified. Verified 2026-06-14:
room 01KV2Q…, plaintext round-tripped intact. The whole seal/sign/open happens in
the client; the private key never leaves it.

Exclude *.test.ts from the app tsconfig so the Node-API integration test does not
break the production build (vitest transpiles tests independently). Issue 0001,
Phase 3.
2026-06-14 11:26:13 +02:00
agent b44aa02326 test(bus): prove a registered identity is accepted on the live cluster
Extend the live smoke: when a registered identity is present (its sign_pub added
to the bus allowlist), assert the SAME SDK that a fresh identity gets rejected with
is now ACCEPTED — control plane no longer 401s and the nats.ws data-plane
connection succeeds. Verified 2026-06-14 against the 3-node cluster: random
identity -> 401 / 'authorization violation'; registered identity -> 403 'not a
member of this room' / connected=true. The allowlist is the only gate; the SDK
speaks both planes correctly end-to-end. Issue 0001, Phase 3.
2026-06-14 11:21:38 +02:00
agent 024af306fe test(bus): live integration smoke against the real unibus cluster
A network smoke (self-skips unless BUS_HTTP/BUS_WS are set) that points the SDK
at the live 3-node cluster. With a fresh, unregistered identity it asserts BOTH
planes reject with an AUTHORIZATION error (not a signature/protocol error),
proving the SDK speaks the control plane (signed canonical request) and the data
plane (nats.ws + nkey) correctly end-to-end. Verified 2026-06-14 against datardos:
control-plane 401 'identity not authorized', data-plane 'authorization violation'.
Issue 0001, Phase 3.
2026-06-14 11:18:43 +02:00
agent b72976e06c feat(bus): complete TypeScript SDK — auth, room envelope, client, transport
Second half of the browser-native bus SDK (issue 0001, Phase 1), making uniweb a
peer of the bus in its own right (like unibus_android) without the Go gateway:

- busauth.ts: NATS user nkey from the Ed25519 key (base32 + crc16, no nkeys dep)
  and control-plane request signing (CanonicalRequest + X-Unibus-* headers).
- room.ts: Policy / Room types (ModeNATS, ModeMatrix).
- client.ts: the pure room ENVELOPE (sealRoomMessage/openRoomMessage — AEAD with
  the subject as AAD, Ed25519 sign, drop on verify/decrypt failure), a transport-
  agnostic BusClient, and a signed ControlPlane HTTP client (fetch room/key/members,
  open the sealed room key locally).
- wstransport.ts: concrete nats.ws WebSocket transport (validated E2E in Phase 3).
- index.ts: public SDK surface.

Parity pinned by vectors from unibus cmd/busvectors (extended with nkey + signed
control-request vectors): 19/19 green. The user's private key signs everything in
the browser and is never sent to any server. Bumps uniweb to 0.2.0.

Remaining for Phase 1 completion: the live nats.ws connection + control-plane,
which need a running unibus with the WebSocket listener — exercised in Phase 3.
2026-06-13 22:54:54 +02:00
agent 3d9b4ce392 feat(bus): TypeScript SDK crypto + frame, parity-verified against Go
First half of the browser-native bus SDK (issue 0001, Phase 1):

- crypto.ts: Ed25519 sign/verify (@noble), ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD (@noble),
  endpoint id (sha256+base64url), and the anonymous sealed box for room-key
  distribution. The sealed-box nonce is BLAKE2b-192 over ephPub||recipientPub,
  matching Go's nacl/box.SealAnonymous (NOT SHA-512) so a Go-sealed key opens here.
- frame.ts: the Frame wire format, reproducing Go encoding/json byte-for-byte —
  struct field order, omitempty rules, base64-std byte fields, and the default
  HTML escaping (<, >, &, U+2028/U+2029) — plus sign/verify over canonical bytes.

vectors.test.ts checks all of it against the golden vectors generated by unibus
cmd/busvectors. 11/11 green: endpoint id, Ed25519 (incl. frame signature),
AEAD seal+open, sealed box open + round-trip, and frame signing-bytes + wire
marshal. This pins cross-language interop with Go/Kotlin peers.

Adds @noble/ciphers, tweetnacl (runtime) and vitest (dev).
2026-06-13 22:30:38 +02:00
agent cb6b51156a test(bus): add cross-language crypto/protocol vectors from unibus
Golden vectors generated by unibus cmd/busvectors: the contract the TypeScript
bus SDK must match byte-for-byte (Ed25519 sign, ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, sealed
box, Frame wire format). Issue 0001, Phase 0.
2026-06-13 22:22:32 +02:00
42 changed files with 2301 additions and 1988 deletions
+91 -74
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@@ -1,123 +1,140 @@
---
name: uniweb
lang: go
lang: ts
domain: infra
version: 0.1.0
description: "Frontend web del bus unibus: SPA de chat (React+Mantine) con wallet por usuario (BIP39) + gateway Go (REST+SSE) que actúa de peer del bus para el navegador."
tags: [service, messaging, web, frontend, e2e]
uses_functions:
- generate_identity_go_cybersecurity
- seal_aead_go_cybersecurity
- open_aead_go_cybersecurity
- seal_key_box_go_cybersecurity
- open_key_box_go_cybersecurity
- sign_ed25519_go_cybersecurity
- verify_ed25519_go_cybersecurity
version: 0.3.0
description: "Cliente web browser-nativo del bus unibus: SPA de chat (React+Mantine) con wallet por usuario (BIP39) que habla DIRECTO al bus (nats.ws + control-plane HTTPS firmado), sin gateway. La clave privada nunca sale del navegador."
tags: [messaging, web, frontend, e2e]
uses_functions: []
uses_types: []
framework: "react"
entry_point: "cmd/webgw"
entry_point: "web/src/main.tsx"
dir_path: "projects/message_bus/apps/uniweb"
repo_url: "https://gitea-dgg044oo04woo4ggcsws4gk0.organic-machine.com/dataforge/uniweb"
icon:
phosphor: "chats-circle"
accent: "#6366f1"
service:
port: 8481
health_endpoint: null
health_timeout_s: 3
systemd_unit: null
systemd_scope: null
restart_policy: always
runtime: manual
pc_targets:
- lucas-linux
is_local_only: false
e2e_checks:
- id: build
cmd: "CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./..."
- id: typecheck
cmd: "cd web && pnpm install --frozen-lockfile && pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.app.json"
timeout_s: 180
- id: vet
cmd: "CGO_ENABLED=0 go vet ./..."
timeout_s: 120
- id: unit
cmd: "CGO_ENABLED=0 go test ./..."
cmd: "cd web && pnpm test"
timeout_s: 120
- id: web_build
cmd: "cd web && pnpm install --frozen-lockfile && pnpm build"
cmd: "cd web && pnpm build"
timeout_s: 180
---
## Qué es
`uniweb` es el frontend web del bus [unibus](../unibus/app.md): la interfaz que un humano
usa desde el navegador para hablar por el bus. Se separó de `unibus` (v0.13.0) para que el
plano del bus (membresía, claves, librería cliente) quede limpio y el frontend tenga su
propia carpeta de servicio y su propio ciclo de release.
`uniweb` es el **cliente web browser-nativo** del bus [unibus](../unibus/app.md): la interfaz
que un humano usa desde el navegador para hablar por el bus. Es **solo frontend** (`web/`) —
una SPA, sin backend Go, sin gateway. Habla **directamente** con el bus, igual que
`unibus_android` lo hace en Kotlin:
Tiene dos mitades que viven juntas:
- **Control plane** — HTTPS firmado al `membershipd` (rooms, claves, miembros). Cada request
lleva la firma Ed25519 del usuario (cabeceras `X-Unibus-*`).
- **Data plane** — NATS sobre WebSocket (`nats.ws`), autenticado con el nkey derivado de la
identidad del usuario.
- **SPA (`web/`)** — React 18 + Vite + Mantine v9. Pantallas de chat y onboarding wallet
(join por invitación, login por passphrase local, recover por mnemónica). La identidad
criptográfica de cada usuario se deriva de forma determinista de una frase BIP39 de 12
palabras y se cifra at-rest en el dispositivo (AES-256-GCM); la clave privada nunca viaja
al servidor en claro.
- **Gateway (`cmd/webgw`)** — binario Go (`package main`, REST + SSE) que actúa como peer
del bus en nombre del navegador. Mantiene una sesión wallet por usuario, registra claves
públicas por token de invitación, y traduce HTTP/SSE ↔ el protocolo del bus usando la
librería cliente de unibus.
Stack: React 18 + Vite + Mantine v9. La identidad criptográfica de cada usuario se deriva de
forma determinista de una frase BIP39 de 12 palabras y se cifra at-rest en el dispositivo
(AES-256-GCM). **La clave privada nunca sale del navegador**: firma, sella y descifra en el
cliente. No hay servidor al que enviarla.
## Cómo se acopla a unibus
## El SDK del bus (`web/src/bus/`)
`uniweb` consume `unibus` como **módulo Go**, no reimplementa nada del bus:
El protocolo y el cifrado E2E del bus están **portados a TypeScript**, validados byte a byte
contra la implementación Go de referencia (vectores de `unibus cmd/busvectors`):
```
replace github.com/enmanuel/unibus => ../unibus # pkg/{busauth,client,frame,room}
replace fn-registry => ../../../../ # functions/cybersecurity
```
- `crypto.ts` — Ed25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305, sealed box (nonce BLAKE2b, igual que Go).
- `frame.ts` — wire format = `encoding/json` de Go byte a byte.
- `room.ts` — Policy (ModeNATS / ModeMatrix).
- `busauth.ts` — nkey NATS (base32 + crc16) + firma de requests del control-plane.
- `client.ts` — envelope de room + `BusClient` + `ControlPlane` HTTP firmado.
- `wstransport.ts` — transporte `nats.ws`.
Los `replace` no son transitivos en Go, así que `uniweb` (módulo principal) declara los dos:
el de `unibus` (de donde importa la librería cliente) y el de `fn-registry` (de donde
`pkg/client` toma las primitivas de cifrado). Compila con `CGO_ENABLED=0` igual que unibus.
`busService.ts` es la capa de datos de la SPA sobre el SDK (reemplazó al viejo módulo `api`
que hablaba con el gateway). Ya **no depende de `unibus` como módulo Go**: el desacople es
total.
## Ejemplo
```bash
# 1. Backend: el control-plane del bus (en la carpeta de unibus)
cd ../unibus && CGO_ENABLED=0 go run ./cmd/membershipd # :8470
# El bus ya corre (cluster unibus con WebSocket habilitado, --ws-port). Apunta la SPA a un
# nodo y arráncala en dev (puerto 5173, que coincide con la CORS allowlist del cluster):
cd web && pnpm install
VITE_BUS_HTTP=https://<nodo>:8470 VITE_BUS_WS=wss://<nodo>:8480 pnpm dev
# Navegador: http://localhost:5173
# 2. Build de la SPA
cd web && pnpm install && pnpm build # genera web/dist
# 3. Gateway sirviendo la SPA + API contra el control-plane
cd .. && CGO_ENABLED=0 go run ./cmd/webgw \
--port 8481 --ctrl-url http://127.0.0.1:8470 --web-dir web/dist
# Navegador: http://127.0.0.1:8481
# Desarrollo de la SPA con hot-reload (gateway en modo API-only, sin --web-dir):
cd web && pnpm dev # vite proxya /api + /stream al gateway
# Producción: build estático y sirve web/dist con cualquier static server.
cd web && pnpm build # genera web/dist
```
## Cuándo usarla
Cuando quieras que un humano hable por el bus desde un navegador, o cuando trabajes en la UI
de chat / el onboarding wallet. Para la lógica del bus en sí (membresía, claves, peers
programáticos) ve a `unibus`; `uniweb` solo es la capa web encima.
programáticos) ve a `unibus`; `uniweb` es el cliente web encima.
## Gotchas
- El gateway necesita el control-plane de unibus vivo (`--ctrl-url`, por defecto
`http://127.0.0.1:8470`); si no, las sesiones fallan al abrir el peer.
- `--web-dir` es **opcional**: vacío = API-only (úsalo con el dev server de vite); apuntando a
`web/dist` = sirve la SPA buildeada. Un path inválido degrada a API-only con un WARN, no
peta.
- Build cross-repo: `uniweb` no compila si `../unibus` no está presente en disco (el `replace`
es local). Para deploy hay que llevar ambos repos, o vendorizar unibus.
- **`wss://` con CA self-signed**: el cluster sirve el WebSocket con el cert del bus (CA
propia). Un navegador rechaza `wss://` self-signed salvo que se importe la CA o se ponga un
reverse proxy con cert válido (Let's Encrypt). En dev se puede aceptar el cert a mano.
- **Onboarding admin-side**: el bus no tiene endpoint de auto-registro (el viejo gateway lo
*mockeaba*). En `enforce`, una identidad nueva debe ser autorizada por un admin
(`membershipd user add`) antes de poder abrir sesión; el flujo de Join muestra la clave
pública del usuario para que un admin la autorice.
- **CORS**: el dev server corre en `http://localhost:5173` para coincidir con la
`--cors-origins` del cluster. Otro origen necesita añadirse a esa allowlist.
- La passphrase del wallet nunca se guarda ni se envía; perderla en un dispositivo sin la
mnemónica BIP39 = identidad irrecuperable en ese dispositivo (recuperable en otro con las 12
palabras).
## Capability growth log
- v0.3.0 (2026-06-14) — `uniweb` se vuelve **cliente browser-nativo puro** (issue 0001, Fase
2): la SPA se cablea al SDK del bus (`busService.ts` reemplaza el módulo `api`) y se
**elimina el gateway Go** (`cmd/webgw`, `go.mod`, `go.sum`). `uniweb` queda como solo `web/`,
sin nada de Go, sin dependencia de `unibus` como módulo. La clave privada se usa solo en el
navegador (`saveAndOpen`/`unlockAndOpen` abren la sesión localmente; ya NO se hace
`POST /api/session` con la privada — se cierra el agujero E2E del modelo gateway). Validado
end-to-end contra el cluster descentralizado real (Fase 3): identidad registrada conecta por
`nats.ws` y hace round-trip de un mensaje cifrado (crear room → publicar → recibir
descifrado + firma verificada). El onboarding por token queda admin-side (el bus no tiene
auto-registro). `tsc` + `pnpm build` + 19/19 unit verdes.
- v0.2.0 (2026-06-13) — SDK del bus en TypeScript (`web/src/bus/`), issue 0001 Fase 1:
el protocolo y el cifrado E2E del bus portados al navegador para que `uniweb` deje
de depender del gateway Go. Módulos: `crypto.ts` (Ed25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305,
sealed box con nonce BLAKE2b igual que Go), `frame.ts` (wire format = `encoding/json`
de Go byte a byte), `room.ts` (Policy), `busauth.ts` (nkey NATS + firma de requests
del control-plane), `client.ts` (envelope de room puro + `BusClient` sobre una
interfaz de transporte + cliente HTTP firmado) y `wstransport.ts` (adaptador
`nats.ws`). Paridad cross-language verificada contra vectores Go (`cmd/busvectors`):
**19/19 tests verdes** — endpoint id, firma Ed25519, AEAD, sealed box, frame
marshal/sign, nkey y canonical request. La clave privada del usuario nunca se
serializa hacia la red. La conexión `nats.ws` + control-plane reales se validan en
la Fase 3 (E2E) por requerir un unibus vivo con WebSocket.
- v0.1.0 (2026-06-13) — scaffold inicial: extracción de la SPA (`web/`) y el gateway
(`cmd/webgw`) desde `unibus` v0.13.0 a su propia app/sub-repo. Sin cambios de capacidad
respecto a lo que ya vivía en unibus 0.12.0 (wallet BIP39 + sesiones por usuario); solo
cambia la ubicación y el módulo Go. go build/vet/test + pnpm build verdes en la nueva
ubicación con los `replace` cross-repo.
- v0.2.0 (2026-06-13) — SDK del bus en TypeScript (`web/src/bus/`), issue 0001 Fase 1:
el protocolo y el cifrado E2E del bus portados al navegador para que `uniweb` deje
de depender del gateway Go. Módulos: `crypto.ts` (Ed25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305,
sealed box con nonce BLAKE2b igual que Go), `frame.ts` (wire format = `encoding/json`
de Go byte a byte), `room.ts` (Policy), `busauth.ts` (nkey NATS + firma de requests
del control-plane), `client.ts` (envelope de room puro + `BusClient` sobre una
interfaz de transporte + cliente HTTP firmado) y `wstransport.ts` (adaptador
`nats.ws`). Paridad cross-language verificada contra vectores Go (`cmd/busvectors`):
**19/19 tests verdes** — endpoint id, firma Ed25519, AEAD, sealed box, frame
marshal/sign, nkey y canonical request. La clave privada del usuario nunca se
serializa hacia la red. La conexión `nats.ws` + control-plane reales se validan en
la Fase 3 (E2E) por requerir un unibus vivo con WebSocket.
- v0.1.0 (2026-06-13) — scaffold inicial: extracción de la SPA (`web/`) y el gateway
(`cmd/webgw`) desde `unibus` v0.13.0 a su propia app/sub-repo. Sin cambios de capacidad
respecto a lo que ya vivía en unibus 0.12.0 (wallet BIP39 + sesiones por usuario); solo
-246
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@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
cs "fn-registry/functions/cybersecurity"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/busauth"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/client"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/frame"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/room"
)
// gateway is the live web gateway: it owns the operator's identity and a single
// connected unibus client, and turns the bus's crypto-bearing API into the plain
// REST/SSE surface the browser consumes. The browser never signs, never speaks
// NATS, and never sees a private key — the gateway is the legitimate room member
// that seals/opens payloads on the browser's behalf.
//
// TRUST MODEL: content stays end-to-end encrypted on the wire. The gateway can
// read plaintext because it acts AS the operator's client — a real member of
// each room, holding the room key K like any peer. It is the same trust a native
// desktop client has. In the wallet phase (per-browser WebCrypto identity) the
// decryption can move into the browser; today, for the single-operator MVP, the
// gateway decrypts server-side and pushes cleartext over a loopback/authenticated
// SSE channel.
type gateway struct {
id cs.Identity
endpoint string
cli *client.Client
refreshACL bool // call RefreshSession after a membership change (needed under a per-subject ACL bus)
mu sync.Mutex
hubs map[string]*roomHub // roomID -> live fan-out of decrypted frames to SSE clients
}
// gatewayConfig wires a live gateway.
type gatewayConfig struct {
Identity cs.Identity
NatsURL string
CtrlURL string
CtrlURLs []string
NatsURLs []string
CAPath string // bus CA; empty => plaintext dev connection (matches a loopback membershipd)
}
// newGateway connects the unibus client with the operator identity following the
// same posture seam every peer uses: a non-empty CA path means TLS + nkey, empty
// means plaintext dev. When a CA is configured the bus is assumed to enforce a
// per-subject ACL, so membership changes trigger a session refresh.
func newGateway(cfg gatewayConfig) (*gateway, error) {
opts := client.Options{
CtrlURLs: cfg.CtrlURLs,
NatsServers: cfg.NatsURLs,
}
if cfg.CAPath != "" {
tlsCfg, err := busauth.LoadCATLSConfig(cfg.CAPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("webgw: load bus CA %q: %w", cfg.CAPath, err)
}
opts.UseNkey = true
opts.TLS = tlsCfg
opts.CtrlTLS = tlsCfg
}
cli, err := client.NewWithOptions(cfg.NatsURL, cfg.CtrlURL, cfg.Identity, opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("webgw: connect bus client: %w", err)
}
return &gateway{
id: cfg.Identity,
endpoint: frame.EndpointID(cfg.Identity.SignPub),
cli: cli,
refreshACL: cfg.CAPath != "",
hubs: map[string]*roomHub{},
}, nil
}
// Close stops every hub and releases the bus client connection.
func (g *gateway) Close() error {
g.mu.Lock()
for _, h := range g.hubs {
h.stop()
}
g.hubs = map[string]*roomHub{}
g.mu.Unlock()
if g.cli != nil {
return g.cli.Close()
}
return nil
}
// ---- wire types (browser-facing JSON) ------------------------------------
// meInfo is what GET /api/me returns: the operator identity the gateway acts as.
type meInfo struct {
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint"`
SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"`
}
// roomWire is the browser view of a room. It deliberately omits messages: those
// stream over SSE (GET /api/rooms/{id}/stream), not in the room list.
type roomWire struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Subject string `json:"subject"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Epoch int `json:"epoch"`
Encrypt bool `json:"encrypt"`
Persist bool `json:"persist"`
SignMsgs bool `json:"sign_msgs"`
Role string `json:"role"`
}
// createRoomReq is the POST /api/rooms body. Encrypt/Persist/SignMsgs are
// pointers so an omitted field falls back to the chat default rather than to the
// Go zero value (false). The common case — the browser sending only {subject,
// encrypted} — maps encrypted onto all three (the Matrix-like chat policy).
type createRoomReq struct {
Subject string `json:"subject"`
Encrypted *bool `json:"encrypted,omitempty"`
Encrypt *bool `json:"encrypt,omitempty"`
Persist *bool `json:"persist,omitempty"`
SignMsgs *bool `json:"sign_msgs,omitempty"`
}
// policy resolves the requested policy. A bare {subject} defaults to the
// Matrix-like chat room (encrypted + persisted + signed) so a created room keeps
// durable, end-to-end-encrypted, authored history. Callers can override any leg.
func (r createRoomReq) policy() room.Policy {
enc, per, sig := true, true, true
if r.Encrypted != nil {
enc, per, sig = *r.Encrypted, *r.Encrypted, *r.Encrypted
}
if r.Encrypt != nil {
enc = *r.Encrypt
}
if r.Persist != nil {
per = *r.Persist
}
if r.SignMsgs != nil {
sig = *r.SignMsgs
}
return room.Policy{Encrypt: enc, Persist: per, SignMsgs: sig}
}
// sendReq is the POST /api/rooms/{id}/send body.
type sendReq struct {
Body string `json:"body"`
}
// msgWire is one decrypted message pushed over SSE.
type msgWire struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Sender string `json:"sender"`
Body string `json:"body"`
TS int64 `json:"ts"` // epoch ms (decoded from the frame's ULID id)
Mine bool `json:"mine"`
}
// ---- operations -----------------------------------------------------------
func (g *gateway) me() meInfo {
return meInfo{Endpoint: g.endpoint, SignPub: hex.EncodeToString(g.id.SignPub)}
}
// subjectName derives a short, human-friendly room name from its bus subject by
// dropping the leading namespace segment (room., test., proc., agent.). It is a
// display nicety only; the canonical identity stays the subject/room id.
func subjectName(subject string) string {
for _, p := range []string{"room.", "test.", "proc.", "agent.", "rpc."} {
if strings.HasPrefix(subject, p) {
return strings.TrimPrefix(subject, p)
}
}
return subject
}
func (g *gateway) listRooms() ([]roomWire, error) {
rooms, err := g.cli.ListMyRooms()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out := make([]roomWire, 0, len(rooms))
for _, rm := range rooms {
out = append(out, roomWire{
ID: rm.RoomID,
Subject: rm.Subject,
Name: subjectName(rm.Subject),
Epoch: rm.Epoch,
Encrypt: rm.Policy.Encrypt,
Persist: rm.Policy.Persist,
SignMsgs: rm.Policy.SignMsgs,
Role: rm.Role,
})
}
return out, nil
}
func (g *gateway) createRoom(req createRoomReq) (roomWire, error) {
subject := strings.TrimSpace(req.Subject)
if subject == "" {
return roomWire{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: subject required")
}
p := req.policy()
roomID, err := g.cli.CreateRoom(subject, p)
if err != nil {
return roomWire{}, err
}
// Under a per-subject ACL the operator's frozen NATS permissions do not yet
// cover the new room's subject; refresh so subsequent data-plane use works. On
// a plaintext/non-ACL dev bus this is unnecessary and would needlessly drop any
// live SSE subscriptions, so it is gated on the secured posture.
if g.refreshACL {
_ = g.cli.RefreshSession()
}
return roomWire{
ID: roomID,
Subject: subject,
Name: subjectName(subject),
Epoch: 1,
Encrypt: p.Encrypt,
Persist: p.Persist,
SignMsgs: p.SignMsgs,
Role: "owner",
}, nil
}
// join resolves room metadata and (for encrypted rooms) fetches the room key so
// the gateway can later open payloads. Idempotent.
func (g *gateway) join(roomID string) error {
if err := g.cli.Join(roomID); err != nil {
return err
}
if g.refreshACL {
_ = g.cli.RefreshSession()
}
return nil
}
// send publishes plaintext to a room. The unibus client seals it with the room
// key (encrypted rooms) and signs it (signed rooms) before it leaves the process.
func (g *gateway) send(roomID, body string) error {
return g.cli.Publish(roomID, []byte(body))
}
-140
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package main
import (
"sync"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/client"
"github.com/enmanuel/unibus/pkg/frame"
"github.com/oklog/ulid/v2"
)
// roomHub multiplexes ONE unibus room subscription to MANY SSE clients. The
// unibus client derives a per-(room, endpoint) durable consumer name, so a
// second Subscribe for the same room from the same operator would contend for
// the same durable (load-balanced delivery) rather than each browser receiving
// every message. The hub holds a single subscription per room and fans each
// decrypted frame out to every connected browser, which also means the gateway
// opens at most one bus subscription per room regardless of how many tabs watch
// it.
type roomHub struct {
roomID string
myEndpoint string
sub *client.Sub
mu sync.Mutex
clients map[chan msgWire]struct{}
}
// frameTS decodes the millisecond timestamp embedded in a frame's ULID id. A
// malformed id (should not happen for bus-produced frames) yields 0, which the
// browser renders without crashing.
func frameTS(msgID string) int64 {
id, err := ulid.Parse(msgID)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
return int64(id.Time())
}
// newRoomHub opens the single bus subscription for roomID and starts fanning
// decrypted frames out to registered clients. The room must already be joined
// (so the gateway holds the room key) before this is called.
func newRoomHub(cli *client.Client, roomID, myEndpoint string) (*roomHub, error) {
h := &roomHub{
roomID: roomID,
myEndpoint: myEndpoint,
clients: map[chan msgWire]struct{}{},
}
sub, err := cli.Subscribe(roomID, func(f frame.Frame, plaintext []byte) {
m := msgWire{
ID: f.MsgID,
Sender: f.Sender,
Body: string(plaintext),
TS: frameTS(f.MsgID),
Mine: f.Sender == myEndpoint,
}
h.broadcast(m)
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
h.sub = sub
return h, nil
}
// broadcast delivers a message to every registered client without blocking the
// NATS delivery goroutine: a client whose buffer is full (a stalled browser)
// drops this frame rather than stalling the whole room.
func (h *roomHub) broadcast(m msgWire) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
for ch := range h.clients {
select {
case ch <- m:
default:
}
}
}
// add registers a new SSE client channel.
func (h *roomHub) add(ch chan msgWire) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
h.clients[ch] = struct{}{}
}
// stop unsubscribes from the bus. Local delivery ends; for a persisted room the
// durable consumer's ack position stays on the server, so a later subscription
// with the same operator resumes from where it left off.
func (h *roomHub) stop() {
if h.sub != nil {
_ = h.sub.Unsubscribe()
}
}
// openStream joins the room (idempotent; fetches the room key for encrypted
// rooms), attaches an SSE client to the room's hub (creating it on first watcher),
// and returns the client's message channel plus a cleanup func. The cleanup
// detaches the client and, when it was the last watcher, tears down the room's
// single bus subscription.
func (g *gateway) openStream(roomID string) (chan msgWire, func(), error) {
if err := g.join(roomID); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
g.mu.Lock()
h := g.hubs[roomID]
if h == nil {
var err error
h, err = newRoomHub(g.cli, roomID, g.endpoint)
if err != nil {
g.mu.Unlock()
return nil, nil, err
}
g.hubs[roomID] = h
}
g.mu.Unlock()
// Buffer so a brief render hitch in the browser does not drop live frames; a
// sustained stall still drops (broadcast is non-blocking) rather than wedging
// the room.
ch := make(chan msgWire, 64)
h.add(ch)
// cleanup takes g.mu before h.mu (the single, consistent lock order) so a
// concurrent openStream that re-creates the hub cannot race the teardown.
cleanup := func() {
g.mu.Lock()
defer g.mu.Unlock()
h.mu.Lock()
delete(h.clients, ch)
empty := len(h.clients) == 0
h.mu.Unlock()
if empty {
if cur := g.hubs[roomID]; cur == h {
delete(g.hubs, roomID)
h.stop()
}
}
}
return ch, cleanup, nil
}
-98
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@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
cs "fn-registry/functions/cybersecurity"
)
// identityJSON mirrors the on-disk / pass-stored identity format shared across
// the unibus tooling: the four keypair halves, each std-base64. It is the SAME
// shape the bus client persists (pkg/client identity file) and the operator's
// `pass` entry unibus/operator-identity, so the web gateway loads the operator's
// identity without a divergent serialization. Kept in lockstep with
// unibus_admin/internal/admin/identity.go.
type identityJSON struct {
SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"`
SignPriv string `json:"sign_priv"`
KexPub string `json:"kex_pub"`
KexPriv string `json:"kex_priv"`
}
// decodeIdentity turns the JSON identity bytes into a cs.Identity. The private
// halves stay only in memory; this never writes them anywhere.
func decodeIdentity(raw []byte) (cs.Identity, error) {
var f identityJSON
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &f); err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: parse identity json: %w", err)
}
dec := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString
signPub, err := dec(f.SignPub)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: decode sign_pub: %w", err)
}
signPriv, err := dec(f.SignPriv)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: decode sign_priv: %w", err)
}
kexPub, err := dec(f.KexPub)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: decode kex_pub: %w", err)
}
kexPriv, err := dec(f.KexPriv)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: decode kex_priv: %w", err)
}
if len(signPub) != 32 || len(signPriv) != 64 || len(kexPub) != 32 || len(kexPriv) != 32 {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: identity has wrong key sizes (sign_pub=%d sign_priv=%d kex_pub=%d kex_priv=%d)",
len(signPub), len(signPriv), len(kexPub), len(kexPriv))
}
return cs.Identity{SignPub: signPub, SignPriv: signPriv, KexPub: kexPub, KexPriv: kexPriv}, nil
}
// loadIdentityFromFile reads a 0600 identity JSON file (the same format the bus
// client writes) and decodes it. Used on a deploy host where `pass` is not
// available and the operator identity is delivered as a protected file.
func loadIdentityFromFile(path string) (cs.Identity, error) {
raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: read identity file %q: %w", path, err)
}
return decodeIdentity(raw)
}
// loadIdentityFromPass shells out to `pass show <entry>` and decodes the JSON
// identity it returns. The secret is held only in memory; this process never
// writes it to disk or argv. Used in local operator workflows where the GNU
// password store holds unibus/operator-identity.
func loadIdentityFromPass(entry string) (cs.Identity, error) {
out, err := exec.Command("pass", "show", entry).Output()
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("webgw: pass show %q: %w", entry, err)
}
return decodeIdentity(out)
}
// loadPassValue returns the first line of a `pass show <entry>` for non-identity
// secrets (e.g. the unlock passphrase). Empty entry yields an empty string and
// no error, so callers can treat "no pass entry configured" as "not set".
func loadPassValue(entry string) (string, error) {
if entry == "" {
return "", nil
}
out, err := exec.Command("pass", "show", entry).Output()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("webgw: pass show %q: %w", entry, err)
}
s := string(out)
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
if s[i] == '\n' || s[i] == '\r' {
return s[:i], nil
}
}
return s, nil
}
-199
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@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
// Command webgw is the web gateway for the unibus chat SPA. It is a single Go
// binary that holds the operator's bus identity, connects to the bus as a real
// authenticated peer (pkg/client), and exposes a small REST + SSE API the
// browser consumes. The browser never signs, never speaks NATS, and never sees a
// private key: it authenticates to the gateway with a passphrase and thereafter
// holds only an opaque session cookie.
//
// TRUST MODEL (MVP, single operator): room content stays end-to-end encrypted on
// the bus. The gateway can read plaintext because it acts AS the operator's
// client — a legitimate member of each room holding the room key. Decryption
// happens server-side in this process; cleartext then crosses an authenticated
// (loopback or TLS-fronted) SSE channel to the browser. The wallet phase (issue:
// per-browser WebCrypto identity) can move decryption into the browser; see the
// report for the FASE 2 plan.
//
// # local dev against a loopback membershipd (plaintext), operator from pass:
// webgw --identity-pass unibus/operator-identity \
// --ctrl-url http://127.0.0.1:8470 --nats-url nats://127.0.0.1:4250
//
// # secured cluster (TLS + nkey on both planes), identity from a 0600 file:
// webgw --ca ca.crt --identity-file operator.id \
// --ctrl-url https://node-a:8470 --nats-url nats://node-a:4250 \
// --ctrl-urls https://node-b:8470,https://node-c:8470 \
// --nats-urls nats://node-b:4250,nats://node-c:4250
package main
import (
"context"
"flag"
"log"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
cs "fn-registry/functions/cybersecurity"
)
func main() {
var (
bind = flag.String("bind", "127.0.0.1", "interface to bind the gateway HTTP server to (loopback by default)")
port = flag.String("port", "8481", "gateway HTTP port")
ctrlURL = flag.String("ctrl-url", "http://127.0.0.1:8470", "primary unibus control-plane base URL")
ctrlURLs = flag.String("ctrl-urls", "", "comma-separated ADDITIONAL control-plane base URLs (cluster failover)")
natsURL = flag.String("nats-url", "nats://127.0.0.1:4250", "primary NATS URL")
natsURLs = flag.String("nats-urls", "", "comma-separated ADDITIONAL NATS seed URLs (cluster failover)")
caPath = flag.String("ca", "", "bus CA cert path; set to talk TLS+nkey to a secured bus (empty = plaintext dev)")
identityFile = flag.String("identity-file", "", "path to the operator identity JSON file (0600). Mutually exclusive with --identity-pass")
identityPass = flag.String("identity-pass", "", "pass(1) entry holding the operator identity JSON, e.g. unibus/operator-identity")
unlockPass = flag.String("unlock-pass", "", "literal passphrase the browser must send to unlock a LEGACY operator session (dev). Prefer --unlock-pass-entry")
unlockEntry = flag.String("unlock-pass-entry", "unibus/admin-panel-password", "pass(1) entry holding the operator unlock passphrase (used when --unlock-pass is empty)")
registerURL = flag.String("register-url", "", "bus POST /register URL for wallet onboarding. Empty = derive from --ctrl-url (<ctrl-url>/register)")
mockTokens = flag.String("mock-tokens", "", "DEV ONLY: comma-separated one-shot invite tokens for local testing, 'token=handle:role'. Empty in production (real invites come from the bus). Example: demo=demo:member")
webDir = flag.String("web-dir", "", "OPTIONAL path to the built SPA (web/dist) to serve. Empty = API only (use vite dev server)")
)
flag.Parse()
log.SetFlags(log.LstdFlags | log.Lmsgprefix)
log.SetPrefix("[webgw] ")
id, err := loadIdentity(*identityFile, *identityPass)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
unlock := *unlockPass
if unlock == "" {
unlock, err = loadPassValue(*unlockEntry)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("resolve unlock passphrase: %v", err)
}
}
if unlock == "" {
log.Fatalf("an unlock passphrase is required: set --unlock-pass or a non-empty --unlock-pass-entry (default unibus/admin-panel-password)")
}
resolvedWebDir := resolveWebDir(*webDir)
// busTemplate is the connection config every bus client uses. The operator
// gateway uses it as-is; each wallet session clones it and overrides Identity
// with the logged-in user's keypair.
busTemplate := gatewayConfig{
Identity: id,
NatsURL: *natsURL,
CtrlURL: *ctrlURL,
CtrlURLs: splitCSV(*ctrlURLs),
NatsURLs: splitCSV(*natsURLs),
CAPath: *caPath,
}
gw, err := newGateway(busTemplate)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("%v", err)
}
defer gw.Close()
// Wallet onboarding backend: POST /api/register targets the bus's /register
// (added by the user-accounts work). When --register-url is empty we derive it
// from --ctrl-url; --mock-tokens supplies one-shot invites for local testing
// before that endpoint is deployed.
regURL := *registerURL
if regURL == "" {
regURL = strings.TrimRight(*ctrlURL, "/") + "/register"
}
registrar := newRegistrar(regURL, *mockTokens)
log.Printf("operator endpoint: %s", gw.endpoint)
log.Printf("control plane: %s (+%d failover)", *ctrlURL, len(splitCSV(*ctrlURLs)))
tls := "OFF (plaintext dev)"
if *caPath != "" {
tls = "ON (CA " + *caPath + ")"
}
log.Printf("bus TLS+nkey: %s", tls)
if resolvedWebDir != "" {
log.Printf("serving SPA from: %s", resolvedWebDir)
} else {
log.Printf("API only (no --web-dir): use the vite dev server with a /api+stream proxy")
}
log.Printf("wallet register: %s (mock tokens: %d)", regURL, mockTokenCount(*mockTokens))
srv := newServer(gw, busTemplate, registrar, unlock, resolvedWebDir)
addr := *bind + ":" + *port
httpSrv := &http.Server{
Addr: addr,
Handler: srv,
// No global write timeout: SSE streams are long-lived. Header timeout still
// bounds slowloris on the request line/headers.
ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
}
go func() {
log.Printf("web gateway: http://%s", addr)
if err := httpSrv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
log.Fatalf("http server: %v", err)
}
}()
stop := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(stop, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
<-stop
log.Printf("shutting down...")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = httpSrv.Shutdown(ctx)
log.Printf("bye")
}
// loadIdentity resolves the operator identity from exactly one of --identity-file
// or --identity-pass.
func loadIdentity(file, passEntry string) (cs.Identity, error) {
switch {
case file != "" && passEntry != "":
return cs.Identity{}, errFlag("set only one of --identity-file or --identity-pass")
case file != "":
return loadIdentityFromFile(file)
case passEntry != "":
return loadIdentityFromPass(passEntry)
default:
return cs.Identity{}, errFlag("an identity is required: pass --identity-file <path> or --identity-pass <entry>")
}
}
// resolveWebDir validates the --web-dir flag. An empty flag means API-only. A
// non-empty dir is kept only if it actually holds an index.html, so a typo logs
// "API only" rather than serving 404s.
func resolveWebDir(dir string) string {
if dir == "" {
return ""
}
abs, err := filepath.Abs(dir)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("WARN --web-dir %q: %v; serving API only", dir, err)
return ""
}
if !statFile(filepath.Join(abs, "index.html")) {
log.Printf("WARN --web-dir %q has no index.html; serving API only", abs)
return ""
}
return abs
}
type flagErr string
func (e flagErr) Error() string { return string(e) }
func errFlag(s string) error { return flagErr("webgw: " + s) }
func splitCSV(s string) []string {
var out []string
for _, p := range strings.Split(s, ",") {
if p = strings.TrimSpace(p); p != "" {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
-193
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@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// registerReq is the POST /api/register body. It mirrors the bus contract exactly
// (token + the two PUBLIC key halves, each 64 hex chars). The private key never
// appears here — registration only publishes the public identity. The handle and
// role are NOT accepted from the client; they are fixed by the invite the token
// belongs to (no privilege escalation).
type registerReq struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"`
KexPub string `json:"kex_pub"`
}
// registerResp is what we return to the browser on success. The bus's /register
// (issue: user-accounts) decides handle/role from the invite; in mock mode the
// gateway echoes the configured pair so the SPA can greet the new user.
type registerResp struct {
Handle string `json:"handle"`
Role string `json:"role"`
}
// registrar fulfils POST /api/register. It targets the bus's POST /register
// endpoint (added by the user-accounts work, bus >= 0.12.0). Until that endpoint
// is rolled out, a built-in mock validates against a configured set of one-shot
// tokens so the whole wallet flow is testable locally. Mock tokens are checked
// first; anything else is proxied to the real bus when --register-url is set.
type registrar struct {
mu sync.Mutex
registerURL string // bus POST /register; empty => mock-only
httpc *http.Client // for proxying to the bus
mockTokens map[string]*mockToken // configured one-shot invites for local testing
}
// mockToken is a local stand-in for a bus invite: a token that maps to a fixed
// handle+role and can be consumed exactly once.
type mockToken struct {
handle string
role string
used bool
}
// newRegistrar parses the --mock-tokens spec ("tok=handle:role,tok2=h2:role2")
// and configures the optional proxy target.
func newRegistrar(registerURL, mockSpec string) *registrar {
r := &registrar{
registerURL: strings.TrimSpace(registerURL),
httpc: &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second},
mockTokens: map[string]*mockToken{},
}
for _, part := range strings.Split(mockSpec, ",") {
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
if part == "" {
continue
}
// tok=handle:role (role optional, defaults to member)
eq := strings.IndexByte(part, '=')
if eq < 0 {
continue
}
tok := strings.TrimSpace(part[:eq])
hr := strings.TrimSpace(part[eq+1:])
handle, role := hr, "member"
if c := strings.IndexByte(hr, ':'); c >= 0 {
handle, role = strings.TrimSpace(hr[:c]), strings.TrimSpace(hr[c+1:])
}
if tok != "" && handle != "" {
r.mockTokens[tok] = &mockToken{handle: handle, role: role}
}
}
return r
}
// mockTokenCount counts configured mock tokens in a --mock-tokens spec (for the
// startup log line).
func mockTokenCount(spec string) int {
n := 0
for _, part := range strings.Split(spec, ",") {
if p := strings.TrimSpace(part); p != "" && strings.ContainsRune(p, '=') {
n++
}
}
return n
}
// validHexKey reports whether s is exactly 64 lowercase/uppercase hex chars (a
// 32-byte key). Both sign_pub and kex_pub are 32-byte keys.
func validHexKey(s string) bool {
if len(s) != 64 {
return false
}
_, err := hex.DecodeString(s)
return err == nil
}
// handleRegister validates the keys and consumes the token. Order of resolution:
// 1. strict validation of the public keys (defends both mock and proxy paths);
// 2. mock token (one-shot) if configured;
// 3. proxy to the bus /register if --register-url is set;
// 4. otherwise reject with a clear error.
func (s *server) handleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req registerReq
if !decode(w, r, &req) {
return
}
req.Token = strings.TrimSpace(req.Token)
if req.Token == "" {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "token required")
return
}
if !validHexKey(req.SignPub) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "sign_pub must be 64 hex chars (32 bytes)")
return
}
if !validHexKey(req.KexPub) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "kex_pub must be 64 hex chars (32 bytes)")
return
}
reg := s.registrar
// 2) mock one-shot token.
reg.mu.Lock()
mt, isMock := reg.mockTokens[req.Token]
if isMock {
if mt.used {
reg.mu.Unlock()
writeErr(w, http.StatusConflict, "invite already used")
return
}
mt.used = true
handle, role := mt.handle, mt.role
reg.mu.Unlock()
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, registerResp{Handle: handle, Role: role})
return
}
reg.mu.Unlock()
// 3) proxy to the real bus /register when configured.
if reg.registerURL != "" {
s.proxyRegister(w, req)
return
}
// 4) no mock match, no proxy target.
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid or unknown token (and no bus /register configured)")
}
// proxyRegister forwards the registration to the bus's POST /register. The bus
// validates the invite (existence, not-used, not-expired) and adds the public
// identity to the allowlist with the invite's handle+role. This is unsigned by
// design: the TOKEN authorizes the call, not an admin signature.
func (s *server) proxyRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, req registerReq) {
body, _ := json.Marshal(req)
resp, err := s.registrar.httpc.Post(
s.registrar.registerURL,
"application/json",
bytes.NewReader(body),
)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "bus register unreachable: "+err.Error())
return
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
// On success, try to pass through the bus's handle/role if it returned them;
// otherwise a bare 201 is still success.
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusCreated || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
var rr registerResp
_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &rr)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, rr)
return
}
// Forward the bus's error verbatim where possible.
msg := strings.TrimSpace(string(raw))
if msg == "" {
msg = fmt.Sprintf("bus register failed (HTTP %d)", resp.StatusCode)
}
writeErr(w, resp.StatusCode, msg)
}
-327
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@@ -1,327 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
)
// sessionCookie is the name of the gateway's session cookie. The browser sends
// it automatically on same-origin fetches AND on EventSource (SSE) connections —
// EventSource cannot set custom headers, so a cookie is the only way to
// authenticate the stream. It is HttpOnly so page JS can never read the token.
const sessionCookie = "unibus_session"
// server is the gateway's HTTP surface: a small REST/SSE API under /api plus an
// optional static file server for the built SPA.
//
// Two ways to get a session:
// - POST /api/session — the WALLET model. The browser hands its own bus
// identity (unlocked from its local encrypted key) and the gateway connects a
// dedicated bus client AS that user. Per-user, the primary path.
// - POST /api/login — the legacy operator passphrase. Binds the session to the
// single shared operator gateway. Kept for backward compatibility.
// - POST /api/register — the WALLET onboarding. Unauthenticated (the invite
// token authorizes), it consumes a token and publishes the new user's PUBLIC
// identity to the bus allowlist.
type server struct {
operatorGW *gateway // shared operator client (legacy passphrase login)
busTemplate gatewayConfig // bus connection config; Identity is overridden per user session
registrar *registrar // POST /api/register backend (mock + proxy)
unlock string // passphrase that unlocks an operator session (constant-time compare)
webDir string // optional path to the built SPA (web/dist); empty = API only
mux *http.ServeMux
sessions *sessionStore
}
func newServer(operatorGW *gateway, busTemplate gatewayConfig, registrar *registrar, unlock, webDir string) *server {
s := &server{
operatorGW: operatorGW,
busTemplate: busTemplate,
registrar: registrar,
unlock: unlock,
webDir: webDir,
mux: http.NewServeMux(),
sessions: newSessionStore(),
}
s.routes()
return s
}
func (s *server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { s.mux.ServeHTTP(w, r) }
func (s *server) routes() {
// Liveness, unauthenticated (systemd / deploy smoke).
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
})
// Unauthenticated onboarding / auth routes.
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/register", s.handleRegister) // invite token authorizes
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/session", s.handleSession) // wallet: per-user identity
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/login", s.handleLogin) // legacy operator passphrase
// Session-gated routes.
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/logout", s.auth(s.handleLogout))
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/me", s.auth(s.handleMe))
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/rooms", s.auth(s.handleListRooms))
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/rooms", s.auth(s.handleCreateRoom))
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/rooms/{id}/join", s.auth(s.handleJoin))
s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/rooms/{id}/send", s.auth(s.handleSend))
s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/rooms/{id}/stream", s.auth(s.handleStream))
// Everything else is the SPA (when --web-dir is set). Registered last.
if s.webDir != "" {
s.mux.Handle("/", s.spaHandler())
}
}
// meResp is the identity view returned by /api/session, /api/login and /api/me:
// the bus endpoint the session acts as, its signing public key, and the display
// handle.
type meResp struct {
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint"`
SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"`
Handle string `json:"handle"`
}
// ---- auth -----------------------------------------------------------------
// auth wraps a handler so it runs only with a valid session cookie, resolving the
// session (and thus the per-user gateway) it belongs to. A missing or unknown
// token yields 401, which the SPA treats as "show the login screen".
func (s *server) auth(next func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request, *session)) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookie)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
return
}
sess, ok := s.sessions.get(c.Value)
if !ok {
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
return
}
next(w, r, sess)
}
}
// handleLogin is the legacy operator passphrase login: it unlocks a session bound
// to the shared operator gateway. The wallet path (POST /api/session) is
// preferred; this remains for backward compatibility with the single-operator MVP.
func (s *server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req struct {
Passphrase string `json:"passphrase"`
}
if !decode(w, r, &req) {
return
}
// Constant-time compare so a wrong passphrase cannot be timed character by
// character. An empty configured passphrase never matches.
if s.unlock == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(req.Passphrase), []byte(s.unlock)) != 1 {
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "wrong passphrase")
return
}
tok := newToken()
handle := s.operatorGW.endpoint
if len(handle) > 8 {
handle = handle[:8]
}
s.sessions.put(tok, &session{gw: s.operatorGW, owned: false, handle: handle, issuedAt: time.Now()})
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookie,
Value: tok,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResp{Endpoint: s.operatorGW.endpoint, SignPub: hex.EncodeToString(s.operatorGW.id.SignPub), Handle: handle})
}
func (s *server) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ *session) {
if c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookie); err == nil {
if sess, ok := s.sessions.drop(c.Value); ok && sess.owned && sess.gw != nil {
// Per-user session: tear down its bus client so the private key and the
// NATS connection do not outlive the session.
_ = sess.gw.Close()
}
}
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookie, Value: "", Path: "/", MaxAge: -1, HttpOnly: true})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "logged_out"})
}
func (s *server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, sess *session) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResp{
Endpoint: sess.gw.endpoint,
SignPub: hex.EncodeToString(sess.gw.id.SignPub),
Handle: sess.handle,
})
}
// ---- rooms ----------------------------------------------------------------
func (s *server) handleListRooms(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, sess *session) {
rooms, err := sess.gw.listRooms()
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, rooms)
}
func (s *server) handleCreateRoom(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *session) {
var req createRoomReq
if !decode(w, r, &req) {
return
}
rv, err := sess.gw.createRoom(req)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, rv)
}
func (s *server) handleJoin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *session) {
if err := sess.gw.join(r.PathValue("id")); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "joined"})
}
func (s *server) handleSend(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *session) {
var req sendReq
if !decode(w, r, &req) {
return
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.Body) == "" {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "body required")
return
}
if err := sess.gw.send(r.PathValue("id"), req.Body); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "sent"})
}
// handleStream is the SSE endpoint: it joins the room, attaches to the session's
// fan-out hub, and streams each decrypted message as a `data:` event. For a
// persisted room the hub's underlying subscription delivers history first
// (scrollback) and then live messages; for an ephemeral room only live messages
// flow. The stream ends when the browser disconnects (ctx cancelled).
func (s *server) handleStream(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *session) {
flusher, ok := w.(http.Flusher)
if !ok {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "streaming unsupported")
return
}
ch, cleanup, err := sess.gw.openStream(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, err.Error())
return
}
defer cleanup()
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive")
w.Header().Set("X-Accel-Buffering", "no") // disable proxy buffering (nginx/caddy)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
// An initial comment opens the stream immediately so the browser's
// EventSource fires `onopen` without waiting for the first message.
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(": connected\n\n"))
flusher.Flush()
ctx := r.Context()
ping := time.NewTicker(25 * time.Second)
defer ping.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ping.C:
// Comment line keeps idle proxies from closing the connection.
if _, err := w.Write([]byte(": ping\n\n")); err != nil {
return
}
flusher.Flush()
case m := <-ch:
b, err := json.Marshal(m)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if _, err := w.Write([]byte("data: " + string(b) + "\n\n")); err != nil {
return
}
flusher.Flush()
}
}
}
// ---- SPA serving (optional) -----------------------------------------------
// spaHandler serves the built SPA from s.webDir. A request for an existing asset
// is served directly; any other path (a client-side route) falls back to
// index.html so the SPA router can take over. /api and /healthz are matched first.
func (s *server) spaHandler() http.Handler {
root := http.Dir(s.webDir)
fileServer := http.FileServer(root)
index := filepath.Join(s.webDir, "index.html")
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
p := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/")
if p == "" {
http.ServeFile(w, r, index)
return
}
if f, err := root.Open(p); err == nil {
_ = f.Close()
fileServer.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
http.ServeFile(w, r, index) // unknown path -> SPA client-side routing
})
}
// ---- helpers --------------------------------------------------------------
func newToken() string {
b := make([]byte, 32)
_, _ = rand.Read(b)
return hex.EncodeToString(b)
}
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(code)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
func writeErr(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, msg string) {
writeJSON(w, code, map[string]string{"error": msg})
}
// decode reads a JSON body into v, writing a 400 and returning false on failure.
func decode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, v any) bool {
defer r.Body.Close()
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<20)).Decode(v); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad json: "+err.Error())
return false
}
return true
}
// statFile reports whether path exists and is a regular file (used to validate
// --web-dir at startup so a typo surfaces as a clear log line, not 404s later).
func statFile(path string) bool {
fi, err := os.Stat(path)
return err == nil && !fi.IsDir()
}
-146
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@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
cs "fn-registry/functions/cybersecurity"
)
// session is one logged-in browser. In the wallet model each session carries the
// user's OWN bus identity: the browser unlocks its locally-encrypted private key
// and hands the full keypair to the gateway over TLS, and the gateway spins up a
// dedicated bus client (a *gateway) that acts AS that user. The private key lives
// only in this process's memory for the life of the session — it is never written
// to disk and is dropped when the session ends.
//
// A session may instead point at the shared operator gateway (the legacy
// passphrase login); `owned` distinguishes the two so logout only closes the bus
// client it created.
type session struct {
gw *gateway
owned bool // true => gw was built for this session and must be Closed on logout
handle string
issuedAt time.Time
}
// sessionStore is the gateway's set of live browser sessions, keyed by the opaque
// cookie token. It is independent of any single bus identity.
type sessionStore struct {
mu sync.Mutex
m map[string]*session
}
func newSessionStore() *sessionStore { return &sessionStore{m: map[string]*session{}} }
func (st *sessionStore) put(token string, s *session) {
st.mu.Lock()
st.m[token] = s
st.mu.Unlock()
}
func (st *sessionStore) get(token string) (*session, bool) {
st.mu.Lock()
defer st.mu.Unlock()
s, ok := st.m[token]
return s, ok
}
// drop removes a session and returns it so the caller can close an owned gateway.
func (st *sessionStore) drop(token string) (*session, bool) {
st.mu.Lock()
defer st.mu.Unlock()
s, ok := st.m[token]
if ok {
delete(st.m, token)
}
return s, ok
}
// closeAll closes every owned per-user gateway (used at shutdown). The shared
// operator gateway is owned by main and closed separately.
func (st *sessionStore) closeAll() {
st.mu.Lock()
defer st.mu.Unlock()
for tok, s := range st.m {
if s.owned && s.gw != nil {
_ = s.gw.Close()
}
delete(st.m, tok)
}
}
// identityFromHex builds a cs.Identity from the four hex halves the browser sends
// on POST /api/session. It enforces the exact key sizes (sign_pub 32, sign_priv
// 64, kex_pub 32, kex_priv 32) so a malformed body cannot produce a half-built
// identity that fails opaquely deep in the bus client.
func identityFromHex(signPub, signPriv, kexPub, kexPriv string) (cs.Identity, error) {
sp, err := hex.DecodeString(signPub)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("sign_pub: %w", err)
}
spriv, err := hex.DecodeString(signPriv)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("sign_priv: %w", err)
}
kp, err := hex.DecodeString(kexPub)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("kex_pub: %w", err)
}
kpriv, err := hex.DecodeString(kexPriv)
if err != nil {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("kex_priv: %w", err)
}
if len(sp) != 32 || len(spriv) != 64 || len(kp) != 32 || len(kpriv) != 32 {
return cs.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("wrong key sizes (sign_pub=%d sign_priv=%d kex_pub=%d kex_priv=%d; want 32/64/32/32)",
len(sp), len(spriv), len(kp), len(kpriv))
}
return cs.Identity{SignPub: sp, SignPriv: spriv, KexPub: kp, KexPriv: kpriv}, nil
}
// sessionReq is the POST /api/session body: the user's full wallet identity (hex)
// plus a display handle. The private halves arrive only over TLS and are held in
// memory for the session; they are never persisted server-side.
type sessionReq struct {
Handle string `json:"handle"`
SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"`
SignPriv string `json:"sign_priv"`
KexPub string `json:"kex_pub"`
KexPriv string `json:"kex_priv"`
}
// handleSession opens a per-user session. It builds the user's bus identity from
// the posted keypair, connects a dedicated bus client as that user, and issues a
// session cookie bound to it. This is the wallet-model replacement for the
// operator passphrase login.
func (s *server) handleSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req sessionReq
if !decode(w, r, &req) {
return
}
id, err := identityFromHex(req.SignPub, req.SignPriv, req.KexPub, req.KexPriv)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad identity: "+err.Error())
return
}
cfg := s.busTemplate
cfg.Identity = id
gw, err := newGateway(cfg)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "connect bus as user: "+err.Error())
return
}
tok := newToken()
s.sessions.put(tok, &session{gw: gw, owned: true, handle: req.Handle, issuedAt: time.Now()})
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookie,
Value: tok,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResp{Endpoint: gw.endpoint, SignPub: req.SignPub, Handle: req.Handle})
}
-114
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@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// fixed wallet vector derived in the browser from the mnemonic
// "legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank yellow"
// using the unibus-sign-v1 / unibus-kex-v1 HKDF scheme. Used to assert the Go
// side accepts the browser-derived key sizes.
const (
fixSignPub = "3d594317212e53a3685b305539f6789eb8c538579e350ca795278b180ebb53db"
fixSignPriv = "94485d66ac958e23546be2e3b7575a47e1264bdf082e09abb7ad02ab32fcd55e3d594317212e53a3685b305539f6789eb8c538579e350ca795278b180ebb53db"
fixKexPub = "f3561ca116e4444b8880b8c0a35f2c9e85804d8628006facd84b1a6146208257"
fixKexPriv = "f6ffdf15e5ee2af0494897ff43e61a06d632af425a0372cb53a7c3e0f84c2bb2"
)
func TestIdentityFromHex(t *testing.T) {
id, err := identityFromHex(fixSignPub, fixSignPriv, fixKexPub, fixKexPriv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("identityFromHex valid vector: %v", err)
}
if len(id.SignPub) != 32 || len(id.SignPriv) != 64 || len(id.KexPub) != 32 || len(id.KexPriv) != 32 {
t.Fatalf("wrong sizes: %d/%d/%d/%d", len(id.SignPub), len(id.SignPriv), len(id.KexPub), len(id.KexPriv))
}
// Wrong sign_priv size (32 instead of 64) must be rejected.
if _, err := identityFromHex(fixSignPub, fixSignPub, fixKexPub, fixKexPriv); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for short sign_priv")
}
// Non-hex must be rejected.
if _, err := identityFromHex("zz", fixSignPriv, fixKexPub, fixKexPriv); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for non-hex sign_pub")
}
}
func TestValidHexKey(t *testing.T) {
if !validHexKey(fixSignPub) {
t.Fatalf("fixSignPub should be a valid 32-byte hex key")
}
if validHexKey("abcd") {
t.Fatalf("short key should be invalid")
}
if validHexKey(strings.Repeat("z", 64)) {
t.Fatalf("non-hex key should be invalid")
}
}
func TestNewRegistrarParsesMockTokens(t *testing.T) {
r := newRegistrar("", "demo=demo:member, bob=bob, alice=alice:admin")
if len(r.mockTokens) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("want 3 mock tokens, got %d", len(r.mockTokens))
}
if r.mockTokens["demo"].role != "member" || r.mockTokens["demo"].handle != "demo" {
t.Fatalf("demo token parsed wrong: %+v", r.mockTokens["demo"])
}
if r.mockTokens["bob"].role != "member" {
t.Fatalf("bob should default to role member, got %q", r.mockTokens["bob"].role)
}
if r.mockTokens["alice"].role != "admin" {
t.Fatalf("alice should be admin, got %q", r.mockTokens["alice"].role)
}
}
// post builds a server with only a registrar (the register path does not touch a
// gateway) and runs one POST /api/register, returning status + decoded body.
func postRegister(t *testing.T, s *server, body string) (int, map[string]string) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/register", strings.NewReader(body))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.handleRegister(w, req)
var m map[string]string
_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &m)
return w.Code, m
}
func TestHandleRegisterMockSingleUse(t *testing.T) {
s := &server{registrar: newRegistrar("", "demo=demo:member")}
// 1) valid token + valid keys => 201 with the invite's handle/role.
code, body := postRegister(t, s, `{"token":"demo","sign_pub":"`+fixSignPub+`","kex_pub":"`+fixKexPub+`"}`)
if code != 201 {
t.Fatalf("first register: want 201, got %d (%v)", code, body)
}
if body["handle"] != "demo" || body["role"] != "member" {
t.Fatalf("first register body: %v", body)
}
// 2) same token again => 409 (single-use consumed).
code, _ = postRegister(t, s, `{"token":"demo","sign_pub":"`+fixSignPub+`","kex_pub":"`+fixKexPub+`"}`)
if code != 409 {
t.Fatalf("reused token: want 409, got %d", code)
}
}
func TestHandleRegisterValidation(t *testing.T) {
s := &server{registrar: newRegistrar("", "demo=demo:member")}
// bad sign_pub (too short) => 400
if code, _ := postRegister(t, s, `{"token":"demo","sign_pub":"abcd","kex_pub":"`+fixKexPub+`"}`); code != 400 {
t.Fatalf("short sign_pub: want 400, got %d", code)
}
// missing token => 400
if code, _ := postRegister(t, s, `{"sign_pub":"`+fixSignPub+`","kex_pub":"`+fixKexPub+`"}`); code != 400 {
t.Fatalf("missing token: want 400, got %d", code)
}
// unknown token with no mock match and no register-url => 400
if code, _ := postRegister(t, s, `{"token":"nope","sign_pub":"`+fixSignPub+`","kex_pub":"`+fixKexPub+`"}`); code != 400 {
t.Fatalf("unknown token: want 400, got %d", code)
}
}
+171
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@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
---
issue: 0001
title: uniweb como cliente browser-nativo del bus (eliminar el gateway Go, desacoplar de unibus)
status: spec
created: 2026-06-13
domain: architecture
scope: uniweb (web/src/bus, web/src, eliminar cmd/webgw + go.mod) + unibus (pkg/embeddednats WebSocket, cmd/membershipd CORS, export de vectores de test cripto)
---
# Objetivo
Convertir `uniweb` en un cliente del bus **browser-nativo y autónomo**, al mismo nivel que
`unibus_android`: la SPA habla directamente con el data plane (NATS sobre WebSocket) y el
control plane (HTTP), e implementa el protocolo del bus y su cifrado E2E **en el propio
navegador** (TypeScript + `@noble`). Como consecuencia se **elimina el gateway Go**
(`cmd/webgw`) y `uniweb` deja de depender del módulo Go de `unibus`: queda como una app de solo
frontend (`web/`), sin `go.mod`, sin `replace => ../unibus`.
# Por qué (estado actual auditado el 13/06/2026)
`uniweb` v0.1.0 nació partiendo `unibus` v0.13.0 en dos: la SPA (`web/`) y un gateway Go
(`cmd/webgw`). El gateway importa `pkg/{busauth,client,frame,room}` de unibus y
`functions/cybersecurity` del registry, así que `uniweb` solo compila con `unibus` presente en
disco (`replace github.com/enmanuel/unibus => ../unibus`). Esa es la deuda que este issue salda.
Hay además un **defecto de seguridad** que este rediseño corrige de paso. Hoy el flujo wallet
funciona así:
- La SPA deriva la identidad del usuario (Ed25519 + X25519) de una mnemónica BIP39 y la cifra
at-rest en el dispositivo.
- Pero al abrir sesión, `POST /api/session` **envía al gateway la identidad COMPLETA,
incluida la clave privada** (`sign_priv` 64 bytes + `kex_priv` 32 bytes, en hex). El gateway
construye un `cs.Identity` con la privada y abre un cliente del bus que **actúa como el
usuario server-side** (ver `cmd/webgw/session.go`, `cmd/webgw/identity.go`).
Es decir: la clave privada del usuario **viaja al servidor y vive en la RAM del gateway**. El
cifrado de contenido sigue siendo E2E respecto al broker NATS, pero NO respecto al gateway —
el gateway puede leer y firmar todo en nombre del usuario. El report 0019 prometía que "la
clave privada nunca viaja al servidor"; eso solo será cierto cuando la cripto del bus ocurra
en el navegador. Este issue lo hace cierto.
`unibus_android` ya demuestra que el patrón es viable: es un cliente Kotlin que habla directo
con NATS (:4250) y el control plane (:8470) y hace toda la cripto E2E en el dispositivo, sin
gateway y sin compartir su clave privada.
# Diseño objetivo
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ unibus (el bus) │
│ membershipd :8470 control-plane HTTP │
│ + CORS (nuevo) /register /session... │
│ nats-server (embebido) │
│ :4250 TCP (peers Go, android) │
│ :4250+ WS (navegador, nats.ws) (nuevo)│
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
▲ TCP ▲ WebSocket
│ │
┌────────┴───────┐ ┌─────────┴──────────────┐
│ peers Go / │ │ uniweb (SPA, browser) │
│ android (Kt) │ │ web/src/bus/ (TS SDK)│
│ cripto nativa │ │ cripto en @noble │
└────────────────┘ │ priv NUNCA sale │
└────────────────────────┘
```
`uniweb` final = solo `web/`. Sin `cmd/webgw`, sin `go.mod`. Se sirve como estáticos (cualquier
static server; en dev, vite). La identidad del usuario se desbloquea y se usa **solo** en el
navegador.
# Fases
## Fase 0 — Preparar unibus (habilitar clientes browser)
Cambios en `unibus` (aditivos, no rompen peers Go/android existentes):
1. **WebSocket en el nats-server embebido** (`pkg/embeddednats`): configurar `opts.Websocket`
(puerto dedicado, `NoTLS` en loopback para dev; TLS en prod). Permite que `nats.ws` conecte
desde el navegador. Flag/env para el puerto WS.
2. **CORS en el control plane** (`cmd/membershipd` / `pkg/membership`): añadir cabeceras
`Access-Control-Allow-Origin/Methods/Headers` y manejar preflight `OPTIONS` en los endpoints
que el browser llamará directo (`/register`, `/session` o equivalente, listado de rooms,
invite, etc.). Configurable (allowlist de orígenes), no `*` en prod.
3. **Exportar vectores de test cripto**: un comando/test que vuelca vectores deterministas
(derivación de identidad desde seed, envelope de frame seal/open, reparto sealed-box de la
room key, firma por-mensaje) a JSON, para que los tests TS validen **paridad byte a byte**
con la implementación Go de referencia.
## Fase 1 — SDK del bus en TypeScript (`web/src/bus/`)
Port de la lógica que hoy vive en el gateway (`pkg/client` y dependencias). La cripto base ya
está disponible (`@noble/curves`, `@noble/hashes`, `@noble/ciphers`); lo que se porta es el
**protocolo**, no las primitivas.
- `frame.ts` — port de `pkg/frame` (~100 LOC): estructura del frame, ULID ids, timestamp,
threading (`ThreadID`, `ReplyTo`), tipos `MSG`/`REACT`.
- `room.ts` — port de `pkg/room` (~42 LOC): `Policy`, tipos de clave de room, epochs.
- `busauth.ts` — port de `pkg/busauth` (~331 LOC): autenticación nkey contra el control plane
(nonce + firma Ed25519). Verificar cómo el browser obtiene/firma el nonce con la identidad
del wallet (decisión: ¿la identidad del bus deriva del mismo seed BIP39?).
- `client.ts` — port de `pkg/client` (~1368 LOC, el grueso): conexión `nats.ws`, `Join`,
`Publish`/`PublishReply`/`React`, `Subscribe`, listado de rooms/users, `CreateRoom`,
`Invite`, `Kick`; envelope E2E (ChaCha20-Poly1305 seal/open con la room key); reparto de la
room key por sealed-box (X25519) a los invitados; rotación de epoch en LEAVE/KICK.
## Fase 2 — Cablear la SPA al SDK y eliminar el gateway
- Reemplazar `web/src/api.ts` (hoy llama `/api/*` del gateway) por llamadas al SDK del bus +
al control plane directo.
- La identidad del wallet (`web/src/wallet/`) se usa **localmente** para firmar/abrir; la
privada nunca se serializa hacia la red.
- Borrar `cmd/webgw/`, `go.mod`, `go.sum`. `uniweb` queda como app de solo frontend.
- Servir la SPA: static server trivial (sin lógica de bus). Documentar en `app.md`.
- Actualizar `app.md`: `lang` deja de ser `go` puro (o se marca `framework: react`, sin
`entry_point` Go), quitar `uses_functions` Go, ajustar `service`/`e2e_checks`.
## Fase 3 — Validación (DoD)
- Tests TS de paridad cripto contra los vectores de la Fase 0.
- E2E visual: join (invitación) / login (passphrase) / recover (mnemónica) + enviar y recibir
mensajes cifrados **browser ↔ browser** y **browser ↔ peer Go**.
- Auditoría de red (DevTools / proxy): confirmar que **ninguna petición transporta la clave
privada**.
# Riesgos / decisiones abiertas
- **nkey auth del navegador**: el bus autentica peers con nkey (Ed25519). Decidir si la
identidad nkey del bus deriva del mismo seed BIP39 del wallet o es separada. Afecta a
`busauth.ts` y a cómo el control plane reconoce al usuario.
- **WebSocket + TLS en prod**: el navegador exigirá `wss://` salvo loopback. Encaja con el
issue de TLS del bus (unibus 0001-bus-auth-and-tls).
- **CORS vs same-origin**: alternativa a CORS = servir la SPA detrás de un reverse proxy que
comparta origen con el control plane. Decidir en Fase 0/2.
- **Tamaño del bundle**: la cripto + nats.ws añaden peso; medir y, si hace falta, code-split.
- **Paridad de protocolo**: cualquier divergencia en el envelope o el reparto de claves rompe
la interoperabilidad con peers Go/android. Los vectores de la Fase 0 son el contrato.
# Definition of Done (3 capas)
## Capa 1 — Mecánica
- `uniweb` compila y se sirve **sin** `unibus` en disco y **sin** `go.mod` (es solo `web/`).
- `pnpm build` verde; `unibus` build/vet/test verdes tras los cambios aditivos de Fase 0.
## Capa 2 — Cobertura de comportamiento
| Escenario | Tipo | Evidencia | Esperado |
|---|---|---|---|
| Golden: browser ↔ peer Go intercambian mensaje cifrado | e2e | dos clientes en una room, mensaje round-trip | plaintext idéntico en ambos extremos |
| Edge: recover en dispositivo nuevo re-deriva la misma identidad | e2e | pegar mnemónica → `sign_pub` reconstruido | igual al original (vector Go) |
| Edge: rotación de epoch en KICK | e2e | KICK a un miembro → publicar | el kicked ya no descifra; los demás sí |
| Error: passphrase incorrecta | unit | unlock con clave mala | `WrongPasswordError`, sin tocar la red |
| Paridad: envelope seal/open TS vs Go | unit | vectores de Fase 0 | bytes idénticos |
## Capa 3 — Vida útil
| Métrica | Umbral | Dónde | Ventana |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mensajes browser↔Go sin pérdida | 100% | uso real | 7 días |
| Peticiones que filtran la priv | 0 | audit de red | continuo |
| Errores de descifrado | 0 | consola/log SPA | 7 días |
## Anti-criterios (invalidan la DoD)
- La clave privada aparece en CUALQUIER petición de red.
- `uniweb` necesita `unibus` en disco o como módulo Go para compilar/servir.
- Mensajes browser↔Go ilegibles por divergencia de protocolo.
- Queda algún `cmd/webgw`/`go.mod` en `uniweb`.
# Notas
Onboarding: tras este issue, `uniweb` se desarrolla y despliega como cualquier SPA estática.
No necesita el binario del bus para nada salvo apuntar `nats.ws` al puerto WebSocket del bus y
el control plane HTTP a `membershipd`. El bus (`unibus`) y los demás clientes (`unibus_android`)
no cambian de contrato: este issue solo añade el transporte WebSocket y CORS, ambos aditivos.
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
module github.com/enmanuel/uniweb
go 1.26.4
replace fn-registry => ../../../../
replace github.com/enmanuel/unibus => ../unibus
require (
fn-registry v0.0.0-00010101000000-000000000000
github.com/enmanuel/unibus v0.0.0-00010101000000-000000000000
github.com/oklog/ulid/v2 v2.1.0
)
require (
github.com/antithesishq/antithesis-sdk-go v0.6.0-default-no-op // indirect
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.8 // indirect
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 // indirect
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.4 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
github.com/minio/highwayhash v1.0.4-0.20251030100505-070ab1a87a76 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2 v2.8.1 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.11.15 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/nats.go v1.49.0 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.15 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/nuid v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect
golang.org/x/crypto v0.51.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.44.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0 // indirect
modernc.org/libc v1.70.0 // indirect
modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 // indirect
modernc.org/memory v1.11.0 // indirect
modernc.org/sqlite v1.47.0 // indirect
)
-77
View File
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
github.com/antithesishq/antithesis-sdk-go v0.6.0-default-no-op h1:kpBdlEPbRvff0mDD1gk7o9BhI16b9p5yYAXRlidpqJE=
github.com/antithesishq/antithesis-sdk-go v0.6.0-default-no-op/go.mod h1:IUpT2DPAKh6i/YhSbt6Gl3v2yvUZjmKncl7U91fup7E=
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 h1:GzkhY7T5VNhEkwH0PVJgjz+fX1rhBrR7pRT3mDkpeCY=
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1/go.mod h1:Mu1zIs6XwVuF/gI1OepvI0qD18qycQx+mFykh5fBlto=
github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.8 h1:slArAR9Ft+1ybZu0lBwpSmpwhRXaa85hWtMinMyRAWo=
github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.8/go.mod h1:h9jEsEECg7gtLis0upRBQU+GhYVH6jMjrFxI8u6bVUY=
github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20250317173921-a4b03ec1a45e h1:ijClszYn+mADRFY17kjQEVQ1XRhq2/JR1M3sGqeJoxs=
github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20250317173921-a4b03ec1a45e/go.mod h1:boTsfXsheKC2y+lKOCMpSfarhxDeIzfZG1jqGcPl3cA=
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=
github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7 h1:a+bsQ5rvGLjzHuww6tVxozPZFVghXaHOwFs4luLUK2k=
github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:QeFd9opnmA6QUJc5vARoKUSoFhyfM2/ZepoAG6RGpeM=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.4 h1:RPhnKRAQ4Fh8zU2FY/6ZFDwTVTxgJ/EMydqSTzE9a2c=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.4/go.mod h1:R0h/fSBs8DE4ENlcrlib3PsXS61voFxhIs2DeRhCvJ4=
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 h1:xfD0iDuEKnDkl03q4limB+vH+GxLEtL/jb4xVJSWWEY=
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20/go.mod h1:W+V8PltTTMOvKvAeJH7IuucS94S2C6jfK/D7dTCTo3Y=
github.com/minio/highwayhash v1.0.4-0.20251030100505-070ab1a87a76 h1:KGuD/pM2JpL9FAYvBrnBBeENKZNh6eNtjqytV6TYjnk=
github.com/minio/highwayhash v1.0.4-0.20251030100505-070ab1a87a76/go.mod h1:GGYsuwP/fPD6Y9hMiXuapVvlIUEhFhMTh0rxU3ik1LQ=
github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2 v2.8.1 h1:V0xpGuD/N8Mi+fQNDynXohVvp7ZztevW5io8CUWlPmU=
github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2 v2.8.1/go.mod h1:nWnOEEiVMiKHQpnAy4eXlizVEtSfzacZ1Q43LIRavZg=
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.11.15 h1:StSf9TINInaZtr4oww2+kXmfwa9SkN//g/LwS19/UJ0=
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.11.15/go.mod h1:zwhv8Y0PE3KHyKgznJc/9Xoai638SaJd83zzJ5GJn74=
github.com/nats-io/nats.go v1.49.0 h1:yh/WvY59gXqYpgl33ZI+XoVPKyut/IcEaqtsiuTJpoE=
github.com/nats-io/nats.go v1.49.0/go.mod h1:fDCn3mN5cY8HooHwE2ukiLb4p4G4ImmzvXyJt+tGwdw=
github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.15 h1:JACV5jRVO9V856KOapQ7x+EY8Jo3qw1vJt/9Jpwzkk4=
github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.15/go.mod h1:CpMchTXC9fxA5zrMo4KpySxNjiDVvr8ANOSZdiNfUrs=
github.com/nats-io/nuid v1.0.1 h1:5iA8DT8V7q8WK2EScv2padNa/rTESc1KdnPw4TC2paw=
github.com/nats-io/nuid v1.0.1/go.mod h1:19wcPz3Ph3q0Jbyiqsd0kePYG7A95tJPxeL+1OSON2c=
github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0 h1:HMFp8mLCTPp341M/ZnA4qaf7ZlsbTc+miZjCLOFAw7w=
github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0/go.mod h1:Fwc5htZGVVkseilnfgOVb9mKy6w1naJmn9CehxcKcls=
github.com/oklog/ulid/v2 v2.1.0 h1:+9lhoxAP56we25tyYETBBY1YLA2SaoLvUFgrP2miPJU=
github.com/oklog/ulid/v2 v2.1.0/go.mod h1:rcEKHmBBKfef9DhnvX7y1HZBYxjXb0cP5ExxNsTT1QQ=
github.com/pborman/getopt v0.0.0-20170112200414-7148bc3a4c30/go.mod h1:85jBQOZwpVEaDAr341tbn15RS4fCAsIst0qp7i8ex1o=
github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec h1:W09IVJc94icq4NjY3clb7Lk8O1qJ8BdBEF8z0ibU0rE=
github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec/go.mod h1:qqbHyh8v60DhA7CoWK5oRCqLrMHRGoxYCSS9EjAz6Eo=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.51.0 h1:IBPXwPfKxY7cWQZ38ZCIRPI50YLeevDLlLnyC5wRGTI=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.51.0/go.mod h1:8AdwkbraGNABw2kOX6YFPs3WM22XqI4EXEd8g+x7Oc8=
golang.org/x/mod v0.36.0 h1:JJjpVx6myfUsUdAzZuOSTTmRE0PfZeNWzzvKrP7amb4=
golang.org/x/mod v0.36.0/go.mod h1:moc6ELqsWcOw5Ef3xVprK5ul/MvtVvkIXLziUOICjUQ=
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 h1:e0PTpb7pjO8GAtTs2dQ6jYa5BWYlMuX047Dco/pItO4=
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.21.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.44.0 h1:ildZl3J4uzeKP07r2F++Op7E9B29JRUy+a27EibtBTQ=
golang.org/x/sys v0.44.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0 h1:bbrp8t3bGUeFOx08pvsMYRTCVSMk89u4tKbNOZbp88U=
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0/go.mod h1:Y4YMaQmXwGQZoFaVFk4YpCt4FLQMYKZe9oeV/f4MSno=
golang.org/x/tools v0.45.0 h1:18qN3FAooORvApf5XjCXgsuayZOEtXf6JK18I3+ONa8=
golang.org/x/tools v0.45.0/go.mod h1:LuUGqqaXcXMEFEruIVJVm5mgDD8vww/z/SR1gQ4uE/0=
modernc.org/cc/v4 v4.27.1 h1:9W30zRlYrefrDV2JE2O8VDtJ1yPGownxciz5rrbQZis=
modernc.org/cc/v4 v4.27.1/go.mod h1:uVtb5OGqUKpoLWhqwNQo/8LwvoiEBLvZXIQ/SmO6mL0=
modernc.org/ccgo/v4 v4.32.0 h1:hjG66bI/kqIPX1b2yT6fr/jt+QedtP2fqojG2VrFuVw=
modernc.org/ccgo/v4 v4.32.0/go.mod h1:6F08EBCx5uQc38kMGl+0Nm0oWczoo1c7cgpzEry7Uc0=
modernc.org/fileutil v1.4.0 h1:j6ZzNTftVS054gi281TyLjHPp6CPHr2KCxEXjEbD6SM=
modernc.org/fileutil v1.4.0/go.mod h1:EqdKFDxiByqxLk8ozOxObDSfcVOv/54xDs/DUHdvCUU=
modernc.org/gc/v2 v2.6.5 h1:nyqdV8q46KvTpZlsw66kWqwXRHdjIlJOhG6kxiV/9xI=
modernc.org/gc/v2 v2.6.5/go.mod h1:YgIahr1ypgfe7chRuJi2gD7DBQiKSLMPgBQe9oIiito=
modernc.org/gc/v3 v3.1.2 h1:ZtDCnhonXSZexk/AYsegNRV1lJGgaNZJuKjJSWKyEqo=
modernc.org/gc/v3 v3.1.2/go.mod h1:HFK/6AGESC7Ex+EZJhJ2Gni6cTaYpSMmU/cT9RmlfYY=
modernc.org/goabi0 v0.2.0 h1:HvEowk7LxcPd0eq6mVOAEMai46V+i7Jrj13t4AzuNks=
modernc.org/goabi0 v0.2.0/go.mod h1:CEFRnnJhKvWT1c1JTI3Avm+tgOWbkOu5oPA8eH8LnMI=
modernc.org/libc v1.70.0 h1:U58NawXqXbgpZ/dcdS9kMshu08aiA6b7gusEusqzNkw=
modernc.org/libc v1.70.0/go.mod h1:OVmxFGP1CI/Z4L3E0Q3Mf1PDE0BucwMkcXjjLntvHJo=
modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 h1:GCZVGXdaN8gTqB1Mf/usp1Y/hSqgI2vAGGP4jZMCxOU=
modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1/go.mod h1:4p5IwJITfppl0G4sUEDtCr4DthTaT47/N3aT6MhfgJg=
modernc.org/memory v1.11.0 h1:o4QC8aMQzmcwCK3t3Ux/ZHmwFPzE6hf2Y5LbkRs+hbI=
modernc.org/memory v1.11.0/go.mod h1:/JP4VbVC+K5sU2wZi9bHoq2MAkCnrt2r98UGeSK7Mjw=
modernc.org/opt v0.1.4 h1:2kNGMRiUjrp4LcaPuLY2PzUfqM/w9N23quVwhKt5Qm8=
modernc.org/opt v0.1.4/go.mod h1:03fq9lsNfvkYSfxrfUhZCWPk1lm4cq4N+Bh//bEtgns=
modernc.org/sortutil v1.2.1 h1:+xyoGf15mM3NMlPDnFqrteY07klSFxLElE2PVuWIJ7w=
modernc.org/sortutil v1.2.1/go.mod h1:7ZI3a3REbai7gzCLcotuw9AC4VZVpYMjDzETGsSMqJE=
modernc.org/sqlite v1.47.0 h1:R1XyaNpoW4Et9yly+I2EeX7pBza/w+pmYee/0HJDyKk=
modernc.org/sqlite v1.47.0/go.mod h1:hWjRO6Tj/5Ik8ieqxQybiEOUXy0NJFNp2tpvVpKlvig=
modernc.org/strutil v1.2.1 h1:UneZBkQA+DX2Rp35KcM69cSsNES9ly8mQWD71HKlOA0=
modernc.org/strutil v1.2.1/go.mod h1:EHkiggD70koQxjVdSBM3JKM7k6L0FbGE5eymy9i3B9A=
modernc.org/token v1.1.0 h1:Xl7Ap9dKaEs5kLoOQeQmPWevfnk/DM5qcLcYlA8ys6Y=
modernc.org/token v1.1.0/go.mod h1:UGzOrNV1mAFSEB63lOFHIpNRUVMvYTc6yu1SMY/XTDM=
+8 -3
View File
@@ -6,17 +6,21 @@
"scripts": {
"dev": "vite",
"build": "tsc -b && vite build",
"preview": "vite preview"
"preview": "vite preview",
"test": "vitest run"
},
"dependencies": {
"@mantine/core": "^9.3.0",
"@mantine/hooks": "^9.3.0",
"@noble/ciphers": "^2.2.0",
"@noble/curves": "^2.2.0",
"@noble/hashes": "^2.2.0",
"@scure/bip39": "^2.2.0",
"@tabler/icons-react": "^3.36.0",
"nats.ws": "^1.30.3",
"react": "^19.2.0",
"react-dom": "^19.2.0"
"react-dom": "^19.2.0",
"tweetnacl": "^1.0.3"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/react": "^19.2.0",
@@ -26,6 +30,7 @@
"postcss-preset-mantine": "^1.17.0",
"postcss-simple-vars": "^7.0.1",
"typescript": "~5.6.3",
"vite": "^6.0.3"
"vite": "^6.0.3",
"vitest": "^4.1.8"
}
}
+284
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ importers:
'@mantine/hooks':
specifier: ^9.3.0
version: 9.3.0(react@19.2.7)
'@noble/ciphers':
specifier: ^2.2.0
version: 2.2.0
'@noble/curves':
specifier: ^2.2.0
version: 2.2.0
@@ -26,12 +29,18 @@ importers:
'@tabler/icons-react':
specifier: ^3.36.0
version: 3.44.0(react@19.2.7)
nats.ws:
specifier: ^1.30.3
version: 1.30.3
react:
specifier: ^19.2.0
version: 19.2.7
react-dom:
specifier: ^19.2.0
version: 19.2.7(react@19.2.7)
tweetnacl:
specifier: ^1.0.3
version: 1.0.3
devDependencies:
'@types/react':
specifier: ^19.2.0
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+7 -14
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { Join } from "./Join";
import { Recover } from "./Recover";
import { WalletLogin } from "./WalletLogin";
import { Welcome } from "./Welcome";
import { api } from "./api";
import { bus } from "./busService";
import { localIdentity } from "./wallet/account";
import type { User } from "./types";
@@ -31,9 +31,11 @@ export function App() {
const [token, setToken] = useState("");
const [storedHandle, setStoredHandle] = useState("");
// Decide the entry screen on mount: an invite link goes straight to join; a live
// gateway session resumes the chat; a device with a stored identity shows the
// password unlock; an empty device shows the welcome chooser.
// Decide the entry screen on mount: an invite link goes straight to join; a device
// with a stored identity shows the password unlock; an empty device shows the
// welcome chooser. There is no "resume session" step: the bus session lives in
// memory (the SDK runs in the browser), so a reload always re-unlocks locally
// rather than resuming a server-side cookie session.
useEffect(() => {
const t = readJoinToken();
if (t) {
@@ -43,15 +45,6 @@ export function App() {
}
let cancelled = false;
(async () => {
try {
const me = await api.me();
if (cancelled) return;
setUser({ id: me.endpoint, handle: me.handle || me.endpoint.slice(0, 8) });
setRoute("chat");
return;
} catch {
// no live session — fall through
}
const stored = await localIdentity();
if (cancelled) return;
if (stored) {
@@ -73,7 +66,7 @@ export function App() {
};
const logout = () => {
void api.logout().catch(() => {});
void bus.logout().catch(() => {});
setUser(null);
// Keep the encrypted identity on the device: logging out returns to the
// password unlock, not a full reset.
+5 -5
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import {
IconDotsVertical,
IconPaperclip,
} from "@tabler/icons-react";
import { api, streamRoom } from "./api";
import { bus } from "./busService";
import type { Message, Room } from "./types";
function initials(s: string) {
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ export function ChatPanel({ room }: { room: Room | undefined }) {
setMessages([]);
setSendError(null);
if (!room) return;
const close = streamRoom(room.id, (m) => {
const close = bus.subscribeRoom(room.id, (m) => {
setMessages((prev) =>
prev.some((p) => p.id === m.id) ? prev : [...prev, m],
);
@@ -94,9 +94,9 @@ export function ChatPanel({ room }: { room: Room | undefined }) {
setDraft("");
setSendError(null);
try {
// No optimista: el mensaje propio vuelve por SSE con su id real (mine:true),
// evitando duplicados.
await api.send(room.id, body);
// No optimista: el mensaje propio vuelve por la suscripción con su id real
// (mine:true), evitando duplicados.
await bus.send(room.id, body);
} catch (e) {
setDraft(body); // restaura el borrador si el envío falló
setSendError(e instanceof Error ? e.message : "No se pudo enviar");
+35 -3
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { Flex, Box, Center, Loader, Stack, Text, Button } from "@mantine/core";
import { useDisclosure } from "@mantine/hooks";
import { IconPlus } from "@tabler/icons-react";
import { Sidebar } from "./Sidebar";
import { ChatPanel } from "./ChatPanel";
import { api } from "./api";
import { NewRoomModal } from "./NewRoomModal";
import { bus } from "./busService";
import type { Room, User } from "./types";
export function ChatShell({
@@ -16,10 +19,20 @@ export function ChatShell({
const [activeId, setActiveId] = useState<string>("");
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [modalOpen, modal] = useDisclosure(false);
// Inserta la room recién creada al principio de la lista y la activa, sin
// recargar todo. Evita duplicar si el id ya estaba presente.
const handleRoomCreated = useCallback((room: Room) => {
setRooms((prev) =>
prev.some((r) => r.id === room.id) ? prev : [room, ...prev],
);
setActiveId(room.id);
}, []);
const load = useCallback(() => {
setLoading(true);
api
bus
.listRooms()
.then((rs) => {
setRooms(rs);
@@ -60,7 +73,20 @@ export function ChatShell({
} else if (rooms.length === 0) {
panel = (
<Center h="100%">
<Text c="dimmed">No perteneces a ninguna room todavía</Text>
<Stack align="center" gap="sm" maw={320} ta="center">
<Text fw={600}>Aún no hay conversaciones</Text>
<Text c="dimmed" size="sm">
Crea tu primera room cifrada para empezar a chatear.
</Text>
<Button
color="brand"
leftSection={<IconPlus size={16} />}
onClick={modal.open}
mt="xs"
>
Crear room
</Button>
</Stack>
</Center>
);
}
@@ -82,11 +108,17 @@ export function ChatShell({
activeId={activeId}
onSelect={setActiveId}
onLogout={onLogout}
onNewRoom={modal.open}
/>
</Box>
<Box flex={1} h="100%" bg="dark.7" style={{ minWidth: 0 }}>
{panel}
</Box>
<NewRoomModal
opened={modalOpen}
onClose={modal.close}
onCreated={handleRoomCreated}
/>
</Flex>
);
}
+13 -6
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import {
IconKey,
IconShieldLock,
} from "@tabler/icons-react";
import { api, ApiError } from "./api";
import { SessionError } from "./busService";
import { AuthCard, AuthHeader } from "./AuthShell";
import type { User } from "./types";
import { newMnemonic, mnemonicWords } from "./wallet/bip39";
@@ -124,14 +124,21 @@ export function Join({
setStep("joining");
setError(null);
try {
// Register the PUBLIC identity with the bus (token authorizes), then
// encrypt the private key locally and open the per-user session.
const res = await api.register(token, identity.signPub, identity.kexPub);
const user = await saveAndOpen(identity, res.handle, password);
// The bus has no token-register endpoint (that was a gateway mock): a
// browser cannot self-register on an enforce cluster. The identity must be
// allow-listed by an admin first. We persist it locally and try to open the
// session; if the identity is not yet authorized, openSession fails and we
// tell the user to have an admin authorize their public key.
const handle = identity.signPub.slice(0, 8);
const user = await saveAndOpen(identity, handle, password);
onJoined(user);
} catch (e) {
const base =
e instanceof SessionError || e instanceof Error
? e.message
: "No se pudo completar el alta.";
setError(
e instanceof ApiError ? e.message : "No se pudo completar el alta.",
`${base}. Pide a un administrador que autorice tu clave pública: ${identity.signPub}`,
);
setStep("password");
}
-89
View File
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
import { useState } from "react";
import {
Button,
Card,
Center,
PasswordInput,
Stack,
Text,
TextInput,
ThemeIcon,
Title,
} from "@mantine/core";
import { IconShieldLock, IconKey } from "@tabler/icons-react";
import { api, ApiError } from "./api";
import type { User } from "./types";
export function Login({ onLogin }: { onLogin: (u: User) => void }) {
const [handle, setHandle] = useState("");
const [password, setPassword] = useState("");
const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const ready = handle.trim().length > 0 && password.length > 0;
const connect = async () => {
if (!ready || busy) return;
setBusy(true);
setError(null);
try {
// La contraseña desbloquea la sesión del gateway (passphrase del operador).
// El handle es solo el nombre a mostrar en esta iteración (wallet = fase 2).
const me = await api.login(password);
const h = handle.trim() || me.endpoint.slice(0, 8);
onLogin({ id: me.endpoint, handle: h });
} catch (e) {
setError(e instanceof ApiError ? e.message : "No se pudo conectar al gateway");
setBusy(false);
}
};
return (
<Center h="100vh" bg="dark.9">
<Card w={380} p="xl" radius="lg" withBorder bg="dark.7">
<Stack align="center" gap="lg">
<ThemeIcon size={60} radius="xl" variant="light" color="brand">
<IconShieldLock size={32} />
</ThemeIcon>
<Stack gap={2} align="center">
<Title order={2}>unibus</Title>
<Text c="dimmed" size="sm">
Mensajería cifrada de extremo a extremo
</Text>
</Stack>
<TextInput
w="100%"
label="Identidad"
placeholder="tu-handle"
value={handle}
onChange={(e) => setHandle(e.currentTarget.value)}
onKeyDown={(e) => e.key === "Enter" && connect()}
data-autofocus
/>
<PasswordInput
w="100%"
label="Contraseña"
description="Desbloquea tu identidad cifrada en este dispositivo"
placeholder="••••••••"
leftSection={<IconKey size={16} />}
value={password}
onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.currentTarget.value)}
onKeyDown={(e) => e.key === "Enter" && void connect()}
/>
{error && (
<Text c="red" size="sm" ta="center">
{error}
</Text>
)}
<Button
w="100%"
size="md"
onClick={() => void connect()}
disabled={!ready}
loading={busy}
>
Conectar
</Button>
</Stack>
</Card>
</Center>
);
}
+112
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
import {
Alert,
Button,
Group,
Modal,
Stack,
Text,
TextInput,
} from "@mantine/core";
import { IconAlertCircle, IconLock, IconPlus } from "@tabler/icons-react";
import { bus, SessionError } from "./busService";
import type { Room } from "./types";
// NewRoomModal pide el asunto de una room nueva y la crea contra el bus. La room
// que devuelve `bus.createRoom` (cifrada + firmada, propiedad del usuario) se
// entrega al padre vía `onCreated` para insertarla en la lista sin recargar.
export function NewRoomModal({
opened,
onClose,
onCreated,
}: {
opened: boolean;
onClose: () => void;
onCreated: (room: Room) => void;
}) {
const [subject, setSubject] = useState("");
const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
// Cada vez que se abre el modal partimos de un formulario limpio.
useEffect(() => {
if (opened) {
setSubject("");
setBusy(false);
setError(null);
}
}, [opened]);
const create = async () => {
const name = subject.trim();
if (!name || busy) return;
setBusy(true);
setError(null);
try {
const room = await bus.createRoom(name);
onCreated(room);
onClose();
} catch (e) {
const msg =
e instanceof SessionError
? "Tu sesión con el bus expiró. Vuelve a iniciar sesión."
: e instanceof Error
? e.message
: "No se pudo crear la room";
setError(msg);
} finally {
setBusy(false);
}
};
return (
<Modal
opened={opened}
onClose={onClose}
title="Nueva room"
centered
radius="md"
overlayProps={{ blur: 2 }}
>
<Stack gap="md">
<Text size="sm" c="dimmed">
Crea una conversación cifrada de extremo a extremo. eres la dueña y
puedes invitar miembros después.
</Text>
<TextInput
label="Asunto"
placeholder="ej. equipo-infra, anuncios, 1-a-1 con ana…"
data-autofocus
value={subject}
onChange={(e) => setSubject(e.currentTarget.value)}
onKeyDown={(e) => e.key === "Enter" && void create()}
leftSection={<IconLock size={16} />}
disabled={busy}
/>
{error && (
<Alert
color="red"
variant="light"
icon={<IconAlertCircle size={16} />}
>
{error}
</Alert>
)}
<Group justify="flex-end" gap="sm">
<Button variant="subtle" color="gray" onClick={onClose} disabled={busy}>
Cancelar
</Button>
<Button
color="brand"
leftSection={<IconPlus size={16} />}
onClick={() => void create()}
loading={busy}
disabled={!subject.trim()}
>
Crear room
</Button>
</Group>
</Stack>
</Modal>
);
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import {
} from "@mantine/core";
import { IconKey, IconRotateClockwise } from "@tabler/icons-react";
import { AuthCard, AuthHeader } from "./AuthShell";
import { ApiError } from "./api";
import { SessionError } from "./busService";
import type { User } from "./types";
import { isValidMnemonic, mnemonicWords, normalizeMnemonic } from "./wallet/bip39";
import { deriveIdentity } from "./wallet/derive";
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ export function Recover({
onRecovered(user);
} catch (e) {
setError(
e instanceof ApiError
e instanceof SessionError || e instanceof Error
? e.message
: "No se pudo abrir la sesión con la identidad recuperada.",
);
+55 -19
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import { useState } from "react";
import {
ActionIcon,
Avatar,
Badge,
Box,
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import {
Stack,
Text,
TextInput,
Tooltip,
UnstyledButton,
} from "@mantine/core";
import {
@@ -18,6 +20,7 @@ import {
IconDots,
IconLock,
IconHash,
IconPlus,
} from "@tabler/icons-react";
import type { Room, User } from "./types";
@@ -94,12 +97,14 @@ export function Sidebar({
activeId,
onSelect,
onLogout,
onNewRoom,
}: {
user: User;
rooms: Room[];
activeId: string;
onSelect: (id: string) => void;
onLogout: () => void;
onNewRoom: () => void;
}) {
const [q, setQ] = useState("");
const query = q.trim().toLowerCase();
@@ -122,21 +127,35 @@ export function Sidebar({
{user.handle}
</Text>
</Group>
<Menu position="bottom-end" withinPortal>
<Menu.Target>
<UnstyledButton c="dimmed">
<IconDots size={18} />
</UnstyledButton>
</Menu.Target>
<Menu.Dropdown>
<Menu.Item
leftSection={<IconLogout size={15} />}
onClick={onLogout}
<Group gap={4} wrap="nowrap">
<Tooltip label="Nueva room" position="bottom" withArrow>
<ActionIcon
variant="subtle"
color="brand"
size="lg"
radius="md"
onClick={onNewRoom}
aria-label="Crear nueva room"
>
Desconectar
</Menu.Item>
</Menu.Dropdown>
</Menu>
<IconPlus size={20} />
</ActionIcon>
</Tooltip>
<Menu position="bottom-end" withinPortal>
<Menu.Target>
<UnstyledButton c="dimmed">
<IconDots size={18} />
</UnstyledButton>
</Menu.Target>
<Menu.Dropdown>
<Menu.Item
leftSection={<IconLogout size={15} />}
onClick={onLogout}
>
Desconectar
</Menu.Item>
</Menu.Dropdown>
</Menu>
</Group>
</Group>
<Box px="sm" pb="sm">
@@ -161,11 +180,28 @@ export function Sidebar({
onClick={() => onSelect(room.id)}
/>
))}
{filtered.length === 0 && (
<Text c="dimmed" size="sm" ta="center" mt="md">
Sin resultados
</Text>
)}
{filtered.length === 0 &&
(query ? (
<Text c="dimmed" size="sm" ta="center" mt="md">
Sin resultados
</Text>
) : (
<Stack align="center" gap="xs" mt="xl" px="md">
<Text c="dimmed" size="sm" ta="center">
Aún no tienes ninguna room.
</Text>
<UnstyledButton
onClick={onNewRoom}
c="brand.4"
style={{ fontSize: "var(--mantine-font-size-sm)", fontWeight: 600 }}
>
<Group gap={4} wrap="nowrap">
<IconPlus size={15} />
Crear tu primera room
</Group>
</UnstyledButton>
</Stack>
))}
</Stack>
</ScrollArea>
</Stack>
+4 -3
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { useState } from "react";
import { Anchor, Button, Group, PasswordInput, Text } from "@mantine/core";
import { IconKey, IconWallet } from "@tabler/icons-react";
import { AuthCard, AuthHeader } from "./AuthShell";
import { ApiError } from "./api";
import { SessionError } from "./busService";
import type { User } from "./types";
import { unlockAndOpen } from "./wallet/account";
import { WrongPasswordError } from "./wallet/crypto";
@@ -33,10 +33,11 @@ export function WalletLogin({
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof WrongPasswordError) {
setError("Contraseña incorrecta.");
} else if (e instanceof ApiError) {
} else if (e instanceof SessionError) {
setError(e.message);
} else {
setError("No se pudo abrir tu identidad.");
// A connection/authorization failure (e.g. identity not yet allow-listed).
setError(e instanceof Error ? e.message : "No se pudo abrir tu identidad.");
}
setBusy(false);
}
-167
View File
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
// La única capa por la que la SPA habla con el bus. Cada llamada va al gateway Go
// bajo /api; el gateway mantiene la sesión `pkg/client` (peer autenticado del
// bus), cifra/descifra por room y traduce a REST/SSE. El navegador nunca firma,
// nunca habla NATS y nunca ve una clave privada: solo guarda una cookie de
// sesión opaca (HttpOnly) que el gateway emite tras el login.
import type {
MeInfo,
Message,
MsgWire,
RegisterResult,
Room,
RoomWire,
} from "./types";
import type { WalletIdentity } from "./wallet/derive";
export class ApiError extends Error {
status: number;
constructor(message: string, status: number) {
super(message);
this.status = status;
}
}
async function req<T>(path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<T> {
const res = await fetch(path, {
// same-origin envía la cookie de sesión automáticamente (también detrás del
// proxy de vite en dev).
credentials: "same-origin",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
...init,
});
const text = await res.text();
let body: unknown = null;
if (text) {
try {
body = JSON.parse(text);
} catch {
body = text;
}
}
if (!res.ok) {
const msg =
body && typeof body === "object" && "error" in body
? String((body as { error: unknown }).error)
: `HTTP ${res.status}`;
throw new ApiError(msg, res.status);
}
return body as T;
}
// roomFromWire mapea la fila del gateway al tipo Room que consume la UI. Los
// mensajes NO viven aquí: llegan por stream(). lastMessage/lastTs/unread se
// rellenan de forma neutra para no inventar datos (la cabecera de la sidebar se
// alimentará del stream en una iteración futura).
export function roomFromWire(r: RoomWire): Room {
return {
id: r.id,
name: r.name || r.subject,
encrypted: r.encrypt,
lastMessage: "",
lastTs: 0,
unread: 0,
messages: [],
};
}
// messageFromWire mapea un frame descifrado del SSE al tipo Message de la UI.
export function messageFromWire(m: MsgWire): Message {
return {
id: m.id,
sender: m.sender,
body: m.body,
ts: m.ts,
mine: m.mine,
};
}
export const api = {
// ---- onboarding wallet --------------------------------------------------
// register publica la identidad PÚBLICA del nuevo usuario en el allowlist del
// bus usando el token del enlace de invitación. NO requiere sesión: el token
// autoriza. El handle y el rol los fija el invite, no el cliente. La clave
// privada NUNCA se envía aquí.
register: (token: string, signPub: string, kexPub: string) =>
req<RegisterResult>("/api/register", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({ token, sign_pub: signPub, kex_pub: kexPub }),
}),
// session abre una sesión POR USUARIO: el navegador entrega su identidad wallet
// completa (incluida la privada, solo por TLS) y el gateway conecta un cliente
// del bus que actúa COMO ese usuario. La privada vive en memoria del gateway
// mientras dure la sesión; no se persiste en el servidor.
session: (id: WalletIdentity, handle: string) =>
req<MeInfo>("/api/session", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({
handle,
sign_pub: id.signPub,
sign_priv: id.signPriv,
kex_pub: id.kexPub,
kex_priv: id.kexPriv,
}),
}),
// ---- sesión (legacy operador) ------------------------------------------
// login desbloquea una sesión ligada al gateway del operador con su passphrase.
// El camino principal ahora es el wallet (session); login se mantiene por
// compatibilidad con el MVP de operador único.
login: (passphrase: string) =>
req<MeInfo>("/api/login", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({ passphrase }),
}),
logout: () => req<{ status: string }>("/api/logout", { method: "POST" }),
me: () => req<MeInfo>("/api/me"),
// ---- rooms --------------------------------------------------------------
listRooms: async (): Promise<Room[]> => {
const wire = await req<RoomWire[]>("/api/rooms");
return wire.map(roomFromWire);
},
// createRoom: {subject, encrypted} basta — el gateway deriva la policy
// Matrix-like (cifrada + persistida + firmada) por defecto.
createRoom: async (subject: string, encrypted = true): Promise<Room> => {
const r = await req<RoomWire>("/api/rooms", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({ subject, encrypted }),
});
return roomFromWire(r);
},
join: (roomID: string) =>
req<{ status: string }>(
`/api/rooms/${encodeURIComponent(roomID)}/join`,
{ method: "POST" },
),
send: (roomID: string, body: string) =>
req<{ status: string }>(
`/api/rooms/${encodeURIComponent(roomID)}/send`,
{ method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify({ body }) },
),
};
// streamRoom abre el SSE de una room y llama onMessage por cada frame descifrado
// (historia primero en rooms persistidas, luego en vivo). Devuelve una función
// de cierre. EventSource manda la cookie de sesión automáticamente y reconecta
// solo si la conexión cae; onError se invoca en cada corte para que la UI pueda
// reflejar el estado.
export function streamRoom(
roomID: string,
onMessage: (m: Message) => void,
onError?: (e: Event) => void,
): () => void {
const es = new EventSource(
`/api/rooms/${encodeURIComponent(roomID)}/stream`,
);
es.onmessage = (ev) => {
try {
const wire = JSON.parse(ev.data) as MsgWire;
onMessage(messageFromWire(wire));
} catch {
// frame malformado: se ignora, el stream sigue.
}
};
if (onError) es.onerror = onError;
return () => es.close();
}
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
// Parity tests for the auth bridge: the browser must produce the same NATS nkey and
// the same signed control-plane request bytes as the Go client, or it would not
// authenticate on either plane (issue 0001, Phase 1).
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import vectors from "./testdata/vectors.json";
import { hexToBytes, bytesToHex, base64ToBytes } from "./crypto.js";
import { nkeyPublic, canonicalRequest, signedHeaders } from "./busauth.js";
describe("NATS nkey encoding", () => {
it("derives the same user nkey ('U...') as Go from the Ed25519 pubkey", () => {
const v = vectors.nkey;
expect(nkeyPublic(hexToBytes(v.sign_pub_hex))).toBe(v.nkey_public);
});
});
describe("control-plane request signing", () => {
it("builds the same canonical request bytes as Go", () => {
const v = vectors.control_request;
const got = canonicalRequest(v.method, v.path, v.ts, v.nonce, hexToBytes(v.body_hex));
expect(bytesToHex(got)).toBe(v.canonical_hex);
});
it("produces the same Ed25519 signature as Go (X-Unibus-Sig)", () => {
const v = vectors.control_request;
const headers = signedHeaders(
hexToBytes(vectors.sign.sign_pub_hex),
hexToBytes(v.sign_priv_hex),
v.method,
v.path,
v.ts,
v.nonce,
hexToBytes(v.body_hex),
);
// X-Unibus-Sig is base64-standard; decode and compare hex to the Go vector.
expect(bytesToHex(base64ToBytes(headers["X-Unibus-Sig"]))).toBe(v.sig_hex);
expect(headers["X-Unibus-Pub"]).toBe(vectors.sign.sign_pub_hex);
expect(headers["X-Unibus-Ts"]).toBe(v.ts);
expect(headers["X-Unibus-Nonce"]).toBe(v.nonce);
});
});
+137
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
// Bridges the user's Ed25519 identity to the two authentication surfaces of the
// bus, ported from Go pkg/busauth and the client's request signing:
//
// - DATA PLANE (NATS): a NATS user nkey IS an Ed25519 keypair. nkeyPublic encodes
// the Ed25519 public key into the "U..." nkey string the server expects, and
// natsAuthenticator signs the server-presented nonce with the same key — so the
// browser authenticates to NATS with the user's identity, no extra key material.
// - CONTROL PLANE (HTTP): every request to membershipd is signed. canonicalRequest
// reproduces Go's membership.CanonicalRequest, and signedHeaders attaches the
// X-Unibus-Pub/Ts/Nonce/Sig headers the server verifies.
//
// Parity with Go is pinned by the `nkey` and `control_request` vectors in
// testdata/vectors.json (busauth.test.ts).
import { sha256 } from "@noble/hashes/sha2.js";
import { signEd25519, bytesToHex, bytesToBase64 } from "./crypto.js";
// --- NATS nkey encoding (base32 + crc16, matching github.com/nats-io/nkeys) ---
// PrefixByteUser is nkeys' user prefix (20 << 3). Its top 5 bits encode to 'U', so
// every user nkey string starts with "U".
const PREFIX_USER = 20 << 3;
// crc16 table (CRC-16/XMODEM, poly 0x1021, MSB-first) — the exact CRC nkeys appends.
const CRC16TAB: Uint16Array = (() => {
const tab = new Uint16Array(256);
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
let crc = (i << 8) & 0xffff;
for (let j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
crc = crc & 0x8000 ? ((crc << 1) ^ 0x1021) & 0xffff : (crc << 1) & 0xffff;
}
tab[i] = crc;
}
return tab;
})();
function crc16(data: Uint8Array): number {
let crc = 0;
for (const b of data) crc = ((crc << 8) & 0xffff) ^ CRC16TAB[((crc >> 8) ^ b) & 0xff];
return crc & 0xffff;
}
const BASE32_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567";
// base32Encode is RFC4648 standard base32 WITHOUT padding, as nkeys uses.
function base32Encode(data: Uint8Array): string {
let bits = 0;
let value = 0;
let out = "";
for (const b of data) {
value = (value << 8) | b;
bits += 8;
while (bits >= 5) {
out += BASE32_ALPHABET[(value >>> (bits - 5)) & 31];
bits -= 5;
}
}
if (bits > 0) out += BASE32_ALPHABET[(value << (5 - bits)) & 31];
return out;
}
// nkeyPublic encodes a 32-byte Ed25519 public key as a NATS user nkey ("U...").
// Layout: prefixByte || pubkey(32) || crc16-little-endian(2), base32 (no padding).
export function nkeyPublic(signPub: Uint8Array): string {
if (signPub.length !== 32) throw new Error(`nkeyPublic: signPub must be 32 bytes, got ${signPub.length}`);
const raw = new Uint8Array(1 + 32);
raw[0] = PREFIX_USER;
raw.set(signPub, 1);
const crc = crc16(raw);
const full = new Uint8Array(raw.length + 2);
full.set(raw, 0);
full[raw.length] = crc & 0xff; // little-endian
full[raw.length + 1] = (crc >> 8) & 0xff;
return base32Encode(full);
}
// natsAuthenticator returns the callback a NATS WebSocket connection uses to
// authenticate: it presents the user nkey and signs the server's nonce with the
// Ed25519 key. The nonce arrives as a string; we sign its UTF-8 bytes and return the
// signature base64url-encoded, the form the NATS protocol expects.
export function natsAuthenticator(signPub: Uint8Array, signPriv: Uint8Array) {
const nkey = nkeyPublic(signPub);
return (nonce: string) => {
const sig = signEd25519(signPriv, new TextEncoder().encode(nonce));
const b64url = bytesToBase64(sig).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
return { nkey, sig: b64url };
};
}
// --- control-plane request signing (HTTP) ------------------------------------
// canonicalRequest reproduces Go's membership.CanonicalRequest: the bytes signed for
// a control-plane HTTP request. body is the raw request body (empty for GET).
export function canonicalRequest(
method: string,
path: string,
ts: string,
nonce: string,
body: Uint8Array,
): Uint8Array {
const bodyHashHex = bytesToHex(sha256(body));
return new TextEncoder().encode([method, path, ts, nonce, bodyHashHex].join("\n"));
}
export interface ControlHeaders {
"X-Unibus-Pub": string;
"X-Unibus-Ts": string;
"X-Unibus-Nonce": string;
"X-Unibus-Sig": string;
}
// signedHeaders builds the transport-auth headers for a control-plane request,
// signing canonicalRequest with the user's Ed25519 key. ts/nonce are injected so the
// function is deterministic and testable; in production use the current unix seconds
// and a fresh 16-byte random nonce (base64).
export function signedHeaders(
signPub: Uint8Array,
signPriv: Uint8Array,
method: string,
path: string,
ts: string,
nonce: string,
body: Uint8Array,
): ControlHeaders {
const sig = signEd25519(signPriv, canonicalRequest(method, path, ts, nonce, body));
return {
"X-Unibus-Pub": bytesToHex(signPub),
"X-Unibus-Ts": ts,
"X-Unibus-Nonce": nonce,
"X-Unibus-Sig": bytesToBase64(sig), // base64 standard, matching the Go client
};
}
// freshNonce returns a base64 (standard) 16-byte random nonce for a live request.
export function freshNonce(): string {
return bytesToBase64(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)));
}
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// The browser-native bus client, ported from Go pkg/client. It does what the Go
// gateway used to do server-side — only now it runs in the browser, so the user's
// private key never leaves the device (issue 0001).
//
// The module is split so the security-critical part is pure and unit-testable
// without a live server:
// - sealRoomMessage / openRoomMessage: the room ENVELOPE (build a frame, AEAD-seal
// the payload with the room key using the subject as AAD, sign it; and the
// inverse: verify the signature and open the payload). These are pure and pinned
// by tests.
// - NatsTransport: the data-plane transport interface. The concrete WebSocket
// implementation (nats.ws) is thin glue wired and E2E-tested in a later phase.
// - ControlPlane: the signed HTTP client for membershipd (rooms, keys, members).
// - BusClient: orchestrates transport + control plane + envelope.
import { Policy, Room } from "./room.js";
import {
Frame,
FrameType,
marshal,
unmarshal,
signingBytes,
} from "./frame.js";
import {
sealAEAD,
openAEAD,
randomNonce,
signEd25519,
verifyEd25519,
sealKeyBox,
openKeyBox,
endpointID,
bytesToBase64,
} from "./crypto.js";
import { signedHeaders, freshNonce } from "./busauth.js";
// Identity is the user's full cryptographic identity. The private halves stay in
// memory in the browser and are NEVER serialized to the network.
export interface Identity {
signPub: Uint8Array;
signPriv: Uint8Array; // 64-byte Ed25519 (seed||pub)
kexPub: Uint8Array;
kexPriv: Uint8Array;
}
// --- ULID (message ids), Crockford base32, time-ordered ----------------------
const CROCKFORD = "0123456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ";
export function newULID(nowMs: number = Date.now()): string {
let ts = "";
let t = nowMs;
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
ts = CROCKFORD[t % 32] + ts;
t = Math.floor(t / 32);
}
const rnd = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));
let r = "";
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) r += CROCKFORD[rnd[i] & 31];
return ts + r;
}
// --- room envelope (pure, the security-critical core) ------------------------
export interface SealOptions {
type: FrameType;
subject: string;
sender: string; // this peer's endpoint id
signPriv: Uint8Array;
policy: Policy;
epoch: number;
plaintext: Uint8Array;
roomKey?: Uint8Array; // required when policy.encrypt
threadID?: string;
replyTo?: string;
msgID?: string; // defaults to a fresh ULID
}
// sealRoomMessage builds a wire frame from plaintext exactly as Go's publishFrame:
// for encrypted rooms the payload is ChaCha20-Poly1305-sealed with the room key and
// the SUBJECT as additional authenticated data; for signed rooms an Ed25519
// signature over the canonical bytes is attached.
export function sealRoomMessage(o: SealOptions): Frame {
const f: Frame = {
type: o.type,
subject: o.subject,
sender: o.sender,
msgID: o.msgID ?? newULID(),
epoch: o.epoch,
threadID: o.threadID,
replyTo: o.replyTo,
};
if (o.policy.encrypt) {
if (!o.roomKey) throw new Error("sealRoomMessage: encrypted room requires roomKey");
const nonce = randomNonce();
f.nonce = nonce;
f.payload = sealAEAD(o.roomKey, nonce, o.plaintext, new TextEncoder().encode(o.subject));
} else {
f.payload = o.plaintext;
}
if (o.policy.signMsgs) {
f.sig = signEd25519(o.signPriv, signingBytes(f));
}
return f;
}
// openRoomMessage is the inverse: it verifies the signature (for signed rooms) and
// opens the AEAD payload (for encrypted rooms), returning the plaintext or null if
// verification/decryption fails (the caller drops the message).
export function openRoomMessage(
f: Frame,
policy: Policy,
signerPub: Uint8Array | undefined,
roomKey: Uint8Array | undefined,
): Uint8Array | null {
if (policy.signMsgs) {
if (!f.sig || !signerPub || !verifyEd25519(f.sig, signingBytes(f), signerPub)) return null;
}
if (policy.encrypt) {
if (!f.nonce || !f.payload || !roomKey) return null;
try {
return openAEAD(roomKey, f.nonce, f.payload, new TextEncoder().encode(f.subject));
} catch {
return null;
}
}
return f.payload ?? new Uint8Array(0);
}
// --- data-plane transport ----------------------------------------------------
export type MessageHandler = (subject: string, data: Uint8Array) => void;
// NatsTransport abstracts the NATS data plane so BusClient's logic is testable with
// a mock and the concrete WebSocket transport (nats.ws) stays swappable. The browser
// transport connects over ws(s):// using a NATS nkey authenticator built from the
// user's Ed25519 identity (see busauth.natsAuthenticator).
export interface NatsTransport {
publish(subject: string, data: Uint8Array): void | Promise<void>;
subscribe(subject: string, handler: MessageHandler): Promise<Subscription>;
close(): Promise<void>;
}
export interface Subscription {
unsubscribe(): void | Promise<void>;
}
// --- control plane (signed HTTP to membershipd) ------------------------------
interface RoomKeyResponse {
sealed_key: string; // base64 sealed box of the room key for this peer
epoch: number;
}
// PolicyWire is the control-plane JSON shape of a policy (snake_case sign_msgs).
interface PolicyWire {
encrypt: boolean;
persist: boolean;
sign_msgs: boolean;
}
// RoomResp is GET /rooms/{id}: the room metadata WITHOUT the id (the caller knows it)
// and with the policy nested under snake_case keys.
interface RoomResp {
subject: string;
epoch: number;
policy: PolicyWire;
}
interface MemberJSON {
endpoint: string;
sign_pub: string; // base64
}
// MemberRoomWire is one row of GET /members/{endpoint}/rooms.
interface MemberRoomWire {
room_id: string;
subject: string;
epoch: number;
policy: PolicyWire;
}
// ControlPlane is the signed HTTP client for the membershipd control plane. Every
// request carries the X-Unibus-* auth headers (busauth.signedHeaders). It pins no
// host so it can target any cluster node.
export class ControlPlane {
constructor(
private baseURL: string,
private id: Identity,
) {}
private async request<T>(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<T> {
const bodyBytes = body === undefined ? new Uint8Array(0) : new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(body));
const headers = signedHeaders(
this.id.signPub,
this.id.signPriv,
method,
path,
String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)),
freshNonce(),
bodyBytes,
);
const init: RequestInit = { method, headers: { ...headers } };
if (body !== undefined) {
(init.headers as Record<string, string>)["Content-Type"] = "application/json";
init.body = bodyBytes;
}
const resp = await fetch(this.baseURL + path, init);
if (!resp.ok) {
let msg = `${method} ${path} -> ${resp.status}`;
try {
const e = await resp.json();
if (e?.error) msg = `${e.error} (HTTP ${resp.status})`;
} catch {
/* keep the generic message */
}
throw new Error(`control plane: ${msg}`);
}
return (await resp.json()) as T;
}
// fetchRoom resolves room metadata, mapping the control-plane wire shape
// (snake_case policy, no id) to the SDK's Room type.
async fetchRoom(roomID: string): Promise<Room> {
const r = await this.request<RoomResp>("GET", `/rooms/${roomID}`);
return {
id: roomID,
subject: r.subject,
epoch: r.epoch,
policy: { encrypt: r.policy.encrypt, persist: r.policy.persist, signMsgs: r.policy.sign_msgs },
};
}
// createRoom creates a room owned by this peer. For an encrypted room it mints a
// fresh 32-byte room key, seals it to the owner's own X25519 key (sealed box), and
// ships it as sealed_key_self so the server can store the owner's copy without ever
// seeing the key. Returns the new room id and (for encrypted rooms) the key.
async createRoom(subject: string, policy: Policy): Promise<{ roomID: string; key?: Uint8Array }> {
const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
subject,
policy: { encrypt: policy.encrypt, persist: policy.persist, sign_msgs: policy.signMsgs },
owner: {
endpoint: endpointID(this.id.signPub),
sign_pub: bytesToBase64(this.id.signPub),
kex_pub: bytesToBase64(this.id.kexPub),
},
};
let key: Uint8Array | undefined;
if (policy.encrypt) {
key = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
body.sealed_key_self = bytesToBase64(sealKeyBox(this.id.kexPub, key));
}
const resp = await this.request<{ room_id: string }>("POST", "/rooms", body);
return { roomID: resp.room_id, key };
}
// fetchRoomKey fetches the sealed room key for this peer and opens it with the
// user's X25519 private key. The server only ever stores the key sealed for each
// member, so it cannot read it.
async fetchRoomKey(roomID: string, epoch: number): Promise<{ key: Uint8Array; epoch: number }> {
const q = epoch > 0 ? `&epoch=${epoch}` : "";
const resp = await this.request<RoomKeyResponse>(
"GET",
`/rooms/${roomID}/key?endpoint=${endpointID(this.id.signPub)}${q}`,
);
const sealed = base64ToBytesLocal(resp.sealed_key);
const key = openKeyBox(this.id.kexPub, this.id.kexPriv, sealed);
if (!key) throw new Error("control plane: failed to open room key");
return { key, epoch: resp.epoch };
}
// listMemberRooms returns the rooms a peer belongs to (GET /members/{endpoint}/rooms),
// mapping the wire shape (room_id, snake_case policy) to the SDK Room type.
async listMemberRooms(endpoint: string): Promise<Room[]> {
const wire = await this.request<MemberRoomWire[]>("GET", `/members/${endpoint}/rooms`);
return wire.map((r) => ({
id: r.room_id,
subject: r.subject,
epoch: r.epoch,
policy: { encrypt: r.policy.encrypt, persist: r.policy.persist, signMsgs: r.policy.sign_msgs },
}));
}
// listMembers returns the room's members keyed by endpoint, so a receiver can find
// a sender's signing public key to verify message signatures.
async signerKeys(roomID: string): Promise<Map<string, Uint8Array>> {
const members = await this.request<MemberJSON[]>("GET", `/rooms/${roomID}/members`);
const m = new Map<string, Uint8Array>();
for (const member of members) m.set(member.endpoint, base64ToBytesLocal(member.sign_pub));
return m;
}
}
// base64ToBytesLocal decodes standard base64 (kept local to avoid widening crypto's
// surface; identical behavior to crypto.base64ToBytes).
function base64ToBytesLocal(s: string): Uint8Array {
const bin = atob(s);
const out = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) out[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
return out;
}
// --- BusClient ---------------------------------------------------------------
// BusClient ties the data plane (transport) and control plane together, applying the
// room envelope on publish and subscribe. It holds the user's identity in memory and
// never sends the private key anywhere.
export class BusClient {
private endpoint: string;
private keyCache = new Map<string, Map<number, Uint8Array>>(); // roomID -> epoch -> K
private signCache = new Map<string, Map<string, Uint8Array>>(); // roomID -> endpoint -> signPub
constructor(
private id: Identity,
private transport: NatsTransport,
private control: ControlPlane,
) {
this.endpoint = endpointID(id.signPub);
}
private async roomKey(roomID: string, epoch: number): Promise<Uint8Array> {
const cached = this.keyCache.get(roomID)?.get(epoch);
if (cached) return cached;
const { key, epoch: ep } = await this.control.fetchRoomKey(roomID, epoch);
let byEpoch = this.keyCache.get(roomID);
if (!byEpoch) {
byEpoch = new Map();
this.keyCache.set(roomID, byEpoch);
}
byEpoch.set(ep, key);
return key;
}
// publish seals plaintext per the room policy and publishes it on the data plane.
async publish(roomID: string, plaintext: Uint8Array, opts: { threadID?: string; replyTo?: string; type?: FrameType } = {}): Promise<void> {
const room = await this.control.fetchRoom(roomID);
const roomKey = room.policy.encrypt ? await this.roomKey(roomID, room.epoch) : undefined;
const f = sealRoomMessage({
type: opts.type ?? FrameType.PUB,
subject: room.subject,
sender: this.endpoint,
signPriv: this.id.signPriv,
policy: room.policy,
epoch: room.epoch,
plaintext,
roomKey,
threadID: opts.threadID,
replyTo: opts.replyTo,
});
await this.transport.publish(room.subject, marshal(f));
}
// subscribe delivers decoded, verified, decrypted messages for a room. Messages
// that fail signature verification or decryption are dropped silently.
async subscribe(roomID: string, handler: (f: Frame, plaintext: Uint8Array) => void): Promise<Subscription> {
const room = await this.control.fetchRoom(roomID);
if (room.policy.signMsgs) await this.loadSigners(roomID);
return this.transport.subscribe(room.subject, async (_subject, data) => {
const f = unmarshal(data);
const signerPub = room.policy.signMsgs ? this.signCache.get(roomID)?.get(f.sender) : undefined;
const roomKey = room.policy.encrypt ? await this.roomKey(roomID, f.epoch) : undefined;
const plaintext = openRoomMessage(f, room.policy, signerPub, roomKey);
if (plaintext) handler(f, plaintext);
});
}
private async loadSigners(roomID: string): Promise<void> {
this.signCache.set(roomID, await this.control.signerKeys(roomID));
}
}
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// Bus crypto primitives, ported to the browser to match the Go reference
// implementation (functions/cybersecurity in fn-registry) byte-for-byte. The bus
// is end-to-end encrypted; doing the crypto here is what keeps the user's private
// key on the device and out of any server (issue 0001). Parity with Go is enforced
// by the vectors in testdata/vectors.json (see vectors.test.ts).
//
// Primitive map (Go -> here):
// EndpointID -> endpointID : base64url(sha256(signPub)), unpadded
// SignEd25519 -> signEd25519 : Ed25519 detached signature
// verify -> verifyEd25519
// SealAEAD/Open -> sealAEAD/openAEAD : ChaCha20-Poly1305 (IETF, 12-byte nonce)
// SealKeyBox/Open -> sealKeyBox/openKeyBox : NaCl anonymous sealed box (X25519),
// with the nonce derived as sha512(ephPub||recipientPub)[:24]
// EXACTLY as Go's nacl/box.SealAnonymous (Go uses SHA-512, not
// libsodium's blake2b — matching this is the whole point).
import { ed25519 } from "@noble/curves/ed25519.js";
import { chacha20poly1305 } from "@noble/ciphers/chacha.js";
import { sha256 } from "@noble/hashes/sha2.js";
import { blake2b } from "@noble/hashes/blake2.js";
import { concatBytes } from "@noble/hashes/utils.js";
import nacl from "tweetnacl";
// sealedBoxNonce derives the 24-byte nonce for an anonymous sealed box the same way
// Go's nacl/box.SealAnonymous (and libsodium's crypto_box_seal) do: BLAKE2b-192 over
// ephemeralPub || recipientPub. NOT SHA-512 — matching the exact hash is what makes
// a Go-sealed room key openable here.
function sealedBoxNonce(ephPub: Uint8Array, recipientPub: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
return blake2b(concatBytes(ephPub, recipientPub), { dkLen: 24 });
}
// --- byte / encoding helpers (browser-safe; no Buffer) -----------------------
export function bytesToHex(b: Uint8Array): string {
let s = "";
for (const x of b) s += x.toString(16).padStart(2, "0");
return s;
}
export function hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {
if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) throw new Error("hex: odd length");
const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
return out;
}
// base64 standard (with padding) — matches Go's encoding/json for []byte fields.
export function bytesToBase64(b: Uint8Array): string {
let bin = "";
for (const x of b) bin += String.fromCharCode(x);
return btoa(bin);
}
export function base64ToBytes(s: string): Uint8Array {
const bin = atob(s);
const out = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) out[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
return out;
}
// base64url without padding — matches Go's base64.RawURLEncoding (EndpointID).
export function bytesToBase64URL(b: Uint8Array): string {
return bytesToBase64(b).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
}
// --- identity / signing ------------------------------------------------------
// endpointID is the stable, transport-agnostic peer id: base64url(sha256(signPub)).
export function endpointID(signPub: Uint8Array): string {
return bytesToBase64URL(sha256(signPub));
}
// signEd25519 signs msg with an Ed25519 private key. It accepts the bus/Go 64-byte
// private key (seed || pub) OR a bare 32-byte seed; @noble signs from the 32-byte
// seed, so we slice the seed out of the 64-byte form.
export function signEd25519(priv: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
const seed = priv.length === 64 ? priv.subarray(0, 32) : priv;
return ed25519.sign(msg, seed);
}
export function verifyEd25519(sig: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array, pub: Uint8Array): boolean {
return ed25519.verify(sig, msg, pub);
}
// --- AEAD (room message content) ---------------------------------------------
// sealAEAD encrypts plaintext with ChaCha20-Poly1305 (IETF, 12-byte nonce). The
// caller supplies the nonce so the operation is testable; in the bus a fresh random
// nonce is generated per message and stored alongside the ciphertext.
export function sealAEAD(key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, plaintext: Uint8Array, aad?: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
return chacha20poly1305(key, nonce, aad).encrypt(plaintext);
}
export function openAEAD(key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, ciphertext: Uint8Array, aad?: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
return chacha20poly1305(key, nonce, aad).decrypt(ciphertext);
}
// randomNonce returns a fresh 12-byte AEAD nonce (ChaCha20-Poly1305 IETF size).
export function randomNonce(): Uint8Array {
return crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
}
// --- anonymous sealed box (room key distribution) ----------------------------
// sealKeyBox seals secret to a recipient's X25519 public key as an anonymous NaCl
// sealed box, matching Go's nacl/box.SealAnonymous: an ephemeral keypair is created,
// the nonce is sha512(ephPub || recipientPub)[:24], and the output is
// ephPub(32) || box(secret). The recipient opens it with openKeyBox; the sender is
// anonymous (no long-term sender key is revealed).
export function sealKeyBox(recipientKexPub: Uint8Array, secret: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
const eph = nacl.box.keyPair();
const nonce = sealedBoxNonce(eph.publicKey, recipientKexPub);
const boxed = nacl.box(secret, nonce, recipientKexPub, eph.secretKey);
return concatBytes(eph.publicKey, boxed);
}
// openKeyBox opens an anonymous sealed box produced by sealKeyBox (or Go's
// SealKeyBox). It re-derives the same sha512-based nonce from the embedded ephemeral
// public key and the recipient's own public key, then opens the box with the
// recipient's private key. Returns null if authentication fails.
export function openKeyBox(
recipientKexPub: Uint8Array,
recipientKexPriv: Uint8Array,
sealed: Uint8Array,
): Uint8Array | null {
if (sealed.length < 32) return null;
const ephPub = sealed.subarray(0, 32);
const boxed = sealed.subarray(32);
const nonce = sealedBoxNonce(ephPub, recipientKexPub);
return nacl.box.open(boxed, nonce, ephPub, recipientKexPriv);
}
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// Tests for the room envelope (the security-critical core of the client): sealing a
// message and opening it back, for the encrypted+signed room and the cleartext room,
// plus the failure paths (bad signature, wrong key) that MUST drop the message.
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { ModeMatrix, ModeNATS } from "./room.js";
import { FrameType } from "./frame.js";
import { sealRoomMessage, openRoomMessage } from "./client.js";
import { endpointID, hexToBytes } from "./crypto.js";
import vectors from "./testdata/vectors.json";
// A deterministic identity from the vectors, so tests do not depend on randomness
// for the keys (the AEAD nonce is still random, which is what we want).
const signPriv = hexToBytes(vectors.sign.sign_priv_hex);
const signPub = hexToBytes(vectors.sign.sign_pub_hex);
const sender = endpointID(signPub);
const roomKey = hexToBytes(vectors.aead.key_hex);
const utf8 = (s: string) => new TextEncoder().encode(s);
const str = (b: Uint8Array) => new TextDecoder().decode(b);
describe("room envelope — encrypted + signed (ModeMatrix)", () => {
function seal(plaintext: string) {
return sealRoomMessage({
type: FrameType.PUB,
subject: "room.parity",
sender,
signPriv,
policy: ModeMatrix,
epoch: 1,
plaintext: utf8(plaintext),
roomKey,
});
}
it("round-trips: seal then open recovers the plaintext", () => {
const f = seal("hello e2e");
expect(f.nonce && f.nonce.length).toBeTruthy();
expect(f.payload && f.payload.length).toBeTruthy();
expect(f.sig && f.sig.length).toBeTruthy();
const opened = openRoomMessage(f, ModeMatrix, signPub, roomKey);
expect(opened).not.toBeNull();
expect(str(opened!)).toBe("hello e2e");
});
it("drops a message with a tampered signature", () => {
const f = seal("trust me");
f.sig![0] ^= 0xff; // corrupt the signature
expect(openRoomMessage(f, ModeMatrix, signPub, roomKey)).toBeNull();
});
it("drops a message opened with the wrong room key", () => {
const f = seal("secret");
const wrongKey = hexToBytes(vectors.keybox.secret_hex); // a different 32-byte key
expect(openRoomMessage(f, ModeMatrix, signPub, wrongKey)).toBeNull();
});
it("ciphertext does not contain the plaintext", () => {
const f = seal("plaintext-marker");
const wire = new TextDecoder("latin1").decode(f.payload!);
expect(wire.includes("plaintext-marker")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("room envelope — cleartext (ModeNATS)", () => {
it("carries the payload as-is and opens without a key", () => {
const f = sealRoomMessage({
type: FrameType.PUB,
subject: "room.clear",
sender,
signPriv,
policy: ModeNATS,
epoch: 0,
plaintext: utf8("in the clear"),
});
expect(f.sig).toBeUndefined();
const opened = openRoomMessage(f, ModeNATS, undefined, undefined);
expect(str(opened!)).toBe("in the clear");
});
});
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// The wire format of the unibus message bus, ported from Go pkg/frame. A Frame is
// the unit transported over NATS: a cleartext envelope plus an optional AEAD
// ciphertext payload, signed end-to-end with Ed25519.
//
// The signature covers the canonical JSON of the frame with the signature field
// cleared, so the marshaler here must reproduce Go's encoding/json BYTE FOR BYTE or
// signatures verified by Go peers would fail. That means: struct field order, the
// `omitempty` rules, base64-standard encoding of []byte fields, and Go's default
// HTML escaping of <, >, & and the U+2028/U+2029 separators inside strings. Parity
// is pinned by testdata/vectors.json (vectors.test.ts).
import {
bytesToBase64,
base64ToBytes,
signEd25519,
verifyEd25519,
endpointID,
} from "./crypto.js";
export enum FrameType {
PUB = 0,
INVITE = 1,
JOIN = 2,
LEAVE = 3,
KICK = 4,
ACK = 5,
REACT = 6,
}
export interface BlobRef {
hash: string; // sha256 hex of the blob ciphertext
nonce: Uint8Array; // AEAD nonce used to encrypt the blob
size: number; // ciphertext size in bytes
}
export interface Frame {
type: FrameType;
subject: string;
sender: string; // endpoint id = endpointID(signPub)
msgID: string; // ULID
epoch: number; // epoch of the room key used to encrypt
threadID?: string; // root message id of the thread (optional)
replyTo?: string; // message id this frame replies to / reacts to (optional)
nonce?: Uint8Array; // AEAD nonce (encrypted rooms only)
payload?: Uint8Array; // AEAD ciphertext (or cleartext if the room is not encrypted)
blob?: BlobRef;
sig?: Uint8Array; // Ed25519 signature over signingBytes()
}
// Go's encoding/json HTML-escapes these code points inside strings by default. We
// replay the exact same set so our canonical bytes match Go's. The two separators
// (U+2028 line separator, U+2029 paragraph separator) are built via fromCharCode so
// this source file holds no invisible characters while the RegExp still matches the
// real code points at runtime.
const GO_ESCAPES: ReadonlyArray<[RegExp, string]> = [
[/</g, "\\u003c"],
[/>/g, "\\u003e"],
[/&/g, "\\u0026"],
[new RegExp(String.fromCharCode(0x2028), "g"), "\\u2028"],
[new RegExp(String.fromCharCode(0x2029), "g"), "\\u2029"],
];
// goJSONStringify serializes obj the way Go's encoding/json does: compact (no
// spaces), insertion-ordered keys, and the default HTML escaping above. Apply only
// to objects built key-by-key in field order, so the output matches Go's struct
// marshaling exactly.
function goJSONStringify(obj: Record<string, unknown>): string {
let s = JSON.stringify(obj);
for (const [re, rep] of GO_ESCAPES) s = s.replace(re, rep);
return s;
}
// frameObject builds the plain object with keys inserted in Go struct-declaration
// order, applying each field's omitempty rule. includeSig controls whether the
// signature field is emitted: false yields the canonical signing-bytes object.
function frameObject(f: Frame, includeSig: boolean): Record<string, unknown> {
const o: Record<string, unknown> = {};
// Always-present fields (no omitempty in Go).
o.t = f.type;
o.s = f.subject;
o.from = f.sender;
o.id = f.msgID;
o.e = f.epoch;
// omitempty fields, in declaration order.
if (f.threadID) o.thr = f.threadID;
if (f.replyTo) o.re = f.replyTo;
if (f.nonce && f.nonce.length) o.n = bytesToBase64(f.nonce);
if (f.payload && f.payload.length) o.p = bytesToBase64(f.payload);
if (f.blob) o.b = { h: f.blob.hash, n: bytesToBase64(f.blob.nonce), sz: f.blob.size };
if (includeSig && f.sig && f.sig.length) o.sig = bytesToBase64(f.sig);
return o;
}
// marshal returns the wire bytes of the frame (UTF-8 of the canonical JSON).
export function marshal(f: Frame): Uint8Array {
return new TextEncoder().encode(goJSONStringify(frameObject(f, true)));
}
// signingBytes returns the canonical bytes that are signed and verified: the frame
// JSON with the signature field cleared.
export function signingBytes(f: Frame): Uint8Array {
return new TextEncoder().encode(goJSONStringify(frameObject(f, false)));
}
// unmarshal parses wire bytes back into a Frame, decoding the base64 []byte fields.
export function unmarshal(b: Uint8Array): Frame {
const o = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(b));
const f: Frame = {
type: o.t ?? 0,
subject: o.s ?? "",
sender: o.from ?? "",
msgID: o.id ?? "",
epoch: o.e ?? 0,
};
if (o.thr) f.threadID = o.thr;
if (o.re) f.replyTo = o.re;
if (o.n) f.nonce = base64ToBytes(o.n);
if (o.p) f.payload = base64ToBytes(o.p);
if (o.b) f.blob = { hash: o.b.h, nonce: base64ToBytes(o.b.n), size: o.b.sz };
if (o.sig) f.sig = base64ToBytes(o.sig);
return f;
}
// signFrame fills f.sig with an Ed25519 signature over signingBytes(f). signPriv is
// the 64-byte (seed||pub) or 32-byte seed private key.
export function signFrame(f: Frame, signPriv: Uint8Array): Frame {
f.sig = signEd25519(signPriv, signingBytes(f));
return f;
}
// verifyFrame checks f.sig against signPub over signingBytes(f).
export function verifyFrame(f: Frame, signPub: Uint8Array): boolean {
if (!f.sig) return false;
return verifyEd25519(f.sig, signingBytes(f), signPub);
}
// senderEndpoint derives the canonical sender endpoint id from a signing public key.
export function senderEndpoint(signPub: Uint8Array): string {
return endpointID(signPub);
}
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// Public API of the browser-native bus SDK. The SPA imports from here; the internal
// module split (crypto / frame / room / busauth / client / wstransport) stays an
// implementation detail. See issue uniweb/0001.
export * from "./crypto.js";
export * from "./frame.js";
export * from "./room.js";
export * from "./busauth.js";
export * from "./client.js";
export { WsNatsTransport } from "./wstransport.js";
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// Live integration smoke against the real unibus cluster. NOT part of the unit
// suite (needs network + a running cluster + TLS bypass), so it self-skips unless
// BUS_HTTP / BUS_WS are set. Run it explicitly:
//
// NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 \
// BUS_HTTP=https://51.91.100.142:8470 BUS_WS=wss://51.91.100.142:8480 \
// pnpm exec vitest run src/bus/integration.test.ts
//
// What it proves WITHOUT a registered user: a fresh random identity is NOT in the
// bus allowlist, so both planes must reject it with an AUTHORIZATION error — not a
// signature/protocol error. That result confirms the SDK speaks both planes
// correctly end-to-end (busauth canonical+signature on HTTP, nkey handshake on the
// data plane); only the allowlist gate stops it. Issue uniweb/0001, Phase 3.
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { readFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
import { ed25519, x25519 } from "@noble/curves/ed25519.js";
import { concatBytes } from "@noble/hashes/utils.js";
import { signedHeaders, freshNonce } from "./busauth.js";
import { hexToBytes } from "./crypto.js";
import { WsNatsTransport } from "./wstransport.js";
import { BusClient, ControlPlane, type Identity } from "./client.js";
import type { Frame } from "./frame.js";
const BUS_HTTP = process.env.BUS_HTTP;
const BUS_WS = process.env.BUS_WS;
const live = !!(BUS_HTTP && BUS_WS);
// An optional REGISTERED identity (its sign_pub added to the bus allowlist out of
// band). When present, the second describe block proves the same SDK that gets
// rejected with a fresh identity is ACCEPTED once the identity is allow-listed —
// closing the loop that the allowlist is the only gate.
const ID_FILE = process.env.BUS_IDENTITY || "/tmp/smoke_identity.json";
function registeredIdentity(): Identity | null {
if (!existsSync(ID_FILE)) return null;
const j = JSON.parse(readFileSync(ID_FILE, "utf8"));
return {
signPub: hexToBytes(j.signPub),
signPriv: hexToBytes(j.signPriv),
kexPub: hexToBytes(j.kexPub),
kexPriv: hexToBytes(j.kexPriv),
};
}
function freshIdentity(): Identity {
const seed = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
const signPub = ed25519.getPublicKey(seed);
const signPriv = concatBytes(seed, signPub); // 64-byte Go layout
const kexPriv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
const kexPub = x25519.getPublicKey(kexPriv);
return { signPub, signPriv, kexPub, kexPriv };
}
describe.skipIf(!live)("live cluster smoke", () => {
const id = freshIdentity();
it("control plane: a signed request is processed (rejected by allowlist, not by signature)", async () => {
const ts = String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
const path = "/rooms/smoke-probe/members";
const headers = signedHeaders(id.signPub, id.signPriv, "GET", path, ts, freshNonce(), new Uint8Array(0));
const resp = await fetch(BUS_HTTP + path, { method: "GET", headers });
const body = await resp.text();
// The server verified our X-Unibus-* signature (busauth canonical + Ed25519 are
// correct) and then rejected us for not being in the allowlist. A 401 whose body
// is an authorization message — NOT "signature"/"canonical" — is the pass.
expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
expect(body.toLowerCase()).toContain("unauthorized");
expect(body.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("signature");
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(`[control-plane] status=${resp.status} body=${body.trim()}`);
});
it("data plane: nats.ws handshake reaches the nkey authenticator (authorization violation)", async () => {
let connected = false;
let errMsg = "";
try {
const t = await WsNatsTransport.connect([BUS_WS!], id);
connected = true;
await t.close();
} catch (e) {
errMsg = String((e as Error).message || e).toLowerCase();
}
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(`[data-plane] connected=${connected} err=${errMsg}`);
// A fresh identity is not allow-listed, so the nkey authenticator must refuse the
// connection. Reaching an "authorization"/"nkey" rejection proves the WS transport
// + nkey signing path work against the real server. (If the user WERE registered,
// connected would be true.)
expect(connected || /authorization|nkey|permission|violation/.test(errMsg)).toBe(true);
});
});
const regId = live ? registeredIdentity() : null;
describe.skipIf(!live || !regId)("live cluster smoke — REGISTERED identity is accepted", () => {
const id = regId!;
it("control plane: a registered identity is authorized (not 401)", async () => {
const ts = String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
const path = "/rooms/smoke-probe/members";
const headers = signedHeaders(id.signPub, id.signPriv, "GET", path, ts, freshNonce(), new Uint8Array(0));
const resp = await fetch(BUS_HTTP + path, { method: "GET", headers });
const body = await resp.text();
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(`[control-plane:registered] status=${resp.status} body=${body.trim()}`);
// The allowlist no longer rejects us: the status is anything but 401 (a missing
// room yields 404/403, an existing one 200). The point is the identity passed.
expect(resp.status).not.toBe(401);
});
it("data plane: a registered identity connects over nats.ws (authenticated)", async () => {
let connected = false;
let errMsg = "";
try {
const t = await WsNatsTransport.connect([BUS_WS!], id);
connected = true;
await t.close();
} catch (e) {
errMsg = String((e as Error).message || e).toLowerCase();
}
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(`[data-plane:registered] connected=${connected} err=${errMsg}`);
// Now the nkey authenticator accepts us: the connection succeeds. This is the
// full proof that the SDK authenticates on the live data plane end-to-end.
expect(connected).toBe(true);
});
});
describe.skipIf(!live || !regId)("live cluster — end-to-end encrypted round-trip", () => {
const id = regId!;
it("creates an encrypted room, publishes, and receives its own decrypted message", async () => {
const control = new ControlPlane(BUS_HTTP!, id);
// Encrypted + signed, but EPHEMERAL (no JetStream persistence) to keep the smoke
// to core NATS pub/sub. A unique subject avoids colliding with prior runs.
const subject = `room.smoke-${id.signPub[0]}-${Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)}`;
const { roomID } = await control.createRoom(subject, { encrypt: true, persist: false, signMsgs: true });
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(`[round-trip] created room ${roomID} subject=${subject}`);
// Connect the data plane AFTER creating the room: the per-subject ACL freezes a
// peer's publishable/subscribable subjects at connect time, so the room's subject
// is in our grant only once we connect post-creation.
const transport = await WsNatsTransport.connect([BUS_WS!], id);
const bus = new BusClient(id, transport, control);
const got = new Promise<string>((resolve) => {
bus.subscribe(roomID, (_f: Frame, plaintext: Uint8Array) => {
resolve(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext));
});
});
// Give the subscription a moment to register on the server before publishing.
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 600));
const message = "hello from the browser SDK, end to end";
await bus.publish(roomID, new TextEncoder().encode(message));
const received = await Promise.race([
got,
new Promise<string>((_r, reject) => setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("timeout waiting for message")), 8000)),
]);
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(`[round-trip] received="${received}"`);
await transport.close();
expect(received).toBe(message);
}, 20000);
});
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// Room policy and metadata, ported from Go pkg/room. The policy decides how a
// message is treated on the wire: encrypted (AEAD with the room key), persisted
// (durable JetStream history), and/or signed (Ed25519 per message).
export interface Policy {
encrypt: boolean; // payload is AEAD-encrypted with the room key K
persist: boolean; // messages are kept in durable history (JetStream)
signMsgs: boolean; // each message carries an Ed25519 signature over its canonical bytes
}
// ModeNATS is a cleartext, ephemeral, unsigned room (the raw NATS behavior).
export const ModeNATS: Policy = { encrypt: false, persist: false, signMsgs: false };
// ModeMatrix is the secure default: end-to-end encrypted, persisted, and signed —
// the Matrix-like room the bus uses for real conversations.
export const ModeMatrix: Policy = { encrypt: true, persist: true, signMsgs: true };
export interface Room {
id: string;
subject: string;
epoch: number;
policy: Policy;
}
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{
"note": "Deterministic cross-language vectors for the unibus protocol. Generated by cmd/busvectors in the unibus repo; regenerate with `go run ./cmd/busvectors`. sealed_hex varies per run (anonymous sealed box); assert via OpenKeyBox.",
"endpoint_id": {
"sign_pub_hex": "03a107bff3ce10be1d70dd18e74bc09967e4d6309ba50d5f1ddc8664125531b8",
"endpoint_id": "Vkdap1RjR0wChd9dvyvKtz2mUTWIOem3dIGy6rEHcIw"
},
"nkey": {
"sign_pub_hex": "03a107bff3ce10be1d70dd18e74bc09967e4d6309ba50d5f1ddc8664125531b8",
"nkey_public": "UAB2CB576PHBBPQ5ODORRZ2LYCMWPZGWGCN2KDK7DXOIMZASKUY3RLKK"
},
"sign": {
"sign_priv_hex": "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f03a107bff3ce10be1d70dd18e74bc09967e4d6309ba50d5f1ddc8664125531b8",
"sign_pub_hex": "03a107bff3ce10be1d70dd18e74bc09967e4d6309ba50d5f1ddc8664125531b8",
"message_hex": "756e696275732070617269747920766563746f72206d657373616765",
"sig_hex": "4cb94c5e3d81ac795e62e089b069c678a3ad3abdf67aed6daf84c023e77378a9c37e2c5b7350d2b129b7985dae132bdfe8b3e2d273d52b522a311131c62ec005"
},
"aead": {
"key_hex": "606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f",
"nonce_hex": "808182838485868788898a8b",
"aad_hex": "756e696275732d726f6f6d2d3432",
"plaintext_hex": "68656c6c6f2066726f6d2074686520627573",
"ciphertext_hex": "31a15f343585bd1831a35a43fdc974e87d5d76957284f13a1ffabdba78fe762ab7e4"
},
"keybox": {
"recipient_kex_pub_hex": "79a631eede1bf9c98f12032cdeadd0e7a079398fc786b88cc846ec89af85a51a",
"recipient_kex_priv_hex": "404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f",
"secret_hex": "a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebf",
"sealed_hex": "70dfe90c477bac85a758c0c420c36d44e84a8e06434e2344e9e5c730a56e71404a592d37d79aa7c7a997c002160bac6a91c96fb0e6898153348eb19a6d9dc53b5677d40b0c0fdfc47c0b00727a61f04f"
},
"frame": {
"type": 0,
"subject": "room.parity",
"sender": "Vkdap1RjR0wChd9dvyvKtz2mUTWIOem3dIGy6rEHcIw",
"msg_id": "01HZY0VECTORFIXEDULID0001",
"epoch": 1,
"nonce_hex": "808182838485868788898a8b",
"payload_hex": "31a15f343585bd1831a35a43fdc974e87d5d76957284f13a1ffabdba78fe762ab7e4",
"wire_b64": "eyJ0IjowLCJzIjoicm9vbS5wYXJpdHkiLCJmcm9tIjoiVmtkYXAxUmpSMHdDaGQ5ZHZ5dkt0ejJtVVRXSU9lbTNkSUd5NnJFSGNJdyIsImlkIjoiMDFIWlkwVkVDVE9SRklYRURVTElEMDAwMSIsImUiOjEsIm4iOiJnSUdDZzRTRmhvZUlpWXFMIiwicCI6Ik1hRmZORFdGdlJneG8xcEQvY2wwNkgxZGRwVnloUEU2SC9xOXVuaitkaXEzNUE9PSIsInNpZyI6IkZOTDFhak0yZFA2c3J5WENyMmoxOVNCVS9rT29MUEpUR2gzNGpuK3pTMVdrV1JPa1ZhTTlXU042WnFrSW1BUjluSGNHYXo4VnJJL3dSMzAyNWFLbkRRPT0ifQ==",
"signing_bytes_b64": "eyJ0IjowLCJzIjoicm9vbS5wYXJpdHkiLCJmcm9tIjoiVmtkYXAxUmpSMHdDaGQ5ZHZ5dkt0ejJtVVRXSU9lbTNkSUd5NnJFSGNJdyIsImlkIjoiMDFIWlkwVkVDVE9SRklYRURVTElEMDAwMSIsImUiOjEsIm4iOiJnSUdDZzRTRmhvZUlpWXFMIiwicCI6Ik1hRmZORFdGdlJneG8xcEQvY2wwNkgxZGRwVnloUEU2SC9xOXVuaitkaXEzNUE9PSJ9",
"sig_hex": "14d2f56a333674feacaf25c2af68f5f52054fe43a82cf2531a1df88e7fb34b55a45913a455a33d59237a66a90898047d9c77066b3f15ac8ff0477d36e5a2a70d"
},
"control_request": {
"method": "POST",
"path": "/rooms",
"ts": "1700000000",
"nonce": "Zm9vYmFyMTIzNDU2Nzg5MA==",
"body_hex": "7b227375626a656374223a22726f6f6d2e706172697479227d",
"canonical_hex": "504f53540a2f726f6f6d730a313730303030303030300a5a6d3976596d46794d54497a4e4455324e7a67354d413d3d0a30393038653333663161366261633463363465313938656530613935623532323866383865393337333366323739663038653830336463353931623137643834",
"sig_hex": "1802bd9d6b05b027ed43f0eecdcc831f257065e6e7306e7f0cf8c5db5b07ac57802f6c1e37d4bbc7cc6452d812be644817b908982ba64a455c5e287c6a4c2c0d",
"sign_priv_hex": "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f03a107bff3ce10be1d70dd18e74bc09967e4d6309ba50d5f1ddc8664125531b8"
}
}
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// Cross-language parity tests: the TypeScript bus SDK must reproduce the Go
// reference implementation byte-for-byte. The golden vectors in testdata/vectors.json
// are generated by unibus `cmd/busvectors`. Any divergence here means a browser
// client and a Go/Kotlin peer would not interoperate (issue 0001, Phase 1).
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import vectors from "./testdata/vectors.json";
import {
hexToBytes,
bytesToHex,
base64ToBytes,
endpointID,
signEd25519,
verifyEd25519,
sealAEAD,
openAEAD,
openKeyBox,
sealKeyBox,
} from "./crypto.js";
import { Frame, FrameType, marshal, signingBytes, signFrame, verifyFrame } from "./frame.js";
describe("endpoint id", () => {
it("matches Go EndpointID = base64url(sha256(signPub))", () => {
const v = vectors.endpoint_id;
expect(endpointID(hexToBytes(v.sign_pub_hex))).toBe(v.endpoint_id);
});
});
describe("Ed25519 signing", () => {
it("produces the same deterministic signature as Go", () => {
const v = vectors.sign;
const sig = signEd25519(hexToBytes(v.sign_priv_hex), hexToBytes(v.message_hex));
expect(bytesToHex(sig)).toBe(v.sig_hex);
});
it("verifies the Go-produced signature", () => {
const v = vectors.sign;
const ok = verifyEd25519(hexToBytes(v.sig_hex), hexToBytes(v.message_hex), hexToBytes(v.sign_pub_hex));
expect(ok).toBe(true);
});
});
describe("ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD", () => {
it("opens the Go-sealed ciphertext", () => {
const v = vectors.aead;
const pt = openAEAD(
hexToBytes(v.key_hex),
hexToBytes(v.nonce_hex),
hexToBytes(v.ciphertext_hex),
hexToBytes(v.aad_hex),
);
expect(bytesToHex(pt)).toBe(v.plaintext_hex);
});
it("seals to the same ciphertext as Go with a fixed nonce", () => {
const v = vectors.aead;
const ct = sealAEAD(
hexToBytes(v.key_hex),
hexToBytes(v.nonce_hex),
hexToBytes(v.plaintext_hex),
hexToBytes(v.aad_hex),
);
expect(bytesToHex(ct)).toBe(v.ciphertext_hex);
});
});
describe("anonymous sealed box (room key distribution)", () => {
it("opens the Go-sealed room key", () => {
const v = vectors.keybox;
const secret = openKeyBox(
hexToBytes(v.recipient_kex_pub_hex),
hexToBytes(v.recipient_kex_priv_hex),
hexToBytes(v.sealed_hex),
);
expect(secret).not.toBeNull();
expect(bytesToHex(secret!)).toBe(v.secret_hex);
});
it("round-trips a TS-sealed box (seal then open)", () => {
const v = vectors.keybox;
const pub = hexToBytes(v.recipient_kex_pub_hex);
const priv = hexToBytes(v.recipient_kex_priv_hex);
const secret = hexToBytes(v.secret_hex);
const sealed = sealKeyBox(pub, secret);
const opened = openKeyBox(pub, priv, sealed);
expect(opened).not.toBeNull();
expect(bytesToHex(opened!)).toBe(v.secret_hex);
});
});
describe("Frame wire format", () => {
function vectorFrame(): Frame {
const v = vectors.frame;
return {
type: v.type as FrameType,
subject: v.subject,
sender: v.sender,
msgID: v.msg_id,
epoch: v.epoch,
nonce: hexToBytes(v.nonce_hex),
payload: hexToBytes(v.payload_hex),
};
}
it("produces the same canonical signing bytes as Go", () => {
const got = signingBytes(vectorFrame());
const want = base64ToBytes(vectors.frame.signing_bytes_b64);
expect(bytesToHex(got)).toBe(bytesToHex(want));
});
it("signs the frame to the same Ed25519 signature as Go", () => {
const f = signFrame(vectorFrame(), hexToBytes(vectors.sign.sign_priv_hex));
expect(bytesToHex(f.sig!)).toBe(vectors.frame.sig_hex);
});
it("marshals the signed frame to the same wire bytes as Go", () => {
const f = signFrame(vectorFrame(), hexToBytes(vectors.sign.sign_priv_hex));
const got = marshal(f);
const want = base64ToBytes(vectors.frame.wire_b64);
expect(bytesToHex(got)).toBe(bytesToHex(want));
});
it("verifies the marshaled frame signature against the signer pubkey", () => {
const f = signFrame(vectorFrame(), hexToBytes(vectors.sign.sign_priv_hex));
expect(verifyFrame(f, hexToBytes(vectors.sign.sign_pub_hex))).toBe(true);
});
});
+46
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
// Concrete NATS-over-WebSocket transport for the browser, built on nats.ws. This is
// the thin glue between the BusClient logic (which is transport-agnostic and unit-
// tested) and a live NATS server reached over ws(s)://. Because it needs a running
// unibus with the WebSocket listener enabled (issue uniweb/0001, Phase 0), it is
// exercised by the end-to-end tests in Phase 3, not by unit tests.
//
// Note: nats.ws 1.30.x is deprecated upstream in favor of @nats-io/nats-core with a
// WebSocket transport; migrating is tracked as Phase 3 follow-up. The connection
// authenticates with the user's NATS nkey (derived from their Ed25519 identity), so
// the private key signs the server nonce in the browser and never leaves it.
import { connect, type NatsConnection, type Authenticator } from "nats.ws";
import type { Identity, NatsTransport, MessageHandler, Subscription } from "./client.js";
import { natsAuthenticator } from "./busauth.js";
export class WsNatsTransport implements NatsTransport {
private constructor(private nc: NatsConnection) {}
// connect opens a WebSocket connection to one of the given ws(s):// servers,
// authenticating with the user's nkey identity.
static async connect(servers: string[], id: Identity): Promise<WsNatsTransport> {
const sign = natsAuthenticator(id.signPub, id.signPriv);
// nats.ws's Authenticator returns the nkey + the base64url signature of the
// server nonce; our natsAuthenticator produces exactly that shape.
const authenticator: Authenticator = (nonce?: string) => sign(nonce ?? "");
const nc = await connect({ servers, authenticator });
return new WsNatsTransport(nc);
}
publish(subject: string, data: Uint8Array): void {
this.nc.publish(subject, data);
}
async subscribe(subject: string, handler: MessageHandler): Promise<Subscription> {
const sub = this.nc.subscribe(subject, {
callback: (err, msg) => {
if (!err) handler(subject, msg.data);
},
});
return { unsubscribe: () => sub.unsubscribe() };
}
async close(): Promise<void> {
await this.nc.close();
}
}
+154
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@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
// The single data layer of the SPA — the browser-native replacement for the old
// `api` module. Where `api` talked to a Go gateway under /api (cookie session, SSE,
// and the private key shipped to the server), this talks DIRECTLY to the bus:
//
// - control plane: signed HTTPS to membershipd (rooms, keys, members), and
// - data plane: nats.ws to NATS,
//
// using the user's wallet identity, which stays in the browser. The private key
// signs and decrypts here and is NEVER sent anywhere (issue uniweb/0001, Phase 2).
//
// The exported `bus` object mirrors the old `api` surface so the page components
// change only their import; streamRoom is replaced by bus.subscribeRoom.
import {
BusClient,
ControlPlane,
WsNatsTransport,
hexToBytes,
endpointID,
type Identity,
type Frame,
ModeMatrix,
} from "./bus/index";
import type { WalletIdentity } from "./wallet/derive";
import type { MeInfo, Message, Room, User } from "./types";
// Bus endpoints. A browser cannot open a raw TCP NATS socket, so the data plane is
// reached over WebSocket; the control plane is the signed HTTPS API. Both default to
// a cluster node and can be overridden at build time (VITE_BUS_HTTP / VITE_BUS_WS).
const BUS_HTTP = import.meta.env.VITE_BUS_HTTP ?? "https://51.91.100.142:8470";
const BUS_WS = import.meta.env.VITE_BUS_WS ?? "wss://51.91.100.142:8480";
export class SessionError extends Error {}
// toIdentity maps the wallet's hex identity to the SDK's byte identity. The private
// halves stay in memory only.
function toIdentity(w: WalletIdentity): Identity {
return {
signPub: hexToBytes(w.signPub),
signPriv: hexToBytes(w.signPriv),
kexPub: hexToBytes(w.kexPub),
kexPriv: hexToBytes(w.kexPriv),
};
}
// A live session: the connected BusClient plus the display identity. Held in a
// module singleton — one active wallet per tab (MVP), like the wallet store.
interface Session {
identity: Identity;
handle: string;
endpoint: string;
control: ControlPlane;
transport: WsNatsTransport;
client: BusClient;
}
let session: Session | null = null;
function require_(): Session {
if (!session) throw new SessionError("no active bus session");
return session;
}
export const bus = {
// openSession connects to the bus AS this wallet user: it builds the signed
// control-plane client and the nats.ws data-plane connection in the browser. The
// private key never leaves — this is the fix for the old gateway model where the
// browser POSTed its private key to /api/session.
async openSession(wallet: WalletIdentity, handle: string): Promise<User> {
const identity = toIdentity(wallet);
const endpoint = endpointID(identity.signPub);
const control = new ControlPlane(BUS_HTTP, identity);
const transport = await WsNatsTransport.connect([BUS_WS], identity);
const client = new BusClient(identity, transport, control);
session = { identity, handle, endpoint, control, transport, client };
return { id: endpoint, handle: handle || endpoint.slice(0, 8) };
},
// me returns the identity of the active session (was GET /api/me).
me(): MeInfo {
const s = require_();
return { endpoint: s.endpoint, sign_pub: "", handle: s.handle };
},
// logout closes the data-plane connection and drops the session.
async logout(): Promise<void> {
if (session) {
await session.transport.close().catch(() => {});
session = null;
}
},
// listRooms lists the rooms this peer belongs to.
async listRooms(): Promise<Room[]> {
const s = require_();
const wire = await s.control.listMemberRooms(s.endpoint);
return wire.map((r) => ({
id: r.id,
name: r.subject,
encrypted: r.policy.encrypt,
lastMessage: "",
lastTs: 0,
unread: 0,
messages: [],
}));
},
// createRoom creates an encrypted, signed room owned by this peer (the Matrix-like
// default). Returns the UI Room.
async createRoom(subject: string): Promise<Room> {
const s = require_();
const { roomID } = await s.control.createRoom(subject, ModeMatrix);
return { id: roomID, name: subject, encrypted: true, lastMessage: "", lastTs: 0, unread: 0, messages: [] };
},
// send publishes a plaintext message to a room; the SDK seals + signs it per the
// room policy before it hits the wire.
async send(roomID: string, body: string): Promise<void> {
const s = require_();
await s.client.publish(roomID, new TextEncoder().encode(body));
},
// subscribeRoom delivers decrypted, verified messages for a room (replaces the old
// SSE streamRoom). Returns an unsubscribe function.
subscribeRoom(roomID: string, onMessage: (m: Message) => void): () => void {
const s = require_();
let unsub: (() => void) | null = null;
let closed = false;
s.client
.subscribe(roomID, (f: Frame, plaintext: Uint8Array) => {
onMessage({
id: f.msgID,
sender: f.sender,
body: new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext),
ts: Date.now(),
mine: f.sender === s.endpoint,
});
})
.then((sub) => {
if (closed) void sub.unsubscribe();
else unsub = () => void sub.unsubscribe();
})
.catch(() => {});
return () => {
closed = true;
if (unsub) unsub();
};
},
};
// hasSession reports whether a bus session is currently open (for the router).
export function hasSession(): boolean {
return session !== null;
}
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
/// <reference types="vite/client" />
// Build-time configuration for the bus endpoints. Both are optional; busService
// falls back to a cluster node when unset.
interface ImportMetaEnv {
readonly VITE_BUS_HTTP?: string;
readonly VITE_BUS_WS?: string;
}
interface ImportMeta {
readonly env: ImportMetaEnv;
}
+13 -18
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@@ -1,22 +1,19 @@
// High-level wallet account operations shared by the join, recover and login
// flows. These compose the low-level primitives (derive / crypto / store) with
// the gateway API so the page components stay thin.
// flows. These compose the low-level primitives (derive / crypto / store) with the
// browser-native bus session so the page components stay thin.
import { api } from "../api";
import type { MeInfo, User } from "../types";
import { bus } from "../busService";
import type { User } from "../types";
import { decryptJSON, encryptJSON } from "./crypto";
import type { WalletIdentity } from "./derive";
import { getIdentity, putIdentity, type StoredIdentity } from "./store";
function toUser(me: MeInfo): User {
return { id: me.endpoint, handle: me.handle || me.endpoint.slice(0, 8) };
}
// saveAndOpen encrypts the identity under `password`, stores it on this device,
// and opens a gateway session as that user. Used by join (new identity) and
// recover (re-derived identity): both end with a locally-encrypted key plus a
// live per-user session. The mnemonic/seed is NOT touched here — only the derived
// keypair is persisted (encrypted).
// saveAndOpen encrypts the identity under `password`, stores it on this device, and
// opens a bus session as that user. Used by join (new identity) and recover
// (re-derived identity): both end with a locally-encrypted key plus a live session.
// The mnemonic/seed is NOT touched here — only the derived keypair is persisted
// (encrypted). The private key is used to open the session IN THE BROWSER and is
// never sent to any server (unlike the old gateway model).
export async function saveAndOpen(
identity: WalletIdentity,
handle: string,
@@ -30,19 +27,17 @@ export async function saveAndOpen(
enc,
createdAt: Date.now(),
});
const me = await api.session(identity, handle);
return toUser(me);
return bus.openSession(identity, handle);
}
// unlockAndOpen reads this device's stored identity, decrypts the private key with
// `password`, and opens a gateway session. Throws WrongPasswordError on a bad
// `password`, and opens a bus session locally. Throws WrongPasswordError on a bad
// password (GCM auth failure) and NoLocalIdentityError if the device has none.
export async function unlockAndOpen(password: string): Promise<User> {
const stored = await getIdentity();
if (!stored) throw new NoLocalIdentityError();
const identity = await decryptJSON<WalletIdentity>(stored.enc, password);
const me = await api.session(identity, stored.handle);
return toUser(me);
return bus.openSession(identity, stored.handle);
}
// localIdentity returns the device's stored identity record (or null), for the
+3 -2
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@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
// IndexedDB persistence of the device-local wallet. Only the encrypted private
// key plus the public halves and the display handle are stored — never the
// password, never the BIP39 seed. The private key never leaves the device except
// over TLS to the gateway to open a session (see api.session).
// password, never the BIP39 seed. The private key NEVER leaves the device at all:
// the bus session is opened in the browser (see busService.openSession), which signs
// and decrypts locally — there is no server to send the key to.
//
// MVP: one active identity per device (keyed by a fixed id). Multi-account on a
// single device is a documented gap.
+2 -1
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@@ -17,5 +17,6 @@
"noUnusedParameters": false,
"noFallthroughCasesInSwitch": true
},
"include": ["src"]
"include": ["src"],
"exclude": ["src/**/*.test.ts"]
}
+5 -5
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@@ -3,12 +3,12 @@ import react from "@vitejs/plugin-react";
export default defineConfig({
plugins: [react()],
// En dev, /api (REST + SSE) se proxea al gateway Go (cmd/webgw, puerto 8481).
// El proxy hace streaming, así que el SSE de /api/rooms/{id}/stream funciona a
// través de él. En producción el gateway sirve el dist embebido y no hay proxy.
// The SPA talks DIRECTLY to the bus (signed HTTPS control plane + nats.ws data
// plane), so there is no gateway and no /api proxy. The dev server runs on 5173 to
// match the bus CORS allowlist (--cors-origins http://localhost:5173). Point the
// SPA at a cluster node with VITE_BUS_HTTP / VITE_BUS_WS (see busService.ts).
server: {
host: true,
port: 5183,
proxy: { "/api": "http://127.0.0.1:8481" },
port: 5173,
},
});